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# THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

resulting from

## THE SINAI CAMPAIGN

October 1956 - March 1957

by Ambassador Abba Eban Washington, June 1957

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## Introduction

When the soldiers of Zahal attacked Sinai, a difficult political front was opened up for Israel, spreading out all over the world, its focal points being Jerusalem, New York and Washington.

Even though these events took place but yesterday, and although the struggle still continues, there is a danger that the experience and the lesson of the campaign become blurred and even distorted. Writers quick off the mark have already managed to flood the world with "historiography" the larger part of which is misleading, wittingly or unwittingly, and in any event as the result of lack of knowledge. Party considerations, too, have brought about the presentation of facts and their results, in an inexact light.

As fate would have it, I ~~stood~~ was in the centre of the political front from its beginning, on the morrow of the penetration into Sinai, to its very end, at the conclusion of the negotiations with the United States as a result of which the decision to withdraw was taken. At a crucial stage of the struggle I sat in Jerusalem at the table of the Government. A number of the Government's fateful decisions flowed directly from the results and conclusions of the negotiations that were conducted in Washington. Therefore I felt an obligation ~~to history~~ to give a detailed account of the events and developments that took place, ~~opposite me. In addition, it is only right that I should explain the conception which prompts me to present this review~~. I am convinced that the Government of Israel was correct in its fateful decisions during the period between October 1956 and March 1957; it was justified in its decision to

shatterthe military power of Nasser; it was correct in its decision ~~of the 8th November~~ to undertake to withdraw from the ~~xxxx~~ conquered areas, with the provisio of "satisfactory arrangements with the UN force"; it was correct in the stubborn stand for three months on the arrangements in the Gulf of Eilat and Gaza that would ensure that there would be no renewal of belligerent actions; and correct in its decision to withdraw at the beginning of March, according to the conditions that prevailed then.

The balance of these decisions is positive in my view, in general, and they add up to an increase in the power, prestige, secruity and internati onal status of the State of Israel.

The entire action that I am about to review took place under the authority of the Foreign Minister and in cooperation with many colleagues. At the same time, I should add that these pages represent my personal opinion only, and no-one else bears any responsibility for them. There is no doubt that this review is lacking in the respect that important events which did not cross the horizon of my direct ~~purview~~ purview and were not engraved deeply in my memory and consciousness, are not included. But they do not purport to be anything but a picture of a political struggle as it reflected itself in the eyes and direct experience of one person who saw events at close hand.

Seven stages can be discerned in the period of twenty weeks that are reviewed:

1. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 29 October - 8 November

The commencement of the Sinai Campaign to the decision to ~~withdraw~~ retire after ten days, during which the military facts were established and the political positions of the various sides became evident, the essentials of which were: the demand of the United Nations for an unconditional withdrawal while an international force entered, and our agreement to retire under "proper arrangements" with the U.N.

2. 9 November - 31 December

Negotiations concerning arrangements with the UN and the withdrawal to El Arish. During this period the political encounter centred in the UN arena, while the US refrained from negotiating with us directly. Our efforts to gain time for the development of a campaign of information while negotiating with Hammarskjold on "proper arrangements", belong to this period.: Our withdrawal 50 kilometers from Suez and our agreement to withdraw to El-Arish.

3. 1 January - 23 January

Completion of the withdrawal except for Gaza and the coast of the Gulf of Eilat and the definition of the demand for guarrantees. A period of three weeks during which the pressure brought to bear upon us to withdraw increased, and the negotiations with Hammarskjold continued without progress being registered. Sinai, except for the coast of the Gulf of Eilat, was evacuated, and we continued to hold Gaza, with the intention of remaining there while making additional attempts to attain guarrantees from the UN. Discussions with Dulles concerning guarrantees commenced. Threats of sanctions were voiced by the US and the UN and support crystallised in Congress and American public opinion.

4. 24 January - 11 February

Crisis in the UN with Hammarskjold for a period of ~~fortnight~~ two and a half weeks between his reports dated 24/1 and 11/2 in which he rejected our demands for guarrantees. The quarrel between us and the UN took shape. We witnessed threats about sanctions but also ~~the penetration of the~~ understanding, into

the press and Congress, that the US Government must enter into direct negotiations with us concerning guarantees.

5. 11 February - 24 February

Discussion and disagreement with the US Government on her proposal of guarantees, a period of a fortnight opened by the State Department memmorandum of 11/2 which developed into a crisis in the discussion of our memmorandum of 15/2 continuing until 24/2, when I returned from discussions with the Government of Israel.

6. 24 February - 28 February

Conclusion of the negotiations with the US Government with the aid of France. Five days of negotiations which ended with mutual undertakings. Our undertaking that was announced in the Assembly on March 1st, concerning the withdrawal from Gaza and Sharem-el-Sheikh, was formulated, on the undertanding that the US, France and other States would publicly and practically support our right to security from Egyptian belligerance from Gaza and from disturbance to Israel shipping, and our right to react with force to Egyptian tampering with these rights.

7. 1 March - 20 March

Discussions with the US on adherence to her undertakings which began as a result of Lodge's announcement in the Assembly on March 1st and brought about a joint announcement of the Foreign Minister and Dulles on March 18th.

CHAPTER 1

## FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SINAI CAMPAIGN TO THE AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW

(29 October - 8 November 1956)

The first information on the penetration of Zahal into Sinai reached the Embassy in Washington on the afternoon of October 29 (evening in Israel), at which time I was at a discussion at the State Department.

At that time I was sitting with R.Shiloach in Rowntree's office - the Assistant Secretary of State - busy discussing the last appeal of President Eisenhower to the Prime Minister in view of the call-up in Israel and the tension around Jordan. I explained - in accordance with the Prime Minister's talk with Ambassador Lawson that day - that all that the Government was doing was to take essential precautionary measures, and that it was united in the view that everything must be done not to be dragged into a war. Suddenly the discussion was interrupted by a note that was given to Rowntree, and Shiloach was called to receive an urgent telephone call from the Embassy; an express telegram had been received from Jerusalem composed of two sentences quoting the announcement of the Zahal spokesman concerning the deep penetration into Sinai.

When Shiloach returned to the room Rowntree terminated the talk, in apparent confusion, saying: "No doubt they have informed you what I have been told. You will agree that our discussion was academic." We left and returned to the Embassy.

## EVENTS THAT PRECEEDED THE CAMPAIGN

One cannot say that the news came like a bolt out of the blue. The skies had been overcast for weeks and the storm of war had been impending, but Jordan rather than Egypt was considered as the source of

of a conflagration that was likely to develop.

From the beginning of October there was evidence of a plan that the Jordan Government would invite Iraq's armed forces to enter her territory to ensure her stability.

The British were behind this plan, the Americans reagrded it as desirable in the beginning and even the French accepted it. Talks on this subject took place between us and American officials in Washington and Jerusalem, as well as with the British and French.

At a certain stage Ambassador Lawson was impressed by a discussion with the Prime Minister, that under certain conditions we would be prepared to reconcile ourselves to the entry of a small Iraqi force into Jordan territory east of the River; but in general it was clear that we rejected the idea as threatening our security, and we pressed the Powers to dissociate themselves therefrom. Our warning was accompanied by a military engagement - the deployment of Zahal on Kalkilyah on October 10th. This campaign served as a warning and a display of strength, but also provided ammunition for the propaganda that presented us as plotting an attack. In any event it was made clear to the West that it was advisable to solicit Israel's opinion before taking any practical steps.

On October 12th the British Embassy officially informed the Foreign Minister of the plan and asked that we accept it in order to prevent the disintegration of Jordan. Our reaction was expressed in the Foreign Minister's letter to Lawson on the same day, maintaining that Israel would regard the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan as a disturbance of the status quo, and as a severe threat to our security. The letter requested that the US intervene to prevent this step.

On October 15th, the day that I left for an ambassadors' consultation called by the Government in Jerusalem, I talked to the Secretary of State, Dulles. He once again explained that the US favoured the plan and was convinced that the conditions that we presented in the talk between the Prime Minister and Lawson for limiting the Iraqi force, and restricting the scope of its activity,

would be maintained in practice. He requested me to deliver a message to the Prime Minister from the President saying that the US is striving for increased friendship with Israel, that the President is aware of the fact that the region is tense and strained and understands that we are sensitive to pressure; nevertheless he hopes that the situation will not worsen, and that nothing will be done to make us appear incorrect in the eyes of the world and place the US in a tight spot. On the other hand, I received the impression that was subsequently verified, that the US would not insist on the plan stubbornly if it was convinced by the force of our opposition.

That day, the 15th of October, the Prime Minister spoke in the Knesset. He hinted at a considerable strengthening of Zahal with Western arms. He described the security situation and its severity. One could have gained the impression that the balance of power had improved, that our independent security had increased and that the danger of war was receding. This speech negated preventative war from the practical and moral point of view, and sang the praises of the states that contributed to our strength with arms, by the exertion of their influence positively, and by economic assistance and financing of various kinds. The prominence of the speech in the world press brought about a considerable decrease of tension, and there was a prevalent impression that Israel was overcoming her primary dangers.

On October 20 the Prime Minister replied to the President's message. He stated that he shared the President's aspiration for friendship between the two nations, and requested him to exert his influence in order to prevent the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan and the endangering of Israel's security.

At the consultations in Jerusalem, Ambassadors Eilat and Avidar participated. A discussion took place on the problem of Iraq-Jordan, shipping in Suez and the Straits of Eilat, relationships with Hammarskjold and the UN machinery in Israel, the situation on the borders and the security policy, and various problems at the forthcoming Assembly. It was less

than a fortnight before the Sinai Campaign, but the idea of an initiated war in the near future almost did not xxx come to mind, although it was clear that our relationships with Nasser were degenerating to a new ~~peak~~ nadir of ~~hatred~~ hostility. The latest development in this direction followed the clash between him and the West on the question of Suez.

The recommendation of the ambassadors was that, if a military confrontation with Nasser was unavoidable, then it was important from the political and historic point of view that the responsibility for the initiative should be placed upon him.

The discussion in the Security Council concerning Suez at the beginning of that month, that concluded with a summary of six xxxxxx principles for the continuation of the negotiations with Egypt, provided an important lesson from our point of view. It became clear that the British and the French gained nothing from their decision not to include us in the discussions, and in retrospect we lost nothing because of the fact that this unfortunate initiative was conducted in all its stages without us being responsible. In the end they certainly learnt that one of the strongest points, if not the strongest, against Egypt was the practical xxxxxx experience of closing the Canal to our ships. Once again they learnt that their salvation lay not in the UN, and when they decided to take the law into their hands, they were able to assume that the experience of the discussion on Suez at the Security Council would stand them in good stead in justifying the need for more effective means of persuasion than those they could achieve at the UN.

Nasser too drew hard conclusions from the discussion at the Security Council. He assumed that he could continue with his actions undisturbed. The termination of the discussions was the signal for Egypt to announce that Israel ships would not be permitted to pass through the Canal, as a state of war

existed between ~~them~~ Egypt and Israel.

On October 18 the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt, Syria and Jordan foregathered in ~~Rebai-Amen~~ Amman and after six days came to an agreement regarding the establishment of a joint command in the event of a conflagration with Israel. It was decided that an Egyptian would be at the head of the command.

On October 21 elections took place to the Jordanian Parliament and the anti-western forces and those propagating an extreme policy against Israel were victorious. The concentration of Iraqi forces on the Jordanian border continued and tension mounted.

On October 28 the Government announced an increased call-up of the Zahal reserves.

On October 27 President Eisenhower replied to the Prime Minister's letter of October 20 on the matter of Iraq and expressed ~~unconcealed~~ open concern ~~nervousness~~ because of the dimensions of the call-up here. The President disagreed on the significance which we attached to the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan, but assumed, in any event, that non-entry served as a contribution to peace in the region. He expressed concern at the wide call-up in Israel that was increasing the tension and pointed out:

**"These are days of great strain. Only statesmanship of a high order and self-restraint by all parties can assure that the tensions in the Middle East can be controlled and prevented from becoming a cause for a breach of the peace in that area and in others affected by the ramifications of those tensions. I remain confident that only a peaceful and moderate approach will genuinely improve the situation and I renew the plea which was communicated to you through Secretary Dulles that there be no forcible initiative on the part of your Government which would endanger the peace and the growing friendship between our two countries."**

I was invited to Dulles the following evening. I found

him in the company of his senior officials surrounded by maps of Egypt, Israel and Jordan. He handed me an additional message to the Prime Minister which stated that in the light of new reports on the intensification of the call-up and the great tension, the President finds it necessary to address the following words to the Prime Minister:

**"Because of the wide repercussions which might result in the present high state of tension in the Middle East and because of the intentions which the United States expressed in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, I have given instructions that this situation be discussed with the United Kingdom and France, which are parties to the Declaration, requesting them to exert all possible efforts to ameliorate the situation.**

**"I have also directed that my concern be communicated to other Middle Eastern countries, urgently requesting that they refrain from any action which could lead to hostilities.**

**"Again, Mr. Prime Minister, I feel compelled to emphasise the dangers inherent in the present situation and to urge your Government to do nothing which would endanger the peace."**

Dulles did not accept our version that Israel was defending herself from impending danger. In his opinion, it was a long time since Israel could regard herself as strong as she was at that time; Egypt was afraid of an attack by Britain and France, Jordan was growing weaker and the Iraqis were not entering her. On the other hand he maintained that if Israel harboured aggressive intentions, then he tended to think that the present time might appear to her to be right and convenient to put them into operation. I concluded the discussion by saying that I did not possess the required information, but when I received it I should be pleased to convey it to him. At the same time I expressed deep regret that the US Government did not evince a greater measure of faith in Israel's intentions.

On October 20 the Prime Minister's reply to the President's two letters that had been presented to him by Lawson was sent.

The danger of Jordan was hardly mentioned, and instead of that the letter concentrates on a description of the Egyptian threat, points out the expansionist aspirations of Nasser, the cooperation between him and the USSR, and his efforts to tighten the noose round Israel's neck. The letter also mentions the discussions on Suez at the Security Council that had increased Nasser's audacity and his provocation of Israel, ending as follows:

**"The growing danger to the area in general and to Israel in particular as a result of Nasser's maneouvers has in the past few weeks been referred to by heads of various Western Governments and is, I believe, widely recognised today by world opinion generally. With Iraqi troops poised in great numbers on the Iraqui-Jordan frontier, the creation of a joint command of Egypt, Syria and Jordan with a decisive increase of Egyptian influence in Jordan and with the renewal of incursions into Israel territory by Egyptian murder gangs, my Government would be failing its essential duty if it did not take all necessary measures to ensure that the declared Arab aim of eliminating Israel by force should not come about. My Government has appealed to the people of Israel to combine alertness with calm. I feel confident that with your vast military experience you will appreciate fully the crucial danger in which we find ourselves."**

In the State Department a more calming impression had been received from Lawson's meeting with the Prime Minister on the evening of October 28. The report that was read to the Embassy a few days later, conveyed in the Prime Minister's name, that Israel was taking precautionary measures only, and that the Prime Minister would share the President's satisfaction if everything remained quiet and calm. To Lawson's remark that the President was not so concerned about defensive activities as he was because there were plans for activities that were not necessarily defensive, the Prime Minister replied, according to Lawson's version, that if the US will just persuade the Arabs to behave moderately, then she

has nothing to fear. He hopes that the US will succeed, but does not place great faith in that.

In the meantime the news about a state of emergency in Israel poured in, the organisation of air-raid protection for civilians, the organisation of food stores, etc. The American Embassy in Tel Aviv again called upon ~~xxxxx~~ American citizens to leave the country. President Eisenhower, who was immersed in the election campaign, was in constant contact with the State Department.

On the morning of the 29th I cabled to the Foreign Minister requesting that a messenger be sent to inform us what was happening. I maintained that we must begin to organise a campaign of sympathy and understanding for us, especially if a conflagration should take place. I stressed that it was important and vital that we know all the facts.

The only instruction that we received 48 hours after the start of the campaign was a collection of wires on the border incidents and announcements that were published in Israel by Foreign Office and Zahal (Army) spokesmen.
The Office added a short instruction on the 29th to describe the action as the taking of precautionary defensive ~~xxx~~ measures and to stress that it was not connected with the quarrel of the Powers with Egypt concerning Suez or a wider objective.

## WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 29

When Shilbach and I returned from that discussion with Rowntree on October 29 we were ready to plan activity. Even though we had received no instruction, our feeling was that a serious campaign had started. The thought of a clash with Egypt was not foreign to us. A year previously, at the beginning of October 1955, a few months after the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, I indicated the possibility that a military action against Egypt would be unavoidable if no other way to balance the security position ~~xxx~~ be found.

The leaders of the Western powers were no less shaken by this last development than we were. Dulles describes the event as the most serious one since the Second World War, as subverting the spirit of Geneva and opening a new front of Soviet aggression and penetration to Africa and the Middle East.
In the US the dizziness of the Geneva spirit, the economic affluence, the general reduction of tension in the country, the President's illness and the approaching elections were bringing about a spirit of do-nothing. There

was no readiness for daring thoughts or decisions, and in the absence of the President there were no arrangements for important decisions.

But one must point out:

a) The Secretary himself had lost faith in (Eastern) experts, and evaluated the situation most seriously.

b) The government went a long way in its undertakings to us, both in relation to safeguarding the balance of military power in the region and in relation to its concern for our security.

No-one can guarantee successes, but it appears to us that until the Spring of 1956 is an opportune time for an effort which has chances in the US of bringing about a more positive approach to the correction of the balance of power.

The first front that we opened was the Press. We were flooded with questions, and information and explanations were demanded of us. [illegible]

We focussed on the Sunday papers whose comment was likely to strongly influence the first impression received by public opinion. We utilised the information we had and we made an announcement detailing the chain of activities of the fedayin recently and our complaints against Egyptian belligerence. We endevoured to explain the motivations of the action, but we could give very few details of its objective and aim.

The contact between us and the State Department actually ceased. (On October 30, when Y.Meroz approached Bergoss on a certain matter, he was told that the only matter under discussion with us was the evacuation of American citizens from Israel).

The information about the campaign reached the President's ears when he was in a plane on the way to Miami for an election tour in the South. In his speech at the airport he promiced to utilise all the weight of the US to prevent a clash between Israel and the Arab States. He promised that the US would not do anything just in order to gain applause. When the news of the first entry into Sinai arrived, he terminated the election tour and hurried back to the Capital.

That afternoon, Dulles invited Senators from among the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee for a discussion on the situation. In the evening, he discussed the application of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 with the British and French ambassadors. [illegible].

That evening the President summoned Dulles, Radford - the Chief of Staffs, Wilson - the Secretary of Defence, Hoover and Allen Dulles as well as the White House and Pentagon officials. The President described his bitter disappointment with the State of Israel. Until that time, he had been convinced of the candour of the Prime Minister's words in regard to his opposition in principle to initiated warfare. Now his faith was destroyed.

In these discussions, the President's declaration of April 9 concerning the US's support for any State attacked, was mentioned. This declaration, which was formulated in the National Security Council, was then intended to protect Israel and to calm her fears in the face of the Arab arming. Now

there were some who considered whether it ought not to be turned against Israel.

There was almost unqualified certainty that we had chosen this time especially because the President's and the Government's hands were tied - on the eve of elections.

It was immediately apparent that the attitude that the US Government would adopt would automatically become the subject of public discussion, especially against the background of the election campaign. Hence the appearance of the President on a television programme to the nation was planned in order to explain the stand that ould be taken in relation to Israel. As a result of the consultation in the White House that evening, the following announcement was made in the President's name:

"The President recalled that the United States under this and prior Administrations has pledged itself to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East. We shall honor our pledge.

"The United States has been in consultation with the British and French Governments, parties with us to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and the United States plans as contemplated by that declaration that the situation shall be taken to the United Nations Security Council tomorrow morning.

"The question of whether and when the President will call a special session of the Congress will be decided in the light of the unfolding situation."

I spoke to the French ambassador, Mr. Alphand, that evening in order to exchange opinions on the events. It is interesting that he too was not aware then, of what was about to transpire in the Security Council within a day - that France was also involved.

The first impression to take hold in American public opinion was that Israel had initiated a war that was likely to spread. The terror of war gripped the country, even influencing the Stock Exchange. The version that this was only a limited defensive action - "Something more than a retaliatory action and less than war" - only arrived after many hours, and in the meantime a deep anger with Israel for playing with fire pervaded public opinion.

That night the "Washington Post" wrote:

"No amount of provocation can justify Israeli aggression against Egypt. In either case it involved the most frightful risk of larger war, and it may well lose for Israel the sympathy of the free world".

This opinion was typical of most of the newspapers. Although they showed understanding for the reasons for the action, they censured it in itself and called for sharp intervention to halt it.

The main fear of our friends was that the matter become complicated, that the crisis continue until the Government be forced to adopt an active anti-Israel line; hence they advised and urged that we end the campaign and the crisis quickly. Two facts contributed to the public atmosphere: our action had come suddenly and without any political preparation, and the absence of a reason, a "casus belli", that could justify our action as a purely defensive one.

THE DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL .2

The Security Council assembled on 30/~~10~~ October at 11 a.m. under the chairmanship of the French delegate Carno Jeantille (?) to deal, according to the US proposal, with "steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt". The Council immediately confirmed the subject for the agenda and invited the Egyptian and Israel delegations to join the ~~xxx~~ table. The US delegate Lodge expressed the consternation of his Government at the Israel action, which had taken place within 24 hours of the President's second personal appeal to the Prime Minister. He demanded that the Council take immediate steps to return Israel to beyond the armistice lines, and that all the members of the UN refrain from giving any assistance ~~that is~~ likely to prolong the hostilities.

The Secretary General gave information that he had ~~been~~ received from Burns. The representatives of Yugoslavia, Persia, the USSR, Australia, China, Cuba, Peru and Egypt also spoke. The Russian, Sobolov, quoted information from London concerning the intention of ~~England~~ Britain and France to intervene in Egypt, and in the hall there was a feeling that there was some truth in this, for this time it was not merely a matter concerning Israel and Egypt and there existed a tension that warned of surprises. The French and ~~English~~ British silence drew guesses and the tension increased when Sir Pearson ~~Dickson~~ Dixon announced that he was waiting to receive an important announcement that had just been published by the British Prime Minister, and that immediately upon its receipt he would bring it to the Council.

The French delegate knew more at this stage than the

British delegate. He whispered to me during the meeting: "Don't worry - there will be a veto". That was the first hint that I had that we were not carrying on a lone campaign.

The last instructions that I had were that if I was asked at the Security Council, the only thing that I was to say was that our forces had entered Sinai in order to destroy the fedayin nests and I was to endevour to postpone the continuation of the discussion until further information was received.

I made a brief announcement, reviewing the most recent fedayin activities, I mentioned the conference of Chiefs of Staff in Amman, and announced that the activities of Zahal were intended to eliminate the fedayin bases in Sinai. I promised to give a fuller announcement in a number of hours.

The meeting was postponed to 4 p.m.. The British delegate read Eden's announcement on the Anglo-French ultimatum and added words of justification that were intended to prepare the ground for a police action to restrain the two opponents, The Frenchman spoke in similar vein.

This manifestation of Anglo French participation in the Israel action added fuel to the fire that flamed in Lodge's speech. His demand to confirm the American proposal before dangerous complications set in became more urgent. The American proposal demanded that Israel forces withdraw immediately to beyond the armistice line, that all UN members refrain from the use of force or the threat of force in any way that negated the aims of the UN, and that they aid the UN in ensuring the integrity of the armistice agreements and accordingly refrain from giving any military, economic or financial aid to Israel until she obeyed the decision.

Lodge objected to the French attempt to postpone the discussion, and was supported by the Russian and Yugoslavian delegates. The former demanded the vehement censure of Israel belligerence but agreed to a milder formulation provided that it was confirmed immediately.

Here an open clash developed between two camps; the one containing Israel, France and Britain, and to a lesser extent also Australia and Belgium, trying to gain time and delay the

Council's action. The second one contained the Americans, Russians and all the others who wanted an immediate ~~xxxxxxx~~ confirmation of a sharp decision.

In the meantime, I managed to prepare for a more comprehensive speech. I gave detailed illustrations of the matter of fedayin activities and the plot to exterminate Israel, which was their objective, the helplessness of the UN to prevent the Egyptian belligerence and the "paradox of unilateral belligerency".

I explained the action as having anticipated an Egyptian attack being planned against us, and maintained that if there was room for talk of bellicosity, then it was Egyptian bellicosity, as Israel's action was merely self-defence. Basing it on a cable that I had received from the Director General of the Foreign Ministry while I sat at the Council table I said that we had no intention of conquering new areas, but merely of destroying the nests of murderers. I ended with our aspiration for peace through negotiation and agreement according to the principles and spirit of the UN.

The Egyptian delegate pointed out that the Anglo-French ultimatum would end the following morning at 6.30 Cairo time, and therefore requested that the Council reconvene for an evening session. Lodge again urged immediate action and added a paragraph to the proposal calling for an immediate cease-fire. He conveyed that Eisenhower had appealed to the British and French Heads of State and requested that the UN be allowed to fulfil its function.

The clash with time worsened. The Australian and Belguim asked for time to receive instructions. The British delegate maintained that his Government's plan of action was dictated by the situation, in order to save the Suez Canal. The Frenchman made a long speech that revealed complete identification with us, being entirely sympathetic. He also explained the overall danger of Nasser and his systematic clash with French interests in North Africa.

When the American proposal was eventually put to the vote, ~~England~~ Britain and France vetoed it, Australia and Belgium ab-

stained - the resolution was defeated.

It appeared that no decision could be expected from the Council, because a continuation of the discussion would have a propaganda and not practical character. A breach had been revealed between the US and its traditional allies.

Immediately after the vote Sobiev proposed a resolution forcing all sides to cease fire immediately. The majority was for postponing the discussion on the resolution for an hour and a quarter. The USSR opposed, the US and Yugoslavia abstained.

When the Council reconvened in the evening the Russian proposal ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ received 7 votes, Belgium and Australia abstained and England and France voted against, and the proposal was defeated. Additional efforts to pass the resolution in changed version were also defeated by Britain and France. ~~XXX~~ When Lodge realised that collaboration with the USSR against ~~England~~ Britain and France made no practical difference, he found an excuse to abstain.

The severe exchange of views continued. The object of the criticism headed by the Russians was to make things difficult for the French and British by casting heavy responsibility on them. Lodge expressed the personal anger and disappointment of Eisenhower and himself. He said that the President hoped that the UN ~~will~~ would be given the opportunity to solve the problem peacably and had sent despatches to the Heads of State of Britain and France. "I", added Lodge, "as his representative, labored all the time with all my strength and devotion, to give effect to his view. Let it be noted that this is our stand."

In this manner the American stand, laden with anger and disappointment, was crystallised and expressed in the throes of storm and tension, a stand whose deep impression was to be recognised in coming months. And we, who entered that morning as an isolated accused, proud and certain of our justness, but nevertheless alone before ~~11~~ eleven judges, emerged encouraged and

more certain of ourselves, hand in hand with two of our judges, with a British and French veto protecting us from both sides.

The Anglo-French veto shook public opinion. On the one hand they and Israel were accused of having conspired together, and on the other, the US began to examine themselves to see whether they were not guilty of the disappointment that overtook their allies. There was a certain alleviation from isolationx , and the press aimed ~~their~~ the sharpest barbs against Britain and France instead of against Israel.

The Council again convened on the morrow, October 31 at 3 p.m. Information was received that the Government of Israel had accepted the Anglo-French ultimatum, whereas Egypt had rejected it, and that ~~English~~ British and French planes were bombing Egypt preparatory to landing troops. In the discussion that developed the British spokesman denied that Britain and France had acted in collaboration with Israel. He announced that his Government ~~dede~~ did not support Israel's intention to conquer Egyptian territory. In ~~her~~ its opinion, Israel would have to withdraw her forces immediately satisfactory arrangements facilitating this were made. Britain had no doubt that in crossing the Egyptian border Israel had broken the armistice agreement.

When the Council reached a complete standstill, ~~then~~ the Yugoslavian delegate officially proposed that an Emergency Session of the Assembly be called. After the discussion, the proposal was accepted by 7 votes. Britain and France voted against, but on this occasion they could not eliminate the proposal, which was of a procedural nature.

The Emergency Session convened on the morrow, on November 1st, at 5.30p.m.

At the meeting of October 31, a force emerged that was to be an impediment to us. Hammarskjold read a personal announcement to the Council that signified a threat to resign as a protest against Britain's and France's abrogation of their obligations to the UN. He delivered a lecture on his philosophy of the UN and its Secretary General, saying:

"The principles of the Charter are immeasurably more important than the organisation that embodies them, and the objectives that these principles were intended to ensure are more sacred than the policy of any State or people. In order to safeguard his efficiency as the servant of the organisation, the Secretary General must refrain from adopting a public stand in relation to differences between member States, unless the adoption of such a stand is likely to assist in solving the problem - and even here he dare not be carried away to a policy of expediency. The Secretary General cannot fulfil his function unless all the members of the UN fulfil their obligations to respect all the sections of the Charter. Hence, if there are States that consider that the interests of the organisation necessitate a different conception of the Secretary's functions, they were entitled to behave in accordance with their opinions." These words won general agreement. They bore witness to an approach that was to shape considerably the process of dealing with our matter at the UN.

One must understand that against the background of the paralysis of the Security Council and the disintegrated balance of powers in the UN there remained a void of authority and political initiative. A desire for an international "hero" was aroused, and Hammarskjold was not afraid of wearing this mantle on the UN platform and behind the scenes.

He appeared as the embodiment of the sublime values of the UN, almost a sort of holy martyr. Personal expressions of faith and esteem became an altar that almost all the delegates saw themselves obliged to serve. Among many, this expressed a desperate clinging to the UN as the last hope for peace. Others, like Britain and France, did so unwillingly, but nevertheless could not refrain from saying "amen".

## The Military Victory .1

On the morning of November 1st, the Foreign Minister and Shimon Peres phoned me from Tel Aviv and informed me of the splendid success of the military campaign. Our forces had reached within ten miles of the Canal, the greater portion of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip were in our hands. The crew of an Egyptian frigate that attempted to shell Haifa was captured together with its ship. The Egyptian army in Sinai had collapsed and broken down completely. Thousands of prisoners were taken and tremendous quantities of ammunition and equipment were captured.

We immediately released an announcement to the Press.

Encouraged by this message I went to speak to Dulles.

## A Talk with Dulles that turned from a warning of sanctions to a denunciation of Nasser. .5

The previous day already, when I was in New York, I received an invitation to come to a meeting with Dulles in Washington "on matters of economic significance" that evening. The invitation came from Dulles' room. It stated that, on that evening, there would take place a meeting of the National Security Council where they would be dealing with various aspects of US policy towards Israel, including economic aspects. If I was in a position to outline and explain the intentions of the Government of Israel, then the Secretary would be happy to receive me before the meeting of the Council. There were grounds for the belief that this was an additional effort to bring pressure upon us to ensure a satisfactory answer to the President's letter to the Prime Minister. As my plane was late the meeting was postponed to the following day. I anticipated that Dulles would threaten us with economic pressure. We had already seen signs of this in the State Department. Although they did not announce the elimination of the economic activities, in effect all were frozen. The departure of the Import-Export Bank's delegation was held up, all the negotiations on the utilisation of the balance of the grant and food were halted, and so was the technical aid in Israel.

We talked to Dulles for half an hour. Wilkins and Shiloach participated. Dulles stated that the US was in the course of examining its assistance programmes, but he first wished to hear something about our intentions. Did we intend to remain in Sinai or to return after we had accomplished what we had set out to do?

The message that had arrived that morning about the military success changed my approach to the talk. We decided not to justify ourselves but to attack. I stated that, with all the importance of the American assistance projects that we very much appreciate, I had much more fundamental thoughts and I invited him to think about them too.

The military power of Nasser had collapsed, and his prestige was on the wane. It was possible to destroy him and thereby to strike a heavy blow at Soviet influence in the Middle East, parallel to Soviet dilemna in Europe. In this revolutionery situation a focal hour was created. The objective must be not a return to an explosive situation, but a thrust towards peace. The State of Israel had a deep desire to renew the atmosphere of understanding with the US. I was convinced that had a regime such a Nasser's become established in the Western hemisphere, under the influence of the USSR, the US would have intervened, even had far-flung States expresses misunderstanding and dissociation. In any event we had reached far-reaching new horizons, and perhaps history had provided Eisenhower with a crucial task; his words on friendship with us the previous day had touched us deeply. I ended by proposing that he (Dulles) digest well what I had said, and that he should think in terms of a permanent solution. I explained that we did not propose an unconditional return to the status quo but limitation and complete mutuality regarding what we and Egypt would do. I recounted the obligations that were placed upon Egypt as a condition to our withdrawal according to the Prime Minister's despatch. Dulles inquired about the abolition of the blockade in the Bay of Eilat parallel to the replacement of the border and asked a number of questions on the subject. At the

outset of the discussion he was angry and tense, but in the course of the talk he calmed down. The matter of economic assistance was abandoned and not mentioned again. He said that the problem was complex. Assuming that I was correct and that the situation in the Middle East would improve as the result of our action -, this was, however, not merely a regional question but one of the UN regime in the world, and what would be its fate and future. When we rose to go he burst into laughter and said: "You will admit that I was right when I said that the Egyptians are useless from the military point of view, and that you have nothing to fear from them even after they received the Soviet arms".

That evening we flew to New York - Dulles and I separately. I again met him at the opening of the Assembly. He said that he had thought a lot about what I had told him and that perhaps I would discern the results of the thinking both in his speech and in the wording of the resolution. Subsequently we learnt that as a result of our talk he changed both his speech and the resolution that he proposed.

In the wording of the resolution he added a paragraph concerning freedom of passage and against attacks, and in his speech he included a section on a non-return to the status quo.

## The Discussion at the Emergency Assembly on December 1st and 2nd.

As the Emergency Session of the Assembly drew nearer we asked the Foreign Ministry whether we were to participate in it at all.

The meeting was opened at 5 p.m. The hall was tense in expepctation of the discussion on "the problem which was discussed at the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings which were held on October 30." The British and French endevoured to question the legality of the session as the Security Council had not

proposed any resolution or recommended resolution. The opposition was rejected. ~~England~~ Britain and France voted against. We and 6 others abstained.

The discussion was conducted in an atmosphere of indescribable tenseness. The hall was completely full. The audience that followed the discussion on television is estimated at 60 million people. Since the Korean War, there had not ~~reigned~~ been such ~~tenseness~~ excitement in the UN buildings.

All the first speakers demanded a cease fire, the Arabs demanding severe condemnation and sanctions. Dulles put forward the American proposal. He opened on a personal vein saying that he doubted whether anyone had ever spoken from that platform with such a "heavy heart". The US found ~~herself~~ itself differing from three States "with whom ~~she~~ it has deep ties of friendship, respect and esteem, and two of whom are ~~her~~ its most veteran and faithful allies". He admitted that there had been provocation and a certain measure of negligence ~~xxxxxx~~ in dealing with M.E. problems on the part of the US, but that all this did not justify the need for force. He maintained that even Israel, ~~who~~ which had a justifiable claim, as Egypt had never complied with the Security Council decision of 1951 to recognise Israel's right to use the Canal, would have had better chances of securing ~~her~~ its desires by peaceful methods. The attack on Egypt he described as a "serious error", but claimed that the mistake could be undone by accepting the moral discipline of the UN. Here he proposed a resolution which stated:

29-30

"The General Assembly,

Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1948 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel,

Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interuppted to the serious prejudice of many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these developments

1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. Urges the parties to armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3. Recommends that all Member States regrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore freedom of navigation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropirate in accordance with the Charter;

6. Decides to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present solution."

Dulles stated ~~stated~~ he hoped that as a result of the tragedy a better situation would emerge than brought it about, for something better than the armistice agreements were required, but that the first condition was that the conflagration be extinguished before it spread.

My turn to speak came with the opening of the evening session, at midnight. Because of the feverish pace of developments I was forced to speak without proper preparation having a few notes, dates and/scattered quotations that I had prepared during the discussion. I concentrated on the effort to inculcate into the Assembly, the millions of viewers on television, listeners on the radiom and readers of the following morning, the correct appreciation of our problems and methods.

I described how Egypt had robbed us of that feeling of security that is the right of every nation. By so doing she had violated all the obligations imposed upon ~~her~~ it as a member of the UN in relation to another member of the same organisation. If these basic obligations had been maintained then what happened would not have occured. The key to understanding the explosion is the protracted Egyptian belligerency. Other peoples are not capable of grasping in concrete form what Egypt did to us. And the UN did nothing to prevent ~~her~~ it from so doing.

We bore this suffering, gritting our teeth until it appeared to us that we were likely to lose everything. Egyptian belligerency expressed itself in clashes on land, in the blockade of Suez and Akaba, with the legalistic claim to the right of belligerency and festive declarations that Egypt's aim is the destruction of Israel.

Egyptian belligerency reached a peak with the organisation of fedayin incursions in various quarters at the demonstrated initiative of Egypt's Government, with the signing of military pacts and amassing arms from known sources.

The Government of Israel is a responsible democratic Government, alive to the judgement of public opinion, but it was just ~~her~~ its responsibility to ~~its~~ its people that forced ~~it~~ it to adopt a step of self-protection. ~~She~~ It is convinced that ~~she~~ it

took a decision that any other Government would have taken in similar circumstances, except that others would certainly have ~~xxxxx~~done so with greater power.

Israel acted on the basis of mutuality. The border between Egypt and Israel cannot be open only in one direction.

The world must choose between the calm and laboring citizens of Israel and the fedayin; above all, there stands the choice between Israel and Nasser. Nasserism is spreading its tentacles over Africa and Asia. Its aspiration is to oppress peace and progress and impose its regime on other nations. After he had degraded and deprived the world at Suez, he turned his brutal force against Israel.

There is hostility in the M.E., but we are not its instigators but its victims. There is no room for conciliating the rampant tyranny. Israel, at any rate, would oppose it. Israel and the Arabs stood at the cross-roads. Belligerent dictatorship had for the first time met with successful opposition. The hopes of freedom were ~~more successful~~ brighter in the M.E. ~~to a greater extent~~ than ~~xxx~~ previously, not only for Israel, but for other nations too, the victims of Nasser, who aspires to depress and enslave them. If the power of tyranny ~~will~~ is not ~~be~~ renewed, the peoples of the region will enjoy peace and ~~also~~ the rights of European and Asian peoples whose welfare is dependent on the M.E. will also be honoured.

It would have been better to have attained this in a less serious manner without victims and dangers, but after we had reached it it was preferable to progress further, and not retrogress - one must not return to the régime of the armistice.

Israel intends to rob Egypt of nothing, but the return of Egypt's rights must be accompanied by its undertaking ~~by her~~ to respect the rights of Israel in an equal measure, and to abstain from hostility in all its manifestations.

The vision of the future for Israel and Egypt must be peace and not the return to the situation that ~~appertained~~ obtained before October 29. Our signpost points not backward to belligerency - but forward to peace.

In the coming days it transpired that this speech,

heard and seen by ~~tens of~~ millions ~~enjoyed~~ had a tremendous ~~reverbe-~~ echo ~~ration~~, and its impression on the continuation of the discussion and on the Press was considerable. Radio stations broadcast it again and various papers reprinted it, and recorded versions ~~of it~~ were sold ~~to~~ by the thousands. There is no doubt that because of the special circumstances of that evening, our arguments against the Arabs' hostility reached the ears of masses of people who were generally passive to and ~~for~~ remote from our interests. Thousands of telegrams and letters from viewers and listeners (from 38 of the 48/50 States) ~~flowed~~ poured into our offices and many telephoned to express their sympathetic and emotional reaction. We saw to it that the speech was read by the President, who had apparently heard about it from various sources. A friend of ours gave it to one of the people who was a frequent visitor to the President ~~who~~ and he placed it before the President, and told us subsequently that he read and was impressed by it.

Towards morning the American proposal was passed. Pearson spoke on behalf of Canada, ~~who~~ which had abstained from voting. He proposed that the Assembly ~~must~~ utilise the cease fire for a political solution to the problem of Palestine and the Suez Canal, and ~~threw~~ injected an idea into the Assembly that was to play a determining role in the subsequent dealings with the problem - that the UN should set up an international force to ensure quiet on the borders. Dulles stated ~~xxxx~~ subsequently that he agreed with Pearson's suggestion and that the US would like to see it formulated~~x. [illegible]~~.

As the appeal was adressed to "all the sides" we considered that we could claim that implementation implied negotiations between us and the representatives of Egypt, France and Britain.

According to procedural practice, the Secretary General forwarded the Assembly resolution of 2/~~11~~ November to the Foreign Minister, accompanied by a request that he be informed of its implementation.

A cease fire, as demanded by the Assembly, would have prevented us from ~~completing~~ finishing the conquest of Sinai - a task that was almost complete. Apart from Sharem-el-Sheich, on ~~xxx~~ 3/~~11~~ November the whole of the peninsula was in our ~~x~~hands. On the other

hand, the Anglo-French landing had not yet begun.

Britain
~~England~~ and France rejected the demand for a cease-fire and we did too, while attempting to inculcate our demand for peace.

Our reply was handed to the Secretary General in a memmorandum of November 3, saying:

a) Israel agrees to a cease-fire on the assumption that a similar undertaking has been given by Egypt.

b) Egypt had claimed for years that a state of war exists between her and Israel, thereby distorting the armistice agreements, exploiting them to cover hostile acts, thus turning them into useless things. A return to the armistice agreements will be nothing but a return to a regime which served as a cover for plots whose objectives was the destruction of Israel.

c) As Egypt destroyed the armistice agreements, Israel considers that the second paragraph in the Assembly resolution (which calls for withdrawal to behind the armistice lines and punctilious maintainance of the agreement)is not in keeping with the basic aim of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. Therefore Israel considers that the only solution is the signing of a peace settlement by direct negotiations. Israel will welcome such negotiations with Egypt and Arab states and calls upon the UN to support this objective.

We continued to seek ways of directly and indirectly influencing the President's and his associates' tend of thought.

It soon transpired that Eisenhower had been most impressed by the fighting qualities ~~of~~ that Israel had revealed in Sinai, and in his inner circle ~~spared~~ withheld no praise for this.

On November 3, ~~the~~ recognition ripened among the Americans that one must deal with the roots of the problem by seeking solutions to the ~~problem~~ questions of Palestine and Suez. This was apparently a natural continuation of Dulles' words on November 1st, but in effect it was an acquiescence in public opinion which in this sphere showed much more xx awareness than the Government. This trend of opinion crystallised in two proposals put to the Assembly on November 3. This was an independent American initiative and it appears that there had been no effort to mobilise additional ~~initiators~~ proposers.

The Assembly Session of 3-4 November; the US Proposed Committees for Palestine and Suez; Withdrawal and Procedural Proposals. .6

The Assembly gathered again on the evening of November 3 to deal with the US proposal.

The information which the Secretary General read to the Assembly showed that the decision of November 2 had not been implemented. The first speaker was Lodge. After expressing regret that the decision had not been implemented, he began to prepare the ground for the American proposal which was intended to solve the problem. He admitted that the UN must also bear

responsibility for what had happened, because the members of the UN had not done all to solve the problems according to the principles of international justice and right. Therefor ethe US is ~~proposing~~ making suggestions which ~~she~~ it hopes ~~xxxxxx~~ will "lay the foundation for positive action which must follow the cessation of the hostile activities". The first proposal speaks of a new approach to the basic problems inherent in Israel-Arab relationships, aimed at creating the conditions for permanent peace and stability. According to this proposal, the Conciliation Commission, which ~~attempted~~ had proved unsuccessful, must terminate its function, and in its place must ~~arise~~ come a committee of five which will investigate the problems and ~~bring~~ submit recommendations to the UN, and, if such a possibility arises, the Committee itself will try to find ways to a solution.

The second proposal dealt with Suez. According to it, a committee of three Powers must be set up whose function would be to ensure the opening of the Canal in consultation with the three States most concerned (Egypt, ~~England~~ Britain and France), in order to establish the procedure for the functioning of the Canal and ensuring freedom of passage in it.

He ended by calling upon the Assembly:

**"Let us stop the futile process of patching up previous agreements and understandings, which but ~~severe~~ serve to provide new pretexts for further provocations. Let us face up to our responsibilities under the Charter, Let us work together for a lasting settlement of what has become a dangerous threat to the peace of the world."**

The American proposals were amost ~~swallowed by~~ engulfed in a torrent of speeches that demanded preference to the current problem: a cease-fire and withdrawal. The Indian delegate, who spoke on behalf of the Afro-Asian block proposed a resolution instructing ~~xxxx~~ the Secretary General to report within 12 hours on the implementation of the decision of November 2.

Pearson proposed that the Secretary General be instructed to bring before the Assembly a plan for the setting up of an international force within two days. Lodge supported the preference of this proposal and announced that the US ~~who~~ would not pressing ~~her~~ its two resolutions at this stage.

## The International Force

The idea of an international force is an old one which accompanied the problem of the armistice regime and the borders from the very outset. Although we consistently objected to the imposition of an international force between us and Egypt, the idea caught on both with friends and outside observers, such as Adlai Stevenson (who repeated it in the election campaign) and Eleanor Roosevelt.

It is not difficult to understand the reasons that prompted Pearson particularly to raise the suggestion as an efficient contribution to a solution, and why it was enthusiastically supported by people such as Hammarskjold and Dulles. From the point of view of Pearson, the establishment of an international force appeared to be able to fulfil to a large extent the function for the free world that Britain and France had taken upon themselves in Suez, and at the same time was likely to enjoy wide support in the UN. The fact that the USSR opposed the plan from the start, just as it had boycotted all those bodies that the UN had set up to deal with the Palestine problem - the conciliation Commission, the Observers' Organisation, the welfare agencies for the refugees - only encouraged him to believe that there was a way to set up, within the UN framework and under its auspices, a force whose heads would be from the West, moreover, under Canadian command and with no direct Russian influence. There is little doubt that he was strongly encouraged by Burns, who had consistently urged the expansion of the authority of the Observer Staff, and who now saw an opportunity to establish a force the like of which he had not dreamed about.

States which were not directly affected by the matter of Palestine, and especially small ones, also accepted the idea willingly. The situation which had developed seemed propitious for

laying the foundations ~~for~~ of an instrument that could ~~pacify~~ mitigate international tensions in various parts of the world, and ~~to~~ remove the initiative for intervention, in the form of "police actions" of the Great Powers.

The plan for the international foce found Egypt in desperate straits. The hope of attaining the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the foreign forces appeared weak, although the self-esteem of Egypt demanded ~~the~~ attainment ~~of such a step~~ at almost any price. The fear of Israel and the Anglo-French landing was great, and it appeared that it was just as well (to) quickly accept the entry of an international force as long as it brought redemption closer. ~~She~~ Egypt therefore admitted that ~~she~~ it would be prepared to accept the UN force on ~~her~~ its territory.

The sworn apponents of the plan were, on the one hand, the Soviet block, which regarded the plan as providing cover for a Western plot, and, on the other hand, ourselves, the British and French; although the opposition of the latter two was short-lived.

Our stand on the International force was not finally formulated for that discussion in the Assembly. I merely delivered our initial reaction ~~on the Assembly platform~~. I commented that the Secretary General and the initiaters of the proposal had not consulted Israel concerning their plans, and I expressed the assumption that we would still have the opportunity to do so before practical steps were taken. I mentioned as a primary assumption that one cannot conceive of the placing of any force on the territory of any State without ~~her~~ its agreement. I pointed out that the ~~head~~ chief of the Observers' staff and his officers draw their authority from the armistice agreements between all the neighbouring countries, and if new authority be given to them then ~~a~~ complicated ~~new~~ legal problems would arise in relation to their authority not only from the point of view of the agreement with Egypt, but also from the point of view of other agreements.

I stressed that these were merely first reactions, and I

requested permission to return to the subject after consultation with my Government.

The Assembly, which sat until 3 a.m., passed the Canadian resolution with ~~the~~ 16 abstention ~~of 16~~: the Soviet block, France England, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Israel and Egypt; and subsequently also passed the Afro-Asian resolution (the second decision on withdrawal) with 5 opposing: Israel, France, Britain, New Zealand and Australia, and 12 abstentions - most of t them West European States.

Attention was now focussed on the establishment of the international force. Hammerskjold acted feverishly. He was apparently prompted by the assumption that the swift establishment of such a force would prevent the landing of Anglo-French forces which had not yet started. He invited us to discuss with him our stand to the plan.

That day Hammarskjold sent a cable to the Foreign Minister in which he informed her of Egypt's agreement to a cease-fire and the entry of international forces, and asked as to our stand.

In the meantime the military action in Sinai had ended and there was once again no objection on our side to a cease-fire.

That day Sharm-el Sheikh was ~~xxx~~ taken, the last stronghold of Egypt in Sinai, and a Zahal spokesman announced: "The campaign in Sinai has ended. The cease-fire has come into effect and there is no more fighting".

The British and French announced that day that bombing had terminated.

The ~~office in Israel~~ Foreign Ministry asked ~~the~~ Ambassadors Nicholls and Gilbert, and we at the UN asked the British and French delegates if they had any objection ~~that we~~ to our announcing in the Assembly that we had ceased fire. They clarified the question and answered positively.

That evening, November 3, I announced at the Assembly, on instructions from the Government, that Israel was prepared for an immediate cease-fire on condition that a similar reply be received from Egypt.

I added criticism of the assumption that there was any

~~connection~~

point in returning to the armistice agreement with Egypt. Egypt had destroyed the agreement and was exploiting it as a cover for belligerence. The only solution is direct negotiations for peace, and Israel is prepared to open such negotiations immediately.

Within five hours we sent the Secreatry General a cable from the Foreign Minister containing five questions for clarification; from which it transpired that we rejected the demand for an unconditional cease-fire:

1) Does Egypt agree clearly and definitely to a cease-fire; for in the meantime the Egyptian army was continuing to fight and the fedayin attacks were continuing?

2) Does Egypt maintain its declared attitude that it is in a state of war with Israel?

3) Is Egypt prepared to open negotiationa immediately with Israel for peace as suggested in the memorandum that we sent to the President of the Assembly on November 4, 1955?

4) Does Egypt agree to cancel the boycott and the economic blockade on Israel shipping in Suez?

5) Does Egypt agree to withdraw the fedayin gangs that were operating under its direction from other Arab lands?

It was clear in advance that the Secretary General would not be satisfied by these complex announcements and would demand a direct answer to the question of the cease-fire, but in the meantime we would gain time.

On the morning of November 5, the Anglo-French landing in Port Said began and any objection to our confirming the cease-fire clearly was removed.

According to instructions from Israel I wrote to the

Secretary General that day saying that our agreement to a cease-fire is not conditional to receiving answers to the questions put. In the light of Egypt's agreement to cease fire, Israel affirms her willingness to cease fire. At the same time we would like to receive clarifications on the five questions.

(Previously, that day, the Secretary General had acknowledged receipt of the memorandum of November 3, and maintained that the Foreign Minister's despatch did not reply to his question regarding our preparedness to a cease-fire at the time that he proposed, and that the five questions did not appear to him to be connected directly with his appeal for a cease fire.

These question, that never received a reply, were, in the course of time, testing ground for our arguments against an unconditional withdrawal.)

## Discussing the International Force with the Secretary General

That morning Kidron and I met with the Secretary General, Bunche and Cawdrey, to discuss the international force. The Secretary General opened by saying that the pressure of time and circumstances had delayed the consultation with us, and that the time had come when it was essential to know our stand as the British and French were maintaining that the cease-fire on their part was intimately bound up with Israel's attitude to the international force. Hammerskjold pointed out that the idea was completely new and that it perhaps constituted the first step to the creation of an international force as mentioned in the UN Charter. One can organise this in one of three methods: (1) Combination of national units under national commands under the UN flag, as in Korea (2) As Britain and France had done in Egypt, i.e. Powers which undertake the mission by themselves (3) Combination of national units under UN command as proposed in the Charter. It was undesirable to return to the example of Korea, while the Anglo-French system was improper. (In the plan that was accepted by the Assembly, forces of members of the Security Council were excluded.) According to the plan, the Secretary General would

appoint three units organised in a company. Its function-"something between observation and a military action".

The force would first be stationed in the vicinity of the Canal between the Egyptian and Israel forces. Subsequently it would advance in the footsteps of the ~~retreating~~ withdrawing Israel forces.

I stated that the idea of an international force was revolutionary and had not yet been discussed by the Government of Israel. For the moment I pointed out two things:

a) We have legal ~~qualifications~~ qualms as to the idea itself both as Israel and as a member of the UN. Even were we not in Sinai at the moment, the stationing of a new non-Egyptian force close to our border implies the change of the military set-up in the area and ~~arouses~~ creates problems that must be examined by Israel. Israel is placed between military positions and opposed policies. On the one hand - permanent members of the Security Council face us with certain facts in the area, and on the other - members of the UN make other demands from us from six thousand miles away. The State of Israel must examine this situation too.

b) Our opinion in relation to the entry of a third factor between us and Egypt is known and has not changed. The effort must be to bring the sides closer and not to separate them. One must utilise the revolutionary change that has come about in the Arab world in order to bring about direct negotiations and not accept the freezing of the existing situation.

I pointed out that ~~England~~ Britain and France had sent their armies to the area in order to solve the problem of Suez and of Israel-Arab relations. I asked if that was also the object of the proposed international force.

The Secretary General agreed to my comment on the previous evening, that there is a need for the agreement of the States upon whose territory the force would be stationed. He agreed that the matter requires legal clarification and asked for our comments on that issue. He agreed to ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ the assumption that direct negotiations for peace were necessary, and that he regarded the American proposal of a new committee as a stage that could be dis-

pensed with. On the other hand he did not consider that in order to bring about negotiations one must first defeat Egypt. I explained to him that our conditions are not the conditions of conquest, we are merely demanding back rights that Egypt had robbed us of, such as not harming our sovereignty, refraining from acts of hostility and threats, free passage in the straits and Suez, cessation of the economic boycott. Hammerskjold immediately stated that there are other rights that the UN is responsible for maintaining e.g. the rights of the refugees.

In the course of the discussion I mentioned the principle that one must not return to the bad structure of the armistice agreements. Bunche pointed out that there must be some relationship between the armistice contracts and the ultimate arrangement that one is aiming at. The Secretary General pointed out that on the question of the armistice agreements we had reached a point of no return, but his colleague stressed that the negotiation cannot be on the basis of surrender.

We agreed that we would provide him with our comments on the plan for an international force at the earliest possible time.

Pressure to Withdraw under the threat of World War. ?

In accordance with the demand of the USSR the Security Council reconvened on the night of November 5-6 to discuss the hostile actions in Egypt. The USSR proposed a severe resolution calling upon England, France and Israel to desist from all military activities against Egypt within 12 hours, and to withdraw their forces. If the decisions were not conformed with, then the USSR and the US, two States with powerful air and sea forces, would be requested to assist Egypt with arms, volunteers and other military means.

The Russian initiative was thwarted in its very beginnings. Only Russia, Yugoslavia and Persia were the only ones to vote for the resolution to be placed on the agenda. Four delegations, including the US, opposed and four others abstained. Lodge, who spoke immediately after the vote, described the idea of using US and USSR forces as unthinkable.

The vote showed up the failure of the political and propaganda efforts of the USSR and the renewed unity of the Western Powers. On the other hand, the Russian initiative brought pressure to bear that encumbered the US in its efforts to influence the Arabs.

The idea of sending volunteers was a part of the campaign of threats that was launched by the USSR. That same day, Bulganin sent sharp warning letters to the heads of the Israel, British and French Governments, and the Russian ambassador in Israel was recalled.

The Soviet threats aroused various evaluations in Washington and at the UN. At any rate, there were many who proposed serious consideration of them, and not negating the possibility that a third world war was likely to start. Afterwards we learnt (from a talk of the ex-US ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, and Argman, a counsellor in our Embassy) that the Russians seriously considered giving Israel a paralysing military blow.

In any event it is certain that the fear of Russia frightened Britain and France and increased US pressure upon them and us.

The British and French broke down completely under the pressure. Informed sources consider that had they continued for one more day they would have been able to conquer the whole Canal area, but they stopped and on November 6 announced a cease-fire.

The English had abandoned us even previously. On November 5, Selwyn Loyd announced in Parliament that Britain had announced to the UN that it supported the need to ensure a swift withdrawal of Israel forces. That, and the fact that Britain and France supported the plan of the international force while we dissociated ourselves from it, left us isolated in the face of increasing pressure of friends and enemies. The fact that, from the beginning of November, we were the only ones who had refused to withdraw unconditionally, influenced the course of the campaign considerably. If Britain and France had insisted upon an agreed arrangement in Suez as a condition for withdrawal, as we had done in relation to the Bay of Eilat, there is no doubt that they would have made our struggle much easier.

The ~~results~~ of the elections in the US that took place on November 6 ~~and were published on November 7~~, returned Eisenhower to the Presidency and gave the Democrats the majority in both houses of Congress. Some ascribe ~~one of the factors for~~ the Republicans' failure in Congress partly to ~~the~~ criticism of their policy in the M.E. On the other hand, the crisis in the M.E. which created an atmosphere of emergency and fear of war ~~even~~ increased the support of Eisenhower as the only leader able to fill the breach.

One must remember that in an election year the American people is attacked by an "isolationist" pacifist frame of mind; the weight of "selfish considerations" and local problems increases in ~~relation~~ ratio to foreign problems. The fear that the war against Egypt ~~is~~ was likely to give birth to a new Korea tortured them. American voters hoped that they would ~~enjoy~~ get the President who saved them from the ~~problem of~~ Korea and ~~led~~ piloted them for four years on quiet and calm waters. The danger of a new war prompted them to place their faith in the personal judgement of Eisenhower, especially at a time when he showed that he was inclined not to involve the US in military intervention and to act through the UN.

One can assume that the election of Eisenhower was assured and that the stand he adopted in the M.E. brought him more votes.

But, no matter what were the reasons for the outcome of the elections, now we had to deal with an President elected for four years, a man full of self-confidence and less sensitive to public opinion than he was a few days previously. On the other hand the Republicans were sensitive to their situation in Congress. The numerical relationship between the two parties being almost balanced, a positive movement in their favour in public opinion in any future round, was likely to ~~weigh~~ tilt the scales in their favour.

## The Prime Minister's Speech on November 7

On November 7, news was received of the Prime Minister's speech in the Knesset. After describing the background to the

Sinai Campaign, he summarised the military ~~campaign~~ aspect and evaluated its national and political significance, and defined the policy of the Government on the following points:

a. The armistice agreement with Egypt - was dead and buried, and will not be revived. It perished after the Egyptian dictator had for many years defied it, violated its principles and aim, desecrated the decisions of the Security Council and the UN Charter. In his repeated declarations that a state of war existed between Egypt and Israel, Nasser had removed the content and objective of the armistice agreement, for in the first paragraph of the agreement it is set down that it was signed in order to ~~return a~~ restore permanent peace. The Egyptian ruler used the agreement as a smoke-screen to hide the murderous attacks against the settlers of Israel and as camouflage for the blockade of Israel on land, sea and in the air. Nasser was not satisfied with the bands of fedayin that he organised from his territory, but planned and implemented such gangs in the other Arab lands against Israel. In this manner the armistice agreements became a dangerous and harmful fiction, which merely assisted the destructive plots of the Egyptian dictator. Any return to the armistice agreement implied a return to murder and ambush, to boycott and destruction against Israel intended to obliterate ~~her~~ it completely.

b. Together with the agreement the armistice lines between us and Egypt perished.

c. There is no quarrel between the people of Israel and the Egyptian people. King Farouk and after him the dictator Jamal Abdul Nasser brought upon their people a ~~heavy~~ grievous tragedy, by inciting them to war against Israel. The desertion of Egyptian army officers and thousands of soldiers in Sinai proves that they had no interest in fighting against Israel in a foreign desert.

d. We do not want to ~~increase~~ aggravate ~~relations~~ state of the anarchy between us and Egypt, and we are prepared for negotiations for a stable peace, cooperation and good neighbourly relations with Egypt, on condition of direct negotiations, with no prior conditions, with no imposition by either side.

We hope that all peace-loving nations will support this desire of ours.

e. We are prepared for such negotiations with all the other Arab countries. But as long as they will maintain the armistice agreements, even if they are not prepared for a permanent peace, Israel too will maintain these agreements.

f. Israel will under no circumstances agree that a foreign ~~power~~ force, no matter what its name may be, stay in ~~her~~ its territories or in one of the areas it held ~~by her.~~

g. Israel will not fight against any Arab State or against Egypt if it is not attacked by them.

The Prime Minister's statement was understood at the UN, in Washington and by the press, as intended to annex the areas conquered, and to oppose the entry of UN forces into Israel or the conquered areas.

The general reaction was confusion and consternation. They claimed that the Arab accusations xxx of expansionism had been confirmed, and the true aim of our incursion into Egypt ~~has~~ become clear. Also, ~~the~~ opposition to the entry of an international force was not accepted by many. Some newspapers wrote about obligations and Israel's rebelliousness against the UN, and the demand for greater pressure to withdraw increased.

~~The "Denver Post" of 8/11 summarised its comments on the P.M.'s speech, saying:~~

Thus, much of the sympathy that we had acquired after October 29 was dissipated when it appeared that we intended to change the border by force, and not merely to destroy the Egyptian danger and open the Tiran Straits, as we claimed at the beginning of the campaign.

The anger also expressed itself indirectly at the afternoon session of the Assembly that day. A number of States that had intended to xxxx abstain from voting voted for withdrawal.

Another UN decision concerning withdrawal .3'

The seven nation proposal on the establishment of the international force and the Afro-Asian proposal on withdrawal of forces were to be discussed.

The proposal concerning the international force was to confirm the Secretary General's suggestion in relation to the organisation of the force. It also ~~set~~ laid down the appointement of a consultative committee composed of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, headed by the Secretary General.

The committee was to advise the Secretary General on the details of the establishment of the international force and its operation; ~~and~~ these were supplementary to the decisions of the Assembly, and without going into the sphere of the force's commander. It was also given authority to convene the Assembly in order to deal with matters that appeared to it to require urgent discussion.

The balanced composition, which nevertheless included only those States ~~who~~ which volunteered to provide units for the international force, ~~included~~ and not a single representative of the Eastern Block, was intended to ensure balance in the conduct of affairs and representation of the states that were about to invest soldiers and money in the international force. This arrangement was also necessary ~~from~~ for " democratic " reasons ~~in order~~ to prevent an impression of a concentration of authority in the hands of the Secretary General.

(In effect, in the course of time, it became apparent that the committee fulfilled a very limited function. The processes of planning and the execution were placed in the hands of the UN Secretariat and Burns.)

The decision concerning withdrawal was mild compared to the previous one. No time was laid down, it spoke about immediate withdrawal. This expression offended the Arabs and Soviets, but was regarded as an essential compromise in order to mobilise the necessary votes. The Afro-Asian proposers explained that by "immediate withdrawal"was meant immediately the international force arrived. This explanation was accepted by the Western Euro-

peans and others who originally considered abstaining and consequently supported it.

This was an important landmark in the process of the Assembly's dealings with the withdrawal. The withdrawal was made dependent upon the date of the international force's application, and the international force was still in napkins.

We did not derive much satisfaction from the appearances of the British and French in the discussions.

Their initiative in argument and explaining was poor. In the Security Council discussions they adopted stubborn attitudes and sheltered behind the veto, without attempting to acquire understanding and sympathy for their reasons. This negligence continued in the Emergency Assembly and was especially obvious outside the UN. No British enlightenment activity was evident in the Press radio and television, and the French behaved similarly. ~~Compared~~

To this was added the difference of opinion concerning the international force. While we had reservations to the plan for the international force, the British and French went over to acceptance on the assumption that a method would be found for international control of the Canal.

In the vote on the international force, on the night of November 7-8, they voted for, while we, faithful to our stand, found ourselves in the good company of the 12 abstainers, with the Soviet bloc, Egypt and South Africa.

In the vote on the withdrawal our complete isolation was apparent. We were the only one to object to the resolution. The English and French contented themselves with abstaining.

This was the first time in the discussion on this matter that we were isolated. We felt a tremor in the hall when our voice was raised, alone and forsaken, against immediate withdrawal.

Hammerskjold was not long in demanding that Israel inform him officially whether it intended to withdraw its forces.

To this was added the difference of opinion concerning the

He added that he had the authority to request this information, as the Assembly had instructed him to attend to the entry of the international force into the area.

Later he invited me to a discussion and informed me that he had been in touch with Eisenhower on this matter (Dulles had fallen ill two days previously). He stated that Washington was afraid, and he shared their fears, that the non-withdrawal of Israel's forces would lead to Soviet armed intervention in the near future, and a third world war. According to him, Eisenhower had promised him that he would spare no effort and would insist adamantly that on the withdrawal from Sinai and the Canal Zone and the stationing there of the UN force. He asked with some feeling whether Israel's Government is correctly evaluating the general international background to the problem and the significance of Bulganin's threat. In ending, he said that the differences of opinion in the past were insignificant compared to the situation question that arose now: Will there be an Israel at all two months from now? And the decision is in the Prime Minister's hands. The question will be answered according to his decision in relation to Sinai.

We were subject to pressure from various quarters to accept the idea of withdrawal and the entry of a UN force. I heard these opinions from Pearson too, who urged us strongly and revealed profound emotion - which was unlike his usual temperament.

Pearson stated that the Prime Minister's expression as if Sinai is not Egypt sounded wild. He himself saw no possibility of Israel opposing, successfully, the entry of an international force into Sinai. If Israel will maintained its opposition then he - Pearson - would not be able to assist us at all or even to adopt a sympathetic attitude. Consistent opposition would bring about Soviet intervention and the conflagration would increase. If Israel's object was to ensure her security, then this was definitely possible, but if she was aspiring to obtain additional territory, there was no possibility of this at this time, except perhaps by a new arrangement in Gaza. I asked him where is the guarantee that, if an international force enters, that the Egyptian forces did not return with it. He admitted that legally there is no guarantee of this, but in effect Egypt did not possess military force, and the international force would occupy the same posts such as the

entrance to the Bay and the cross-roads from where Egypt was capable of preparing disturbances: He strongly stressed that by stubbornness Israel would lose all her friendly ties in the world and perhaps be destroyed.

The Soviet pressure took the form of threats and strong warnings. It transpired that England supported the idea of the entry of the international force, even if this means using force, and that France does not object to this intention.

The USSR continued to threaten that if the forces do not withdraw, she will intervene with force, just as Britain and France had done a few days earlier. The US treated this threat seriously, it appeared that her intelligence forces knew of Soviet preparation for a military action. The Americans for their part took serious security measures in the event of a world conflagration. Ships of the American fleet were ordered to sea for fear of a lightning air strike, and various units were placed in a state of readiness.

It was clear that under these circumstances the US would pay no attention to any internal or external restraints, for in her opinion world peace and withholding an atomic war was in the balance. I cabled to the P.M. to inform him of my assesment of the seriousness of the situation. I assumed that the US would not apply force to push us out, at any rate not at the first stage, but would apply all its influence to acquire our acquiescence to the entry of the international force and the exit of our forces.

I considered that it we insist on our opposition to a withdrawal and the entry of the international forces we would find ourselves opposed by all these forces. At the same time I assumed that one could obtain international agreement to the non-entry of Egyptian forces into Sinai, including Sharém-el-Sheikh.

Eisenhower's letter to the Prime Minister on 7/11

That evening, while I was at the Assembly, Shiloach was invited to the Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, who conveyed to him a copy of a letter from Eisenhower to Ben Gurion, whose original had been forwarded to the American Embassy in Israel to be handed directly to the Prime Minister, saying as follows:

51-2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations has arranged a cease-fire in Egypt to which Egypt, France, the United Kingdom and Israel have agreed. There is being dispatched to Egypt a United Nations force in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly. That body has urged that all other foreign forces be withdrawn from Egyptian territory, and specifically, that Israeli forces be withdrawn to the General Armistice Line. The resolution covering the cease-fire and withdrawal was introduced by the United States and received the overwhelming vote of the Assembly.

Statements attributed to your Government to the effect that Israel does not intedn to withdraw from Egyptian territory, as requested by the United Nations, have been called to my attention. I must say, frankly, Mr. Prime Minister, that the United States views these reports, if true, with deep concern. Any such decision by the Government of Israel would seriously undermine the urgent efforts being made by the United Nations to restore peace in the Middle East, and could not but bring about the condemnation of Israel as a violator of the principles as well as the directives of the United Nations.

It is our belief that as a matter of highest priority peace should be restored and foreign troops, except for United Nations forces, withdrawn from Egypt, after which new and energetic steps should be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to solve the basic problems which have given rise to the present difficulty. The United States has tabled in the General Assembly two resolutions designed to accomplish the latter purposes, and hopes that they will be acted upon favourably as soon as the present emergency has been dealt with.

I need not assure you of the deep interest which the United States has in your country, nor recall the various elements of our policy of support to Israel in so many ways. It is in this context that I urge you to comply with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the current crisis and to make your decision known immediately. It would be a matter of the greatest regret to all my countrymen if Israel policy on a matter of such grave concern to the world should in any way impair the friendly cooperation between our two countries.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Subsequently it transpired that the code cable service between the State Department and their Embassy in Tel Aviv suffered from a mechanical fault and delay. On request from the office we cabled the text of the letter through our code department.

In supplement to the letter (Hoover) added verbally:

"I consider that this is the most important meeting ever held with Israel representatives. I am speaking on behalf of Dulles, whom I saw today in hospital. This is the most serious situation in which the free world has found itself, not only in regard to the future of the Middle East but the entire free world. We as well as you have evidence of the Soviets exploiting this situation with eventual major consequences of a disastrous nature. If this happens, as we often pointed out, Israel would be amongst the first to be swallowed up. At this time Israel's refusal to comply with the overwhelming UN requests to withdrawal lays her wide open to the charge of endangering world peace. The only choice and means to avoid the terrivle disaster lies in the UN and the UN only. Israel's refusal is tantamount to flouting world opinion and public opinion in the USA. In these circumstances Israel's attitude will inevitably lead to most serious measures, such as termination of all governmental and private aid, UN sanctions, and eventual expulsion from UN, I repeat, I speak with utmost seriousness and gravity."

Shiloach stated that he would convey the message to the Government but requested clarification because at the last meeting with Dulles had agreed that there would not be a return to the previous position.

Hoover mentioned, in replying, the two proposals which the US had made in the Assembly to set up committees to deal with the problem of Israel-Arab relationships and Suez, and added that he did not want to say anything then that would affect the factors likely to develop in relation to these subjects at the UN. Rowntree interrupted him and said:

"We said we could not leave these problems unsolved, but we also insisted that the first step must be a cease-fire and withdrawal behind the armistice lines. In the last conversation with Dulles, Eban had stated, on the authority of the Prime Minister, that the Prime Minister would be ready subject to certain

conditions, to recommend to the Government of Israel the withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory. We have therefore been profoundly shocked at the report of the Prime Minister's latest stand. The most important single element, with a view to saving the peace of the world, is now Israel's immediate withdrawal behind the armistice lines."

It was apparent that we were standing at the centre of a world crisis, and the key for which was held by us: At that time a cable from me was on its way to the Prime Minister saying:

"The world is waiting in a state of great tension for your reply to Eisenhower's letter. The appeals from Jews and others are increasing, all of them urging that you retreat from point 6 in your speech yesterday. (Refusal to allow the international force to enter the occupied areas.) The US Government ordered her ships to head out to sea in order not to be trapped by a lightning attack. There is a general feeling that fateful matters of world peace are in your hands. After consultation with colleagues I recommend the following stand:

a. At the beginning of the campaign the Government of Israel announced that the objective was to destroy the fedayin in Sinai and ensure passage on sea and land. In the meantime not only were the fedayin eliminated, but also the Egyptian army and its arms both in Sinai as well as in Gaza were destroyed and the main danger that threatened the State from the Arab world has been removed.

b. With the achievement of these objectives, the Government of Israel announces that it has no territorial aspirations in Sinai. At the same time the Government of Israel declares her willingness to withdraw her forces from Sinai when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is about to enter the Canal Zone. The Government of Israel will cooperate with this international force.

c. We insist upon the realisation of the following objectives in the framework of the international action that is presently being planned:
One - that Egypt be prevented from disturbing our shipping in Suez.
Two - That Egypt be prevented from disturbing our shipping in the Gulf of Eilat. Three - that the arrangements in Sinai be such as to prevent the organisation of fedayin activities or any other hostile activities.

Four - that we receive binding guarantees from Egypt concerning the suspension of hostile activities and removal of the state of war. Five - that negotiations start immediately with Egypt on a new arrangement that will replace the armistice agreement.

d. In our estimation we have no more than 30 hours before a fundamental change in our situation. Therefore such an announcement is necessary within 24 hours, for tension is growing. The highest intelligence organisation here has already informed us that Soviet fighter planes and bombers will reach Syria within a few days unless it transpires that the British, French and Israel forces agree soon to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It is superfluous to stress the significance to Jewish history if we should appear as the source of the danger of world war. I shall try to talk to you telephonically early in the morning. The large newspapers ~~that are~~ appearing already this evening are emphasizing, with banner headlines, your personal responsibility for the most fateful decision.

In addition to the announcement of these things, we suggest that in a letter to Eisenhower you add a comment on Bulganin's threat and the concentration of ~~arms~~ Soviet arms in Syria, inviting Eisenhower to undertake that the US will exercise its full influence to remove this danger to our security."

My decision on the ~~reservation~~ qualification to the withdrawal 56

On the evening of November 7 and the day of November 8 the news of Soviet preparations to intervene with force, in order to force Israel to agree to withdraw, increased. The fear that such intervention might cause a wide conflagration influenced the US to take a number of military preparatory measures. (After a number of months we learnt that the US Ambassador to Moscow, Bohlen, warned the USSR Government against armed intervention of any sort and received a ~~reaction~~ reply that convinced him of the serious danger of a "single day" Soviet air action against Israel). A similar atmosphere was rampant in Paris when the Foreign Minister visited there during those days, where the French Government was sorely concerned about the Soviet danger. At that time the representatives of Communist countries in Israel prophesied of a Soviet action that would come in the near future, if

Israel does not agree to withdraw in conformity with Britain's and France's agreement.

In the light of this danger, the Government decided to leave the decision in my hands whether to undertake an immediate and unqualified withdrawal (The Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately) or to make the withdrawal conditional (The Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the UN in connection with the international force).

In the cable that I received from Jerusalem it was stated that I was to decide according to my estimation of the degree of danger from the Soviet threat.

I decided in favour of the conditional sentence. R. Shiloach and M. Kidron participated in this fateful consultation. No proposal was voiced to me to adopt the unqualified and timorous withdrawal.

The considerations that prompted me to accept this alternative were as follows:

1. The qualified sentence was of very great importance. It gave us two advantages - gain of time to continue our political campaign on our rights in the Gulf of Eilat, Gaza and Sinai; and the certainty that the evacuated areas would not be handed over to the Egyptian army, but to the international force. I saw great importance in this objective, especially in relation to the Straits of Tiran. We would have lost these two advantages had we accepted an immediate unconditional withdrawal.

2. The Soviet threat was based on the assumption that Israel is abandoned and beyond the pale of international law, so that an attack upon her would not involve the danger of Western opposition and especially American opposition. From the moment that Israel returned to the sphere of the US's responsibility to safeguard the peace, the Soviet danger would automatically disappear. Therefore any reply that was capable of satisfying the US and ending the clash with her, would in any case remove the danger of Soviet intervention. It was clear to me that our qualification of the withdrawal by arrangements with the international force would be

which they were planned and directed, we must repeat our urgent request to the United Nations to call upon Egypt, which has consistently maintained that she is in a state of war with Israel, to renounce this position, abandon its policy of boycott and blockade, to cease sending into Israel territory of murder gangs and, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter to live at peace with member states, to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel.

"On behalf of my Government I wish to express to you our gratification at your reference to the deep interest of the United States in Israel and the policy of support for our country. I know these words of friendship stem from the depth of your heart and I wish to assure you that you will always find Israel ready to make its noble contribution at the side of the United States in its effort to strengthen justice and peace in the world."

I immediately applied to the State Department, accompanied by Shiloach, to deliver the letter to Eisenhower through Hoover. Hoover asked whether the implication of the reply was withdrawal to the armistice lines. I refused to explain and stated that I would discuss details with Hammerskjold. He told us that the President had spoken to him an hour before, had expressed satisfaction, and intended to express his satisfaction for Israel's decision in a public announcement that evening. I drew Hoover's attention to the renewal of fedayin activities, and the increase of Soviet activity. He stated that the US would now concentrate upon bringing about peace as one could not return to the previous regime of relationships.

At that meeting it was agreed that the Prime Minister was entitled to quote from Eisenhower's letter on conditions that he quoted it fully. I explained to the White House that the intention was - inter alia - educational; it was desirable that the Israel people should know and appreciate the difference between the coarse threats of Bulganin and the moderate approach of Eisenhower.

acceptable to the US, which was not so concerned with a confused withdrawal as with a withdrawal that would enable the international force to take up positions in the area and prevent a return to the previous conditions of force.

3. One of the two: Either the USSR had decided to attack us in order to win the favour of the Arabs - and then she would not be held back even by an unconditional agreement to withdraw, whose honesty she could always question: or the USSR would hesitate before attacking us at any time that American reaction was possible, and then a qualified agreement to withdraw was sufficient to heal the breach between us and the US and to assure us of the support of the Western nations if we were attacked by the Soviets.

In the meantime I received a cable from Eytan saying that, in the light of wellfounded fears of an Soviet air attack that night, I was to inform my Soviet colleague that Israel had decided to withdraw her forces. Kidron telephoned this message to Soblev, who replied that this was very good news and asked when our forces would withdraw. Kidron evaded giving a clear reply.

Tense hours passed until the P.M.'s reply to the President arrived containing an undertaking to withdraw as I ~~happened to~~ might decide.

The Prime Minister's Reply to Eisenhower of 8/11 SC

"I have only this afternoon received your message, which was delayed in transmission owing to a breakdown in communications between the Department of State and the United States Embassy in Tel-Aviv.

" Your statement that a United Nations force is being dispatched to Egypt in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly is welcomed by us. We have never planned to annex the Sinai Desert. In view of the United Nations resolution regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt and the creation of an international force, we will, upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the international force entering the Suez Canal area, willingly withdraw our forces.

" Although an important part of our aim has been achieved by the destruction as a result of the Sinai operation, of Fedayeen gangs and of the bases from ~~which~~

Simultaneously with this action in relation to the US, the Foreign Minister sent a parallel reply to the Secretary General saying:

"I have the honor on behalf of the Government of Israel to inform you that the Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the UN in connection with the international force.

"At the same time, and without prejudice to this indertaking, I wish to state that while as a result of the Sinai Operation we have succeeded in destroying many of the fedayeen gangs and the bases from which they were planned and directed, we must repeat our urgent request to the UN to call upon Egypt, which has consistently maintained that it is in a State of war with Israel, to recounce that position, to abandon its policy of boycott and blockade, to cease the sending into Israel of murder gangs, and in accordance with its obligations under the UN Charter to live at peace with member states, to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel."

was formulated

Before formulating the reply, I telephoned to Hammerskjold and informed him of the Government's intention. I stressed that our undertaking would be conditional upon arrangements with the UN force. He expressed a tremendous relief and said that this was one of the most welcome decisions and that the Israel People would benefit from it for many generations. He was most gratified by the condition of withdrawal subject to arrangements with the international force.

The White House spokesman immediately announced that the President was sending words of appreciation to the Prime Minister, which reached him subsequently through Lawson, saying:

"I appreciate your message of yesterday informing me that you will withdraw your forces from Egypt. This decision will be widely welcomed not only by the United States but by all nations which are struggling to restore peace and security for all nations in the Middle East.

It will contribute greatly to the situation in which a peaceful solution may be arrived at."

Israel's announcement and the positive reaction of the President were received with a deep relief at the UN and by the public. In the opinion of the public we became the saviors of world peace instead of those endangering it.

A new period 5'

When we took this decisive step we immediately had to turn our efforts to exploit the improved atmosphere in order to attain positive values. In the meantime, news was received on the radio voiced by "senior officials in the Israel Foreign Ministry", that our agreement to withdraw and to recognise the international force was caused by the Soviet threat. I cabled to the Ministry office saying that in our explanations here we had stressed our concern for the peace of the world and our consideration for the UN and Eisenhower, and that this explanation was accepted with sympathy. I commented that pointing out the Soviet threat as the major factor in the Government's decision opened a doorway to unlimited Soviet pressure.

The Ministry office instructed its representatives to adopt this line of explanation.

Chapter 2.

Negotations concerning arrangements with UN and withdrawal from El Arish

(November 9 - December 31 1956)

Following upon the agreement to withdraw

When we agreed in principle to withdraw we had to deal immediately with establishing our stand in relation to the many problems that arose therefrom. In the light of the information about the large amount of ammunition that we had captured, I cabled to Israel on November 9 to suggest that this ammunition should not remain in any area where our legal and political fate was doubtful, that is - that it be removed not only from Sinai but also from Gaza. I also suggested that, in order not to give an excuse to the Soviets to act against us, it was in our interests to do as the British and French had done and to publish that we had begun a process of diminishing our forces in the conquered areas even before the international force had arrived.

That same day I cabled that one must be careful of pressure to give up Gaza unconditionally. There was no doubt that at least the USSR and the Asians would put pressure upon us in this direction while the West had not yet formulated a united approach.

In relation to the US, the vital point could be the question of the refugees. I therefore suggested that Israel make an announcement that the emancipation of Gaza would enable it to make a contribution to the solution of the refugee problem to a much greater extent than was possible previously. Such an annoucement was likely to bring about a certain degree of acceptance, in the West, of our status in Gaza.

After the decisions concerning the cease-fire and withdrawal which were taken amidst a storm of strong protests and the pressure of threats, it appeared that a new sort of discussion and clarification was about to commence. The struggle became more political - diplomatic, our chances of emerging from the struggle were more and more conditional upon

renewing the faith and attaining the understanding and goodwill of world public opinion. However, the information that arrived during those days from Burns to Hammarskjold and reports that appeared in the newspapers, especially from Homer Bigard to the "New York Times", did not make our work any easier. Burns reported on the continuation of dissention between observers and Zahal officers in Gaza against the background of the attempt of Observers to fullfil some of their functions and the refusal to allow 10 Observers who were in Gaza to pass through Sinai to the Canal region on official duty. In the atmosphere of the Assembly, it was natural that incidents such as these would be exaggerated and would undermine the achievements that had been attained through a difficult process of persuasion.

On November 11, there appeared an article by Homer Bigard concerning the announcements of the Government's spokesman that we would not abandon Gaza, no matter what, and clear hints of high officials that in affect we did not intend to honour the Prime Minister's announcement concerning the withdrawal from Sinai but that we would continue to hold the greater portion of the conquered area. Bigard's impression was "that without a renewal of strong pressure of the Powers and especially the US, Israel would break her specific promise to the UN."

I considered it my duty to suggest that we restrain ourselves from announcements and observations such as these, in order not to undermine any further our international status and our public respect. I suggested that we withhold the statement of our intentions and demands until we came to discuss them with the bodies involved.

On November 11, Hammarskjold sent a letter to the Foreign Minister in reply to her letter of November 8 where she announced the withdrawal of our forces "upon the completion of satisfactory arrangements with the UN in connection with the international force". He pointed out that the UN force would be prepared to begin its task quickly and therfore requested that we expedite

the discussion of necessary arrangements in order that it would be possible to announce soon the implementation of the withdrawal of forces. To this letter he added a comment that it would be possible to open the discussion s in New York upon the arrival of Burns, who was due to arrive there in a short time. This letter did not get to the Foreign Minister who was about to leave for New York in order to ~~stand at the head of~~ lead our delegation to the Assembly.

Towards the normal Assembly session

On November 10, the Emergency Assembly met and decided to transfer the discussion on the matter of Egypt to the General Assembly that was about to open in two days' time, as a subject with ~~preferance~~ priority. The American delegation suggested that the 2 proposals of November 3 concerning problems of Palestine and Suez, be brought up for urgent discussion.

I took the floor. I said that Israel was convinced of the justice of the actions that were taken and that many share this feeling ~~with her~~. Thanks to Israel, it was possible to establish new relationships between Egypt and Israel. Regarding Israel's agreement to withdraw I said that it stemmed from aspiration to safeguard world peace. Israel's agreement is based upon the "natural assumption" ( it may be that this was the first contribution of the conception of assumptions and expectations to the "dictionary" of the Sinai story) that also the other sides would also honour their obligations according to the Charter, that belligerent Egyptian actions would cease on land and sea. I mentioned that during the recent period the attacks on our borders had begun again by Jordan or Syrian armies, I expressed concern in the light of the information concerning the concentration of Soviet Arms in Syria and pointed out the responsiblilty of the USSR (without mentioning names) for the creation of detension.

As the suggestion of the US to place the two proposals on the agenda of the Assembly, was opposed by the Afro -Asian block. Lodge announced that for the sake of unity and in order to satisfy everyone he would be happy to remove the section (on the 2 proposals ), as he did not wish to ~~oblige~~ commit

coming Assemblies in advance" .

Thus the American inititive was nipped in the bud, an initiative which had arisen during a stormy moment and had never managed to develop and bear fruit.

During the following days, we attempted to find support for a proposal on steps to peace, but we were not very successful.

The matter of the Foreign Minister's coming to the Assembly was decided a number of weeks before the Sinai Campaign. It was also decided upon a programme of speeches for the Bonds. During the Assembly, this task made it very difficult for the Foreign Minister and for myself. During the months of November and December we conducted the activities of the delegation while travelling at night through the continent in order to assist the Bonds effort that was during that period the only source of income of the State in foreign currency.

Now, on the eve of the General Assembly, three main fields of activities confronted us;

a. the conduct of as lengthy negotiations as possible with the Secretary General concerning co-ordination of activities with the international force. " The dragging out" of the negotiations was necessary in order to gain as much time as possible, so as

to achieve the other 2 objectives before decisions against us were taken.

b. The creation of facts in the field especially in rooting ourselves in Gaza and starting free shipping in the Gulf.

c. A wide-spread propaganda campaign in order to acquire support for our stand and for our plans in relation to Sinai, Gaza, the Gulf, Suez and the arrangements of Israel-Arab relationships in general.

Objectives of US policy in November

Our interests had a certain fundamental clash with certain basic objectives of the American Government, especially at this stage;

a. An effort to safe-guard peace and refrain at almost any price from the use of force as a means of settling international disputes .

b. An effort once more to establish the status of the UN as an instrument of peace, a platform for war against the Russians and an instrument of American influence.

c. An effort to win over Asia in the framework of the competition between the West and East.

d. An effort to fill the void which was created in the Middle East as a result of France and Britain's exit.

Safe-guarding peace was a great principle and a central point of the Eisenhower Doctrine, it was the great slogan in whose name he came to power twice and there is no doubt that he guarded it jealously. Safe-guarding peace means repugnance towards any act that is likely to spark off world war, accordingly the Sinai Suez campaign was basically repugnant, despite any justification that they may have had from the point of view of Nasser's provocation of Israel and the West.

The strengthening of the UN involved seeking common factors with as many States as possible and not depending upon the West and Latin blocs alone, whose relative weight was getting

smaller. The UN is also an instrument that allows the US to get out of dealing directly and alone with unpleasant problems, such as the problem of Palestine itself, and therefore it was useful and essential to strengthen its power. The clash of ~~England~~ Britain, France and Israel with the UN harmed an instrument that the US had to protect, in the opinion of the US -even in the interests of Israel itself.

The winning over of Asia involved a competition with the Communist bloc and ~~the~~ dissociation from the remnants of colonialism. To the extent that Israel was marked in the eyes of Asia as an aggressor or a satellite of colonialism, any identification of the US with ~~her~~ it was undesirable. During the very course of discussions in the UN on the results of the Sinai-Suez campaign, ~~and the~~ a serious attempt was made by the US to come to terms with Nehru.

The recognition that the US must ~~fulfill~~ the void created in the Middle East was also a force against us. There are Americans who are prepared to accept our complete analysis in relation to the danger of Nasser and nevertheless do not support our conclusions.

[redacted] They are afraid that his downfall in a dramatic way and by foreign non-Arab forces can be harmful. It is desirable that this work should be done by his Arab opponents, and at any rate open Western provocation of Nasser is likely to strengthen him and make him more popular in the Arab world.

The Americans ~~Sought~~ Seek the solution to the void in the Middle East and the problem of ~~the~~ Nasser by encouraging the Bagdad Pact and the strengthening of Saud, with whom there are of course essential matters of oil and bases.

Against these aims we had the traditional friendship of the US to Israel and especially the valuable asset of sympathetic public opinion. This sympathy required attention but developed as a result of internal American factors and reached wonderful peaks especially in the months January and Febuary.

## The Demand for Action against the Soviet Threat.

From the beginning of November the matter of the Soviet threat to Israel's existence was the central point of our contacts with the State Department. We requested that the US come out with a sharp statement against the voicing of these threats and especially against their implementation.

This desperate need for US support not only did not improve our stand with the State Dept. but also gave it the advantage of pressure on us. Intead of demanding and insisting that the US understands the justice of our activity in Sinai, desists from placation and supports our proposed solution, we were forced to request patronage and defence.

Until the end of November they put us off, saying that they were aware of our problems and were considering how to assist.

On November 30, a new factor was added to the feeling that the US was ignoring the Soviet ~~Government~~ threat against Israel. On that day, the US Government published a declaration against attack on the Bagdad Pact States, which stated inter alia:

"In recent days we have been alive to the serious threats ~~upon~~ to peace and security in the world. The UN's action has put an end to the war in the ~~M~~ M-E- and the world has been given a new opportunity to act according to the UN Charter for the solution of existing serious problems and to assist the States in the area to maintain their integrity and independence".

"The Bagdad Pact States have proved, in the last few weeks, their preparedness to exert their influence in the interests of the free world and peace throughout the world. The US supported the principles and aspirations of the Bagdad Pact and is prepared to assist the member States to maintain their security: The US takes a serious view of the threat to the integrity and

our proposed solution, we were forced to request patronage and defence.

Until the end of November they put us off saying that

and independence of these States".

We regarded as a serious ~~failing~~ omission, the lack of mention of Israel in this warning. We also pointed out the absence of a separate parallel announcement warning the USSR against ~~her~~ its direct threats upon us.

We decided to present a letter to the State Dept. demanding some public expression in view of the USSR's threats. On December 1, Shiloach presented the letter to Rowntree. His appeal was also based upon their support for the Bagdad Pact countries. Shiloach stated that in view of Moscow's threats to ~~upon~~ the very existence of Israel, the silence of the US would have a most serious meaning. Especially as a number of the Bagdad Pact States, upon ~~whom~~ which the US looks favourably, have come out with declarations on the blotting out of Israel. Rowntree stated that he would pass the letter on to his superiors. As an immediate reaction, he stated frankly that Israel was guilty of defiance towards the UN.

The US wholeheartedly supported these decisions and if ~~she~~ it were to express ~~herself~~ itself at this stage as Israel proposed, ~~her~~ its ability to find solutions to basic problems would be affected and that would be contrary to the interest of Israel. This was not to say that the policy of the US had changed, and ~~she is~~ it was still responsible for maintaining the existence and security of Israel, but the time is not ripe for declaring this policy anew.

Shiloach protested against the word "defiance" and detailed the progress in our discussions with the Secretary General, but Rowntree maintained that the US must consider how certain UN members would be impressed and that our withdrawal had not yet been implemented.

This stand of the State Dept. prompted us to adopt indirect methods of influencing the Government's policy.

a. Mobilisation of American public opinion [redacted]

b. Mobilisation of support in the American Congress. In this sphere the possibility of action was limited as long as the Congress recess continued, ending in January.

c. Mobilisation of the support of W. European States to

b. Mobilization of support in the American Congress. In

urge the US Government in the spirit of our demands. This we did in the framework of the Assembly by the Foreign Minister's talks with the Western Foreign Ministers and friendly delegations at UN. We also exploited the NATO Conference in Paris in mid-December.

Our propaganda machinery and its asscoaites produced pamphlets and booklets, special surveys and reprints of speeches and memoranda, collections of articles and caricatures in thousands of copies; prepared instructional material for lecturers and distributed material for prepared by the Foreign Ministry in Israel. For example, background material on Fedayin, the Arab refugees, the Bay of Eilat and the Straits, Gaza and Egyptian belligerence, reprints of our main speeches in the Assembly, a series of articles by Brig. General Marshall on the Suez Campaign, and a collection of Egyptian documents captured in Sinai, were published.

What we had to say appeared also in closed circles of industrial and commercial tycoons whose opinion carried wieght with the formulators of American public opinion. More than once I was invited to select clubs in Wall Street which wanted detailed documented explanations based upon the examination of maps and statistics.

The most effective instrument is obviously mass communication, television, radio and press. There was almost no problem of finding platforms. The television networks were under the pressure of listeners - viewers, particularly as a counter to the appearances of other representatives. I received copies of letters to the stations demanding that they invite me to appear, "as the American people is entitled to know the whole truth."

The Press was full of news and articles about us. All these months Israel was in the headlines. No day passed without an outstanding front page headline, and articles and commentry on us occupied almost every political weekly.

Our press conferences were accompanied by interest and were reflected in articles penetrating from there into the minds and ~~ears~~ of ordinary people and statesmen. If one ~~attained~~ got a good article in the New York Times, it was certain that many of the makers of American foreign policy would be impressed by it. Among the UN delegates, this paper became a sort of Bible. On more than one occasion it occured that, in a debate with an Arab delegate on an Assembly platform, we attacked each other with quotations from that morning's edition.

In public opinion our cause had ups and downs. We enjoyed great understanding which readhed a peak when our action was described as a justified security measure, but, when this was replaced by the impression that we it was different were abandoning this line and turning the campaign into a belligerent cause, whose objective was conquest. Now, after we had agreed in principle to withdraw, we saw the possibility of bringing public opinion back to where it had been previously, even though a hint of suppicion remained in relation to the honesty of this agreement. It was possible to hope that, towards the reopening of the discussion in the Assembly, we could ~~adopt~~ wear the mantle of a State that is prepared to sacrifice a great achievement, from its own point of view, on the ~~other~~ altar of world peace, on condition that a number of essential matters, such as passage in the Eilat Gulf and quiet on the Gaza border, was assured.

One of the most difficult tasks, and perhaps the most difficult one, was the definition of our stand in a flexible and persuasive manner. Here there was a double difficulty:

a) How to explain to the American community unacceptable ideas, positions rejected by the UN.

b) The need for continious adaptation of our propaganda to the changes that took place in our stand.

The content of our argument, the P.M's instruction and the memmoranda "On the crisis in the M. E.

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On November 11, we received the briefing of the Prime Minister sent to the State's representatives in various countries concerning the lines of explanation that we were to adopt.

This briefing established the following lines:

1. That one must not permit the Egyptian army to return to the Sinai desert, and thereby to turn the canal in effect (if not de jure) into an international Canal.

2. That the international force must remain in the Canal Zone, and only in the Canal Zone, and thereby to ensure free passage for all countries without dependence on Egypt.

3. That one must demand of Egypt that it discuss a stable peace with Israel, that the armistice agreements had been finally destroyed, and that from the beginning there was no intention that it become a permanent arrangement, but was intended to serve as a passage to the attainment of a state of peace.

4. That the straits of Eilat and the Western coast of those Straits were vital to Israel - that their retention in Israel's hands would ensure free Israel and international passage in the Red Sea. This shipping was a vital economic need to our State and it could bring benefit to all the peoples of Africa and others who required the port of Eilat for sea commerce or to convey oil to the Mediterranean not via the Suez Canal, which Egypt could block from time to time as it had now done.

5. The real nature of Nasser's regime:

A Fascist and military dictatorship, which depresses the Egyptian people in order to establish a bloated military power upon which the regime rests. It utilises the farming of religious Moslem and racialist Arab instincts against every other people in order to implement expansionist aspirations over the whole Moslem world.

6. In the Arab world - in Egypt and Syria too - there are many forces and people who oppose the regimes and aspirations of Nasser and Kuwatly, but they require active assistance from the free world in order to rid themselves of these two malignant people. These lines of argument were also woven into the memo on "The Crisis in the M.E." which I prepared in mid-November, for an enlightenment campaign to supplement discussions with people close to the Government and who shaped public opinion.

The memo is composed of four chapters. In the first - "The Sinai Campaign", I endeavoured to describe to American readers, in their concepts, the danger that Egypt constitutes for Israel. The difference between the US and Israel in regard to evaluation of the danger that threatened Israel stemming essentially from ~~the~~ geographical proximity. If such a danger had lurked on ~~the~~ US border, then ~~xxx~~ Americans would be no less sensitive than we. Here there was a description of the belligerent activities and the military preparation and an explanation why Israel, ~~xxxxxx~~ with its small area cannot permit itself to wait for a situation of "Pearl Harbour", or to rely on external aid to come, if it comes at all, only after the first attack.

In the second section - "The fall and rise of Nasserism" I pointed out that before the start of the Anglo-French action, Nasser's regime was about to fall under the shock of Israel's lightning campaign, but the process was halted and the opportunity lost. The fables concerning the military power of Nasser and of Arab solidarity under his leadership were exploded. Had his downfall been complete, the road would have been opened to a correction of Arab relationships with the West and the concentration of the Arabs on solving their internal problems. This would have been a heavy blow to the USSR ~~who~~ which spurred Egypt on and in her hour of trial did not come to her aid. Europe was about to free itself from the torture that threatened ~~her~~ its economy, security and independence.

Now Nasser had been rescued from complete extinction

by the UN because the US had seen fit to assist his revival. In any case Nasser's rescue was credited, by the Arabs, to the USSR. It transpired that what could have been a victory for the West became a victory for the USSR and Nasser.

The third chapter, on "Solution by the UN", opens with the question whether the West is entitled to ignore its own good and chain itself to an approach through the UN, while the USSR and Nasser ignore the laws of the UN. Dependence upon the UN alone without the US ~~the US~~ developing a special "Western" diplomacy has brought about a number of evils already.

(a) The UN gave patronage to Nasser, one of the main violators of the Charter both in relation to Israel and in relation to the States which require the Suez Canal.

(b) While UN pressure bought about the agreement to withdraw, on the part of Israel, Britain and France, it was unable to be of avail in Hungary ~~and~~ or to restrain the USSR.

(c) The Soviet-Arab covenant in the UN with its many votes, against which there is no consolidated Western stand, lays the UN open to anti-Western decisions. If the US accepts the judgement of the UN in advance without endevouring to influence it in accordance with Western interests it is obvious that the fate of the West (is sealed) at the UN.)

The conclusion is that the US must intervene efficiently in order to direct the discussions and decisions at the Assembly with the objective of not bringing about decisions hostile to Israel, Britain, France, Europe and all those that have an interest in Suez.

A fourth chapter on "The Future" opens with the assumption that the solution must be in keeping with UN policy and simultaneously ~~to~~ ensure the vital interests of the Western World, including Israel.

The US must cooperate with the West and Israel before and not after the decisions have become crystallised at the UN.

It is not enough to demand a withdrawal, one must direct the line of withdrawal and its timing, for the system of withdrawal is likely to affect the future. One must negate a process of withdrawal before the UN army which will be followed by the Egyptian army coming in to fill the void left by the withdrawal of the UN army itself. That is a reversion to the status quo with all its dangers, even though it can perhaps be reconciled with UN decisions.

The other method is to exploit the flexibility of the UN decisions.

The UN army must not withdraw from the Suez Canal before the freedom of passage, for Israel as well, is assured, as embodied in the resolutions of the Assembly and the Security Council.

In order to ensure the freedom of passage in the Bay and the Straits, Nasser must not be permitted to return to the region. This can be attained by agreement between the UN and Israel. Recent experience revealed the drawbacks of Suez. The Gulf of Eilat has advantages and it can serve as an alternative that will allow the Europe to breath with two "lungs" instead of one.

The idea of the demilitarisation of Sinai gained support. A demilitarised Sinai would contribute to the security of both Israel and Egypt. In order to attain this aim one must not permit the Egyptian army to return before a final settlement or a local military settlement.

Gaza in the hands of the Egyptian army again would serve as the source of continuous tension between Egypt and Israel and keep the refugees tied to their camps. Gaza is not Egyptian territory and Egypt does not even claim it. Her only interest in Gaza was as a base for belligerency. Israel is examining how to contribute to a solution of the problem of the refugees, and in the meantime one must leave the integration of Gaza into Israel as an open possibility.

If one does not have the possibility of drawing basic solutions from the negotiations, then the opportunity of laying the foundations for stable relationships will be missed and the danger of a flare-up in the M.E. will be renewed.

One must not neglect the idea of a final settlement. Whether direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs is possible at this stage or not, it is just as well that the UN should support this idea. Therefore it is desirable that the American proposal that suggests the establishment of a mediation committee (of November 3) be amended and suggest direct negotiations.

The fact that Nasser has up to now refused to discuss anything with Israel does not mean that now that he has to be thankful to the US and the UN he should not be urged to do so. Conditions for exerting pressure upon him have been created and they dare not be wasted. This can also be a propitious time to air programmes of national and regional development and to provide guarantees for the integrity of Israel.

This memorandum crystallised ideas that we had developed in scores of discussions - formal and informal - from the beginning of November. They were the subjects for exchanges of opinion with statesmen and journalists, with people close to the Government, for the preparation of speeches, lectures and interviews, for discussions on public platforms, on radio and television, and for background talks with the Press.

Most of the ideas were well received; they were sometimes quoted verbatim in the Press, in articles, or in leaders. The appeal against the worship of the UN made an impression, coming as it did from someone who could not be regarded as a dissentient to the idea of the UN and was not unfamiliar with its workings.

## Talks with Western Foreign Ministers 6

The Assembly was an excellent opportunity for an exchange of views with Foreign Ministers and especially West European Foreign Ministers who had come to New York. These talks had a double aim: to persuade them; and to induce them to exert influence on the US.

On November 15, the Foreign Minister spoke to Pinay. I participated. We suggested that the Foreign Ministers of Europe

and NATO make a united assault upon the US to explain that the success of Nasser-USSR implies the collapse of Europe. . Pinay promised to make a personal effort in Washington and to speak with other Foreign Ministers. We agreed to act separately but in constant coordination. Pinay agreed to our demand that Egyptian forces do not return to Gaza and Sinai, and told us that Lodge had mentioned that if Israel succeeded in making a substantial contribution to the solution of the refugee problem, ~~she~~ it would ~~not~~ have no difficulty in acquiring international recognition of her status in Gaza. According to him, Lodge stated that it was important not to revert to the conditions that had caused the explosion, and if the situation recurred there is no doubt that Israel would return to Sinai. Pinay hinted that under such circumstances France would help.

That day the Foreign Minister, Comay and I met ~~with~~ Pearson. He agreed that one must not return to the past and maintained that the difficulty was that the Russians ~~are~~ were exploiting the split in the Western Powers and it was essential to unite them again. He understood our argument about Gaza and showed interest in the possibility of demilitarising Sinai and Tiran. He did not try to insist on unqualified withdrawal on our part. When we claimed that the American action at the UN had saved Nasser and increased the Russian danger, he replied that what had been done was the best ~~that had been~~ possible ~~thing~~ under the circumstances. Great efforts had been made to prevent worse resolutions on the part of the majority of UN States, and especially against our being censured as aggressors. In his opinion, if the British and French had continued for another day or two, they would have attained the immediate objective, but the political loss would have been much greater, as the Asiatics would then have left the family of nations.

In his opinion, it was ~~desirable~~ good that the American suggestion had been raised at the Assembly, not in order that the Plenary deals with it, for that ~~is~~ was impracticable, but just in order to transfer the matter to a limited committee, as ~~was~~ had been done with the partition plan in 1947. He said he intended to speak to the Americans about that.

In the course of time a great deal of internal criticism was aimed at the Government of Canada ~~from inside~~ because it had not supported ~~England~~ Britain and France, and Pearson had to make a supreme effort to mediate between the US and ~~England~~ Britain in order to prevent an unbearable crisis in Canadian policy.

The following day, the Foreign Minister and I spoke to the British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, the Norwegian Lange and the Dutch Luns. Luns agreed with us in everything and promised assistance at the UN and in Washington. Lange was friendly but more reserved, questioning the wisdom of the military campaign. On the other hand, he was positive in relation to our demands for the present and the future.

Lloyd was confused when the Foreign Minister brought up the words of his Ministry's spokesman which signified that Britain expects us to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza. Lloyd stressed that Britain does not insist on the withdrawal of our forces to any particular point and hopes to coordinate our stands. ~~England herself~~ Britain itself would like to remain in the Canal until the UN ~~would~~ undertakes that the international force will remain until the settlement of the Canal, but the fear of oil supplies being cut off by the Arab countries without compensation from the US bred doubts. Lloyd read a memmorandum drawn up by the Foreign Office which proposed relying upon the 1947 decision for the solution of the Palestine problem. We objected to this violently and apparently influenced him.

On 19/~~11~~ November, the Foreign Minister spoke to the Australian Foreign Minister Casey. He said that the Americans expected us to be "hard" in the negotiations on the stages of withdrawal, and he himself recommended that ~~we~~ be so. He suggested that we present the Americans with a package deal that would include something to calm their fears about an additional flare-up on the Syrian border, and a detailed description of our demands in relation to Egypt, Sinai and the Gaza Strip. In relation to Sinai, he asked whether we would object to the demilitarisation of a deep strip. He expressed the opinion that our agreement to the dimilitarisation of a thin strip on our side even if it be

only a strip of half a kilometer would alleviate things politically. He also asked how many refugees we would be prepared to accept in exchange for the annexation of Gaza. Casey promiced to speak with the US President and at the UN in the spirit of our stand.

On the morrow the Foreign Minister spoke to the Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, ~~with the participation of Nagar~~. He also considered that one must not return to the staus quo, but did not know how to ~~bring~~ get Egypt to agree to the demilitarisation of Sinai. In his opinion we should ask for the assistance of the UN to solve our problems. He said that he saw no ~~gain~~ profit in our demand for direct negotiation with Egypt. In his opinion we would do better to aim for the establishment of a committee for "good ~~services~~ offices". He stressed that our main effort must be concentrated on Washington as the Americans were still very bitter and the influence of the European leaders on Washington was very limited.

Summarising the Situation

On 22/~~11~~ November I summarised our ~~propaganda~~ public relations efforts in a cable to Israel:

"In her talks with the Foreign Ministers of Europe and the Commonwealth the Foreign Minister stressed the importance of a united action in Washington to bring the US closer to our stand.

The Foreign Ministers of Britain, Francem Holland, Belgium, New Zealand and Australia visited Washington and some of their Ambassadors told me of their impressions. Out of this whole effort the following conclusions appear:

(a) The only serious action of the US was in connection with the Soviet threat of volunteers. The National Security Council took serious decisions and activated the fleet and air-force in

addition to the President's warnings. At this moment the impression is that the USSR and/the Arabs will hesitate before provoking the US more by specific Soviet military activity in the M.E.

(b) On the other hand, the US has not yet revealed readiness to bridge the gap ~~that was~~ revealed between ~~her~~ it and Europe. ~~She~~ It continues to stress that one must renew the alliance and ~~to~~ return ~~the~~ relationships with Israel to what they were, but that first one must implement the undertakings of England, France and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt. Our contention that, if the US does not assist us in these vital negotiations, a victory will be chalked up for Nasser, and a number of essential interests of the West will suffer, has not penetrated. At the present, ~~the~~ pressure is being put on Britain on the basis that if ~~she~~ it withdraws, then France and Israel will hurry to do likewise.

(c) In relation to our conditions and demands, Murphy expressed interest in the demilitarisation of Sinai and assured us that under no circumstances would the blockade on the Bay be renewed, and Clay maintained that no-one in the US dreams that Egyptian forces will return to Gaza. On the other hand the Americans do not consider that we have to remain in the Bay. In relation to Gaza, they hint that, if we reveal our intentions in relation to the refugees, they will define their stand in relation to the idea of Israel remainingin Gaza. The US is taking no initiespecially tive to persuade Hammarskjold of ~~their~~ its conceptions; his stand appears to be even more rigid than that of the US.

(d) The President has repeated that the UN must handle the crisis and the US will support it. We have explained to a number of his friends that, if the US ~~will~~ takes up a passive attitude and does not establish a pro-Western stand, the decisions and conclusions of the UN are likely to be undesirable even to the US, reflecting the Soviet-Asiatic policy in the M.E. I have no basis for saying as yet that we have succeeded in moving the US from this stand. Without the US, the Israel-European camp does not ~~draw~~ command real respect from Hammerskjold.

(e) The US continues to maintain the need for a swift and permanent solution, but it is not yet known when ~~she~~ it will put ~~her~~ its proposal for

a new peace committee. The US does not intend to ask the Assembly for the specific lines for a settlement. The fate of the committee's decision is doubtful.

(f) The press, radio and public opinion are sympathetic both in relation, both to the understanding of our stand and ~~in relation~~ to the need to abolish the situation of hostility and to lay the foundations for a more stable situation.

(g) Although the process of bringing the American stand to a compromise is much more difficult and slow than was anticipated in the light of the united pressure of Israel, Britain and Europe, we all consider that it is desirable to gain time, in case all these efforts bear fruit that is not yet evident. This assumption guides us in our ~~collaboration~~ cooperation with the British and French, ~~cooperation that~~ which is very close, especially with the latter."

A number of these assumptions of mine were verified ~~by~~ at the visit which General Clay paid to the Foreign Minister, by his definition of the American policy as follows:

(a) The US Government feels a deep moral obligation to ensure the existence and independence of Israel. At the same time if the Soviets win over the Arab world then this will seal the fate both of the interests of the West and of Israel, hence the US must safeguard ~~her~~ its influence and status in the Arab world that has not yet been won over by Nasser.

(b) The Government sees Nasser as a negative influence and would like to see him fall, but the method chosen by France and ~~England~~ Britain was a failure. True, if the British had hurried to end their portion of the campaign the situation would have been different, but the British military failure was a most terrible event. On the other hand the military success of Israel was most impressive and won military esteem despite the differences of opinion concerning the actual wisdom of the initiative.

(c). It is clear that one must not return to the previous bad situation, but one must make an effort to expedite a permanent settlement.

(d) The main thing at the moment is to prevent Soviet penetration. The US Government took energetic public, diplomatic and "other"

steps in order to warn the USSR against interference. It appears to him that it is clear to the USSR that intervention in the M.E. means war. During the previous week, the movements of the US fleet and air-force were better known to the the USSR than to the American people.

(e) The US will assume close relationships with Britain, France and Israel again, but when ~~she~~ it does so it is important that ~~she~~ it does not abandon the Arab-Moslem world to the Soviets.

(f) There is no harm in the Canal being closed for a short time. Europe will learn that it is possible to live without the Canal with the aid of the American Continent, and the Arabs, including Nasser, will suffer such financial losses that they will see that the dependence between the West and the Arab world is mutual and not one-sided.

## The Discussion at the General Assembly and the exchange of views with the Secretary General (until the end of November)

The 11th Assembly opened on ~~the~~ 12th November under the shadow of the "question discussed at the ~~special~~ emergency session of the General Assembly of the 1st to 10th November".

The acceptance of Tunis, Morocco and Sudan ~~increased~~ enlarged the camp of the enemy. This, after the acceptance of a number of Asian States the previous year, increased our isolation (the 19 new members included 5 Arabs, 4 Communist, 4 Asians and 5 Catholics). Our chances of being chosen for a central function in one of the committees decreased (and in fact the only candidate that we proposed, who was head and shoulders above the other candidates, was defeated) and we were not invited to join any group initiating any proposal. It was as if we were "ostracised". The balance of powers in the Assembly sealed the fate, in advance, of any initiative to make a proposal in our favour. The chances had gone of mobilising two thirds in favour of any resolution that 11 Arab States, 8 Soviet bloc States and even another 8-9 others out of the remaining 60 States would oppose. Even the mobilisation of a third in order to defeat a third vote had

become a difficult and complex thing. Until now the Afro-Asian bloc had been uniformly opposed to us, while the Western States had remained disunited in initiative and attitude.

Our matter only came up for discussion on ~~xxx~~ 23/~~11~~ November. One of the reasons was the journey of the Secretary General to Egypt to look at the problems of organising the international force from close and to speak to Nasser. When he had an idea in which spheres he could manoeuvre with Nasser, he turned his pressure upon us.

On 19/~~11~~ November Hammarskjold sent letters to us, the French and to the ~~English~~ British, requesting answers to four questions: (1) Had any withdrawal of forces been made? (2) Could something be stated about plans for withdrawal? (3) What was the reason that there had been no progress or that there had not been greater progress in the implementation of the decsion? (4) What, in the opinion of the Governments ~~affected~~ concerned, was the situation in implementing the cease-fire?

On November 21, the Foreign Minister, Kidron and I met the Secretary General. He raised the issue of the disturbances in the Gaza Strip and requested that he be allowed to send Observers from the international force, insisting on this despite our assurances that the area was quiet. For better effect, he sent his request in writing and requested a reply in writing, promising to keep the correspondence secret. We agreed that Observers be sent, and the promice of secrecy of the correspondence was shortly broken.

He did not maintain the dependence of the withdrawal upon any permanent arrangements such as non-renewal of the blockade and guarantees against aggression, but again demanded replies to the four questions. He pointed out that the functions of the international force do not include the implementation of ~~all~~ all terms of the the Assembly's resolution of November 2 (cease-fire, withdrawal of the forces, non-entry of forces and arms into the area, cleaning of the Canal, renewal of passage and its guarantee), but it might serve to guard the ~~xxxx~~ equipment that was used for the

clearing of the Canal. In relation to the stationing of the force, he said that he had rejected Egypt's demand to place it on both sides of the border, even though this was desirable for the maintenance of ~~the~~ peace.

He admitted that one should exploit the situation in order not to return to the confused arrangements of the armistice agreement and the Observers' staff. In his opinion, it was possible to do something about the non-renewal of the blockade, as the UN could not countenance a blockade.

During the day I brought him the replies to the questions and we continued the discussion. The answer which I drafted said: (a) Our forces had been withdrawn along the whole length of the front to various distances. (b) We will honour our undertaking of November 8 with the completion "of satisfactory arrangements with the UN in connection with the international force." The arrangements that we allude to are such that they will ensure the security of Israel from a renewal of the threat or the danger of attack or belligerent activities on land or sea (with this wording I endeavoured to widen the scope of the condition upon which the withdrawal was based). (c) The Government of Israel had therefore been given the opportunity to discuss with the UN the abovementioned arrangements. ~~She~~ It awaits details on the plans for our fate, for the stationing of the UN ~~army~~ force and ~~to~~ the form in which it is intended to fulfil the functions imposed upon it, in addition to ensuring the cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. (d) Israel expects answers to the five questions which ~~she~~ it sent to the Secretary General on November 3. (e) Israel is observing the cease-fire.

I added verbally to the Sec.Gen. that there were two alternatives for the implementation of the withdrawal of forces. (a) That the international force will replace the armies of Israel, France and Britain and immediately be replaced by Nasser's army and (b) That the UN ~~army~~ force remain in the Canal Zone, Sinai and the Bay. The first possibility would not only encounter our objection, but would immediately result in another upheaval. The second possibility was likely to ensure stability and perhaps

even peace. Hammerskjold agreed that one dare not miss the opportunity and return to the status quo, and in relation to Sinai he commented that the idea of demilitarisation is attractive but there is a legal difficulty in preventing Egypt from return to an area which belongs to it from the legal point of view. Perhaps the best idea was that the UN people stay in the main centres so that the Egyptian army would not be able to maintain effective lines of communication in the peninsula. Afterwards it will be possible to talk of demilitarisation by agreement in the framework of the armistice.

Following upon my comment that the annexation of Gaza to Israel is not a concession to Israel but implies the assumption of a great responsibility by Israel, he begged me desperately that we do not hurry to withdraw from Gaza, We must not cause a void suddenly. I told him that we had not yet decided finally but he need not fear an unexpected withdrawal.

This discussion took place a day after he had published his reports on the UN force, preparations for the clearing of the Canal and the implementation of the Assembly decisions regarding the withdrawal.

These reports were the subjects of the Assembly's discussions on November 23. An Afro-Asian proposal was put to that session expressing "serious concern" that the decision on the withdrawal had not been implemented, again calling upon Britain, France and Israel, and instructing the Sec.Gen. to report "without delay" on its implementation. A second resolution was proposed by Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, the US and Yugoslavia instructing the Sec. Gen. to continue with the implementation of the UN force and the clearing of the Canal.

I spoke at the afternoon session. I again justified our action and gave a description, which I had received shortly beforehand from Zahal, of the conversion of Sinai by the Egyptians into a perfect army base with equipment, stores, fortifications, roads and air-fields as required for agressive action. I mentioned the Egyptian army documents that had fallen into our hands and the hostile intent that was apparent in them. I asked the Assembly whether it was prepared to allow Nasser to continue his hostility

under UN patronage. I commented that the matter of a cease-fire should not be lightly considered by the UN, and that it should be mindful of another precedent - what Egypt had done when she was ordered to cease-fire by the Security Council in May 1948, and rejected the order claiming that it conflicted with a superior objective which ~~she~~ it had set for ~~herself~~ itself when ~~her~~ its forces entered Palestine. I mentioned that the decision of November 2 also calls for the cessation of incursions, for the permission of free passage and desisting from belligerence in general. I again confirmed our undertaking to retreat in accordance with the implementation of the international force according to the task placed upon it, and added that these aims cannot be dictated by Egypt. I rejected the conception that Egyptian forces can advance in the wake of the UN forces, because then the UN force would become a cover for the renewed hostility of Egypt on Israel's border. Here I pointed out the two methods of implementing the withdrawal. The one that we retire without considering the future, even if this be a return to the status quo, i.e. to the renewal of the Egyptian belligerent base, and the other that we retire while ensuring that the hostility will not recur and thus prevent a new tragedy. I pointed out that there was a possible means of assuring that "the historic barren desert becomes a bridge of peace between States" without going into details. I said, without elaborating, that it was possible to solve the problem of Gaza without it once again becoming the source of a disturbance of the peace between Israel and Egypt, and mentioned Egypt's crime in closing the Canal to out ships. Finally I pointed out the eternal contradiction between Egypt's claim to rights of belligerency and ~~her~~ its obligations to the Charter.

Lodge, who spoke the next day, repeated the need for expediting the withdrawal. There was a positive innovation in his speech when he explained that the US favours

withdrawal coordinated with the entry of the UN force, and that no State (read Egypt) is entitled to dictate the actions of this army. But this positive stand did not find expression, to the exasperation of its Western allies, in the proposal that the US put forward. To the rancour of the French and British, Lodge maintained that the withdrawal of forces from Port Said does not have to be delayed until the Canal is cleared, demanding on the other hand that the cleaning start soon, even while those forces are still there.

During the session, we became aware that our general reply regarding the withdrawal of a portion of our forces was not satisfactory, and so we consulted with Israel, and ~~it transpired that~~ we were able with no difficulty to make more specific details known - that four units had been withdrawn from Sinai. We quickly informed the Sec.Gen. about the withdrawal of two units, keeping back the information about the other two for a later opportunity.

This session saw the first crystallisation of a united Western front, and one must appreciate the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Spaak, who proposed far-reaching amendments to the proposal on withdrawal. The European Block still appeared to be very weak as compared to the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs working together, but the very existence of organised European initiative was encouraging. When the Belgian proposal was put to the vote, it received only 23 votes, including Israel. 33 opposed, including a number of Latins, and 18 abstained, including the US. It was a saddening sight because there is no comparison between the real weight of Europe and the Commonwealth in the world and their numerical weight in the Assembly.

The Afro-Asian resolution was softened during the day in order to gain support, but its drafters retained the distorted version that we had not withdrawn troops to any extent at all.

I asked for the floor in order to contradict this mistaken assumption. I repeated what we had announced to the Sec. Gen. but my words fell on deaf ears and the wording was not altered.

The amended Afro-Asian resolution and the proposal of the six States relating the the UN force and the cleaning of the Canal were passed by a large majority.

This was the forth resolution calling for withdrawal.

The Assembly continued the discussion on November 26-28 with the problems of the organisation of UN ~~army~~ force, its financing and implementation being the central points.

On the 26th in the morning the Foreign Minister spoke. She again expressed our protest against the Afro-Asian resolution that was confirmed on the 24th November, which was based on a distorted assumption that there had been no withdrawal of Israel forces, despite the facts that the Assembly had our two announcements sent to the Sec.Gen on the 24th (the one at 10a.m. and the other at 3 p.m.) and even though the delegation's representative again brought the facts before the Assembly before the voting. "The excuse of the initiators of the proposal that they voted only on what was already included in the Sec.Gen's report" - maintained the Foreign Minister - "sounded very odd. The Assembly is not dealing with the history of the past, but with current facts... Must we conclude that the language of the proposal is more important than the action which it involves?" The second excuse, made by India, was that it was not clear whether the two units which were withdrawn were actually withdrawn to beyond the border. This assumption ~~was invited in the clarification with~~ had been clearly disproved by the Israel delegate, but the supporters of the resolution took no notice. "I am certain" - stated the Foreign Minister - "that all the members of the Assembly are honestly interested that the moral authority of resolutions adopted should be unblemished". Finally she again announced that we ~~are~~ were prepared to enter into ~~clarifications~~ negotiations on arrangements regarding the UN ~~army~~ force.

This discussion with the authors of the resolution of November 24 shows how we were faced with a wall of preconceived notions and stubbornness. The moral countenance of the leaders of the campaign of pressure against us - Krishna Menon and his like - showed up in its full brilliance in the discussion on Hungary and was due to shed light on the discussion on Kashmir.

The Assembly ratified the proposal made by the Sec.Gen. according to which he was given authority to open an account for the financing of the UN ~~army~~ force and the clearing of the Canal.

The US, England and France were among those for. The Soviets objected and were were in the diverse company of Asiatics and Latins who abstained.

In the meantime, the UN ~~army~~ force was being organised. On November 27, the Sec.Gen. announced that 23 States had placed some 4,400 officers and men at the disposal of the force. 1,400 of them were already in Egypt, and the intention was that this force would take over the Canal Zone by the middle of December. It was clear that the time had arrived to open the discussions with the UN on the arrangements connected with the International force before we were faced ~~by~~ with undesirable proposals and perhaps facts - as the next stage was the allocation of a portion of this force to Sinai.

Negotiations with the Secretary General on withdrawal and guarantees.

On November 26, the Foreign Minister sent a letter to Hammerskjold ~~where~~ in which she proposed we continue the discussion that had begun five days before. The letter contained a complaint of sorts that the Sec.Gen did not show too much alacrity in hearing our arguments. Hammerskjold grasped the hint and understood that he must enter into serious negotiations.

In reply he mentioned his request of November 11 that Israel send him ~~her~~ its proposals in writing so that he could examine them before the verbal discussions. He ended his letter with the sentence "obviously I will not permit (!) that this delays in any manner the withdrawal of Israel forces as obliged by the unqualified and unconditional demand of the General Assembly".

This attitude softened ~~with~~ after a day, apparently because of a frame of mind that began to overtake the State Dept., which was very keen in its efforts to start the negotiations between Israel and Hammerskjold.

On November 28, internal consultations took place in the State Dept. headed by Hoover as a result of which instructions were sent to Lodge. No attitudes towards final solutions were

crystalised, but it was decided to concentrate on "intermediate arrangements" in relation to the Bay, Sinai and Gaza. We had grounds for the belief that our main contention that there must be no return to the status quo, which was already accepted in principle by Dulles in his speech of November 2, ~~already~~, was acquiring support.

A situation was created in which the State Dept. was handing us into the custody of Hammerskjold, and at the same time ~~is~~ beginning to influence him positively. In view of the bitter experience in the Assembly we thought that under these circumstances, negotiations with the Sec.Gen were preferable to leaving the subject to the continuous discussion of the Assembly. We had no hope of breaking down the negative routine which had overtaken the Assembly, whereas with Hammerskjold there were apparently hopes of progress - and in any event the chance of gaining time. At that stage it appeared that the fate of the campaign was dependent upon the negotiations with Hammerskjold.

On November 28, Kidron, Rafael and I met ~~with~~ Hammerskjold, (=) Bunche and Staveropoulos, and a series of talks were started that continued for three months.

I expressed reservations about his letter of the 26th to the Foreign Minister and especially the last sentence. I pointed out that, because of the seriousness of the matters, the Foreign Minister had decided not to continue the correspondence on procedure, but to ~~enter~~ start negotiations on the subject itself, and had given me the authority to explain our stand in detail.

I said that we proposed the withdrawal of our forces from Egypt, coordinated, as Lodge had said, with the plan of the international force, and I asked whether he was able to propose an arrangement in relation to the international force that would ensure that under no circumstances would the blockade of the Bay ~~would not~~ be renewed. To this he replied that the UN policy is freedom of passage both in the Canal and in the Bay. On the other hand, he is unable at this stage of developments of the international force to propose a practical arrangement that will ensure this in the Bay, and therefore he proposes that in the plan for the withdrawal of our forces "that will doubtless take some

time" we will leave this point for a later stage, and in the meantime we would remain there. In the course of time, he would perhaps propose to us a temporary international arrangement that would leave time for seeking a permanent solution.

To my question concerning Gaza he told me that we should keep quiet until the time came for a fundamental clarification, and in the meantime we should endevour that there should be no need to arouse the doubtful legal status of our remaining. We should not voice announcements that would force him to reply, we would adopt a reasonable attitude to the inhabitants and avoid quarrels with UN elements on the spot.

In relation to Sinai, I stated that we were interested in demilitarisation in order to avoid the return of Egyptian army. He said that the UN forces could stay at key points of the communications network and wherever UN forces stayed no other force would be. To the question as to who would guarrantee that the UN force would not depart within a short time and then the Egyptian army would enter before agreement on demilitarisation or some other mutual agreement was reached, he answered that in relation to the service of the UN force there was an agreed and calculated black-out. In any event we would have a winter and summer during which the UN force would stay in Egypt, during which period we would seek more stable solutions. In this regard the Assembly and Security Council have rights as well as Egypt has.

He solemnly asked that we draw back our forces from the Canal in order that the British should not have an excuse to claim that they are holding our forces apart, nor be able to throw the responsibility for not cleaning the Canal upon us. He added that the moment we agreed the implementation and publication would be postponed until Burns got together with us, because the object is to introduce UN forces into the eastern bank of the Canal and not to give the Egyptians time to precede them. Here he revealed that the suggestion came from Fawzy, as Egypt was interested first of all in the evacuation from Port Said.

We agreed that, apart from the fact of the existence of the negotiations, nothing would be published, regarding their content.

The process of negotiations with Hammerskjold could superficially arouse hopes ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ of a settlement, but when I came to summarise the content of that meeting for the ~~office~~ Ministry I cabled: "We saw a glimpse of light, but it is just as well to expect ups and downs because the man and the situation are complex". I asked for the P.M.'s instructions as to how I should react to the request for the withdrawal of our forces from the Canal, and suggested ~~xxx~~ the wording for a message to the Sec.Gen that would say that as a result of the process of progressive withdrawal, Israel forces would not be within 30 miles of the Canal on the morning of December 1, that the Government of Israel agrees to contact ~~with~~ Burns in relation to the stationing of UN units in the area between the Canal and the line of ~~her~~ its forces, and that the Israel command will be prepared to assist in implementing this arrangement. It would be pointed out that an additional company would be withdrawn from Egyptian territory to Israel territory beyond the armistice line.

I added that it was important that we should give our announcement soon, otherwise there was a serious danger that the British and French would precede us and then we would lose the tactical advantage and would appear to have dragged after them.

~~[illegible]~~ The P.M. agreed that I ~~should~~ convey the message with certain changes. He particularly insisted that I omit mention of the armistice lines, because we were not to mention ~~any more~~ the armistice line with Egypt under any circumstances any more - neither in public nor in diplomatic announcements. ~~[illegible]~~

He also asked that the text of the announcement be given to the French and the British before it ~~is~~ was presented.

The main question that arose in the P.M.'s opinion was whether the US would support our stand in relation to the Bay, Gaza and the demilitarisation of Sinai. Therefore I was asked to request a discussion at the highest level with the State Dept., in order to

ascertain their stand; it ~~is~~ was desirable that I ascertain their stand but if I do not manage then I was not to hold up the handing over of the announcement.

We told Lodge about our discussion with Hammerskjold and he was very satisfied. We also told the French delegation who passed it on to Pinay. Pinay was ~~xxxxxx~~ to visit London on the morrow in order to determine a final Anglo-French stand in the whole episode.

On November 30 we received instructions from Israel to delay the announcement, as Pinay and Lloyd had requested this.

I reacted in a cable to the P.M. expressing concern that we had decided to respond to the request from LLoyd and Pinay, which is basically the former's demand. The fact of who first announces the withdrawal, Israel or the Anglo-French, is likely to have an important effect on public opinion. If they predede us they will be regarded at having solved the problem of the Canal and we ~~xx~~ as merely following. I ~~reminded~~ recalled that in the episode of the cease-fire they delayed our reply and detracted a great deal from our political and public advantage. I added that I appreciated greatly the spirit and content of the direct assistance that we had received from France, ~~xxx~~ but this did not commit us to harm ourselves in vital matters merely ~~in order~~ to serve the tactical considerations of our most faithful friends, If I ~~am~~ was correct in my assumption that our main aim ~~is~~ was to mend our relationships with the US as our only defence to Soviet hostility, then my opinion ~~as above~~ carried even greater weight.

In the meantime the news agencies spread the news that Britain and France had decided to withdraw their forces from the Canal and that they would publish an annoucement within two days. I received instructions from the ~~office~~ Ministry to precede them in conveying and publishing the annoucement.

I handed the announcement ~~xto~~ to the Sec.Gen on December 1 at 4 p.m., with the date of our withdrawal being set for December 3. He responded that our announcement was most satisfactory, especially at this time, and told us that the ~~English~~ British and French had informed him that they would hand over their announcement in

writing on the morrow. We agreed to continue the negotiations in a day or two.

On December 3 the English and French announced their agreement to withdraw their forces from the Canal.

On December 4 before the meeting between Burns and our people had taken place, a Yugoslavian armoured column entered and took up positions in the area evacuated by Zahal.

On December 4 at noon the second discussion with Hammerskjold took place. Bunche, his military advisor and Stavropoulos. I was accompanied by Kidron and Rafael. A verbatim minute was recorded - not for publication.

Hammerskjold pointed out that the previous meeting had been a sort of free exchange of opinions, whereas now we ~~will~~ would get down to discussions whose content he would have to convey to the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly decision of 7/~~11~~ November. In my reply, I claimed that the decision of the Government of Israel was based upon the conclusions of the first meeting and one cannot regard it as having been unofficial. Hammerskjold agreed.

I asked for his position on the matter of the ~~Xxx~~ straits and he said: The UN must ensure that freedom of passage will exist in the waters of the straits. True, there is a legal problem of territorial waters, but this problem does not detract from the principle of free passage, and in effect one must regard the ~~XXXXX~~ Straits of Tiran like any international waterway, hence the prevention of hostile acts between Egyptian forces and Israel shipping definitely constitutes part of the authority of the international force and its functions*. This official decision will be made at the same time and in the same manner that the free passage in Suez ~~will be~~ is confirmed; but all this at a later stage of the general withdrawal. This was the most positive announcement that we heard from him on the matter of freedom of passage in Eilat.

As to Gaza, after he had heard our stand that Gaza is not part of Egypt and that its legal status was blurred whereas there was a certain political reality, he stated that the turn of Gaza would come at a later stage, ~~even~~ although he had no authority to

discuss political questions with us. He wished to point out that on this question there was a contradition between the terms of the resolutions and Israel's stand. The UN has a legal right, according to the Assembly, to enter Gaza.

When I pointed out that the decision of November 2 demands more than withdrawal - also refraining from incursions, he ~~a~~swered that there was no point in~~xx~~ a discussion on the theory of the indivisible integrity of the decisions. For example, one of the paragraphs demands observance of all the clauses of the armistice~~d~~ while we claim that the agreement is null and void. In his opinion it was better to concentrate on the subjects ~~of the~~ under discussion and not to pay attention to the things stated outside the framework of the negotiations, such as the announcements of Cairo radio or speeches in the Knesset.

Hammerskjold pressed to receive a date for the completion of the withdrawal as this was necessary to plan the movement of UN forces. On the other hand I claimed that it is necessary to know more about the ~~xxxuxixxx~~ state of the force and its development, and I suggested that Burns be in touch with our people. I promised to convey the question of the date to my Government.

He also raised the question of the state of the evacuated area and complained about mines and destruction. I expressed surprise that the Yugoslavs had entered before a meeting between Burns and Dayan had taken place, and stressed that it was preferable to discuss and enter subsequently.

In a ~~separate~~ informal discussion he subsequently explained to Rafael that he wanted the date of the withdrawal to be close to the date of the Anglo-French withdrawal, i.e. mid-December; even if it transpired in discussions with Burns that it must be postponed a little for technical reasons, he proposed that we inform of our preparedness to hand over to the UN ~~army~~ force the whole of Sinai apart from Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza as there are special problems concerning the latter ~~concerning~~ as to which we are consulting with him.

In a personal talk with Kidron, Bunche ~~told~~ said that in the UN Secretariat they were planning the stay of the force for at least

18 months, and that thanks to the transportation that they had acquired they would be able to replace any unit that departed, e.g. the Yugoslavs or Indians, without delay.

We left the initiative at this meeting to Hammerskjold in order to learn his views, because we had not intended to commit ourselves to anything, and also at the meeting between Dayan and Burns we did not have to commit ourselves to anything beyond which we had announced on December 1. We extracted from him a confirmation that the Bay and Straits must be open to free passage, confirmation that the matter of our remaining in Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh is not the subject of discussion in the near future. On the other hand it was apparent that he aspired to station the UN forces in the whole of Sinai apart from these two areas, and he also avoided going into the question as to who will guarantee that Egypt does not return to Sinai.

## Exchange of Cables with the Government towards the continuation of the negotiations with the Secretary General

3'

The Government dealt with the talk with the Sec.Gen and my suggestion, and on December 9 I received an evaluation of the situation and instructions.

Israel's assumptions were that (A) We must gain time without committing ourselves on complete withdrawal in the hope that:

(1) The UN will gradually free itself of the ~~the~~ end of the ~~war~~ fighting and a quieter and more practical atmosphere for discussion would be created in any case.

(2) The UN's attention would concentrate on the matter of Hungary.

(3) The NATO conference would have a beneficial influence in the US.

(4) The pressure of public opinion on the US Government would begin to ~~bear fruit~~ yield results.

(5) The Egyptians would perhaps try to place armed forces in Sinai and thus create difficulties between them and the Sec. Gen.

At the same time, one must avoid a clash with the Sec.Gen. lest he reports to the Assembly and it takes another decision on withdrawal finally mentioning a specific date. It was accordingly suggested that we say to the Sec.Gen that the Israel Govt. understood from our talk on November that it is only required to withdraw for the Canal to be cleared and only after this withdrawal will an additional withdrawal be discussed. But in the light of his request of December 4, the Government decided that the withdrawal would continue and that contact would be made with Burns in this connection. If he was satisfied with this, it was all to the good, and if not, then we could promise on the spot that there would be a withdrawal of 25 kilometres every week.

(B) The withdrawal will be along the length of the Canal only, as the only road connecting with Sharm-el-Sheikh runs through the Pass of Mitleh and the whole area south of Mitleh is necessary for maintaining this link. If he objects strongly, then we would hand over the area containing the Mitleh Pass on condition that the passage of civilian convoys would be allowed, and in any event we required the town of Tor which is the sole source of water for Sharm-el-Sheikh.

(c) We have noted his comments on the Bay and Gaza.

(D) We demand a promise in regard to passage through Suez

(E) We assume that the Sec.Gen. will soon be able to inform us how the international force will fulfil its function of preventing hostile actions and ensure the implementation of everything implied in the decision of November 2.

The Government's assumption was that, in the light of the Sec.Gen's reply we would return to the discussion of the withdrawal every week in the light of developments in Washington and elsewhere, and if we found it necessary to stop the process of withdrawal, we would be able to do so. If, within three weeks, no possibility of stopping the withdrawal revealed itself, we would come to a halt in the first week of January at the El-Arish line and would remain there until we received real assurances. This was on the assumption that until then political conditions would be created enabling us to maintain this political stand.

The Government was afraid that if we gave a date for the completion of the withdrawal apart from Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza, we would tie our hands. On the other hand, if we announced a date for the withdrawal to El-Arish we would immediately become involved.

The delegation was asked to consider this reply. We consulted with the Foreign Minister and on 9/~~12~~ December I commented to Israel that in the light of our clear undertaking to the UN and the US we would not be able to avoid withdrawing from Sinai including El-Arish. ~~[illegible]~~. If we ~~will~~ attain free passage in the Bay and perhaps the Canal, and the non-return of Egyptian forces to Gaza, and a barricade against the renewal of Egyptian power in Sinai, this will be a not ~~inconsequential~~ insignificant victory."

I pointed out that we could not place our hopes in the fact that the Assembly would be preoccupied with Hungary.

In the meantime, the general debate continued in the Assembly. 64 delegations utilised their right to speak. Most of the speakers touched directly or indirectly on the problems of the M.E. In particular the Arab, Asian and Communist delegations grasped this subject, using it as an instrument to preach against belligerence and imperialism, an opportunity to show knowledge in world events. ~~[illegible]~~

There were also many expressions of a positive nature on the part of Latin and European countries, accompanied by a call for a basic effort to bring about peace in the M.E.

Hoover, who spoke on behalf of the US, voiced a sharp warning against the Soviets' threats to send "volunteers" to the M.E. and ~~x~~ called for progress towards basic solutions.

We did not hurry to utilise our right to participate in

the debate. We preferred ~~xxxx~~ to wait until the majority of the Arab and Afro-Asian delegations had had their say, so that our words would not be carried away in the flood of invective.

On November 5, December the Foreign Minister spoke, presenting our matter in its broadest ~~scope on the basis of a~~ scope against the background of a general conception of the problems of peace in the world and the M.E. She ended by calling for peace.

The speeches in the general debate did not generally attract attention but this speech of Golda Meir's ~~enjoyed a~~ had deep ~~reverberation~~ echoes in the Press and at the UN.

In the meantime Hammerskjold returned to the subject of the destructive activities that Zahal had undertaken on withdrawal from Sinai. On December 7 he wrote to me, on the basis of information he had received from Burns, concerning mines that had been laid and sabotage to plants, roads and railways. He pointed out that these ~~deeds~~ acts render the significance of the delay in withdrawal all the more serious and make ~~it difficult for~~ the activities of the international force difficult, and demanded that we desist from them.

On December 10 he asked in addition, through Bunche, that we confirm that in future we ~~will~~ would not plant mines or harm roads, and in particular that we will not harm the air-field at El-Arish. Bunche conveyed that the Egyptians were evincing surprising docility and were accepting the knowledge that the UN ~~army~~ force ~~will~~ would remain in Sinai for many months. They accepted the UN conditions for the clearing of the Canal, agreed to ~~xxxxxx~~ continue negotiations with Britain and France on passage through the Canal, and that the Americans were showing optimism in relation to the possibility of arranging the matter of passage according to the 1888 Treaty and the UN decisions including those in relation to Israel shipping.

On the 10th, Israel informed me that I could convey to the Sec.Gen that instructions had been given not to blow-up anything that could delay the withdrawal or entry of the UN force and that the El Arish air-field ~~will~~ would not be blown up.

We conveyed an announcement about this to the Sec.Gen.

On December 11, the third meeting with the Sec. Gen. took

place. I conveyed our reply in relation to ~~the explosions~~ blowing up. He demanded more explicit undertakings and also spoke about the destruction of villages and wells. It was clear that if he did not receive such promises he would paint a very dark picture for the Advisory Committee which was likely to call on the Assembly and them we would be forced to give way not only on the question of ~~the~~ explosions but also to expedite the withdrawal. The central subject of discussion was the withdrawal from Sinai. I announced that we would be prepared to evacuate an additional strip that week and so on every week, and thus the UN force would be able to take over the greater proportion of Sinai by the first week in January. I stressed that we were not talking about the whole peninsula or about the Bay of Solomon. But parallel to the process of withdrawal, we wished to clarify two vital questions:
(a) The non return of the Egyptian army.
(b) The remaining of the UN force until an overall solution had been found or at least a local one such as demilitarisation.

Bunche appealed about the slow pace. I replied that the pace was determined ~~according to~~ by practical considerations and was influenced psychologically by the lack of explanation regarding the prevention of Egypt's return. We agreed to leave the question of the pace of withdrawal to discussions between Burns and Dayan.

The Sec.Gen. claimed that from the legal point of view he was not able to give orders ~~to~~ regarding the Egyptian army's movements in Egypt's territory. On the other hand, he agreed that the function of the international force ~~is~~ was to prevent hostility, and accordingly he ~~is~~ was able to establish under what conditions the entry of Egyptian forces was likely to disturb the UN army, and then its entry was forbidden. In any event the UN force would assure the separation of forces and would remain in the area as long as its presence was necessary to prevent the renewal of hostilities.

During the period of the UN ~~army's~~ force's stay, one must act for the attainment of a settlement but there was no possibility of beginning to seek a settlement as long as the military problem was not removed.

The question of Gaza was not mentioned at all. On the question of Suez there were discussions that did not have clear conclusions, and so we agreed to leave this problem to a separate discussion. When we raised the question of the Jews of Egypt we found that he avoided strong action.

It transpired that the question of the explosions was likely to bring upon us once again a serious ~~battle~~ fight. The reports in the press on the destruction of villages and the blocking of wells in the desert left a bad impression, and affected the public sympathy that we had mobilised recently. The Indian delegate in the Advisory Committee was already putting pressure on Hammerskjold on this issue. The Asiatics, who were in a quandry as a result of their two-faced stand on the question of Hungary, were interested in incitement. The State Department also invited us to a clarification of this matter.

On the 12th, I informed the Sec.Gen. according to a cable from Israel that instructions had been given to stop all bombing and destruction. Subsequently Bunche told us that the letter arrived a few hours before the Asiatics intended to raise the question at the Assembly.

The next stage on this level was to have been the Burns-Dayan meeting. I suggested that in order to avoid the Assembly that we propose evacuating a strip wider than 25 klms, if the international force was able to position it. I explained that an impressive proposal that week, even at the expense of the following week, was most important.

In reply to this the P.M. gave authority to Dayan to announce the evacuation of a wider strip, if he ~~finds~~ found this necessary according to the development of the talk with Burns.

## A discussion with the members of the Advosory Committee 16

In the meantime we dealt with the Advisory Committee to the Sec.Gen. appointed to assist in the implementation of the decision of November 7. I invited the Ambassadors of Norway, Brazil and Colombia, who together with Canada constituted a majority in the Committee, to

a long talk. Tov, Rafael and Kidron participated with me. I ~~lectured~~ talked on the negotiations with Hammerskjold, and it transpired that he had not kept them well informed of the progress of the negotiations.

All of them were strongly in support of our stand. In relation to the Bay they thought that Hammerskjold's attitude was also positive. The Colombian hinted that it was possible to ensure freedom of passage not just by placing a UN force at Sharm-el-Sheikh and Tiran; ~~but~~ it was sufficient to leave these positions empty by the UN's request, and to have surveys of UN ships to prevent the disturbance of shipping. The advantages of this system are:

(a) That UN soldiers will not be required to degenerate in the desolation of the place.

(b) The permanent placing of a foreign force on Egyptian soil would not arise.

On the other hand, the UN ship conforms with the Sec.Gen's definition that the Bay is an international waterway. It was not clear whether the suggestion was his or if he had heard it at the UN or in Washington.

The general opinion was that on the guarantee of freedom of passage we would have to demand that the UN policy on this matter as defined in our talk with Hammerskjold on December 5, be given officially and directly when we left that area.

On Suez, the Norwegian expressed his certainty that the blockade would not be renewed.

On Sinai, their impression was that we would not attain complete prohibition ~~to~~ of the entry of Egyptian soldiers, but we could attain severe limitations on their movements. They considered the idea of the demilitarisation of a wide strip in the eastern part of the peninsula.

The Colombian said that he ~~is~~ was pressing that the American proposal on a peace settlement be confirmed, and this ~~will~~ would in fact ensure that the UN forces do not move until a settlement is attained. Even if a settlement is not attained, it is important that the UN stand by it in principle and ensure that at least hostile actions

be prevented. All three of them were proponents of the continued stay of the UN ~~army~~ force.

In the meantime an official Egyptian declaration was voiced by Fawzy in the National Press Club in Washington, that Egypt ~~does~~ did not intend to permit the passage of Israel ships in the Canal.

The Secretary General objects to the Dayan-Burns Agreement 56

On December 16 the ~~office~~ Foreign Ministry informed me that Burns and Dayan had met and had agreed that there would be a withdrawal ~~of~~ of 30 miles that week and 15 the following one. Accordingly our forces would, at the beginning of January be some 50 kilometers from El Arish, and also that it was agreed that at this stage we ~~are~~ were not moving from Mitleh

Bunche approached Kidron in the name of the Sec.Gen. to object to the results of this meeting. Initially he maintained that at our meeting of December 12 we had promised that by the beginning of January we would evacuate the greater part of Sinai, but according to the pace that Dayan had set with Burns 4 ~~o~~ 6 weeks would pass before our forces get to the armistice lines. Kidron stated that this pace was agreed upon with Burns and he must have known what he was doing. (The reasons prompting Burns' agreement became clear from his report to the Sec.Gen. that Bunche read to me. Burns explained that he did not press for a wide withdrawal during the first week as he did not have forces to occupy a greater area, and therefore he agreed temporarily to a withdrawal of 25 kilometers in the second week too). We agreed to leave this matter to Burns and Dayan.

From Herzog we received an evaluation that gave us 3 - 4 weeks to "breathe", for political planning and explanatory activities.

I found it necessary to question this estimation as it stemmed from ~~passing~~ changing conditions (a) The British withdrawal was not completed. When it ~~is~~ was complete all the pressure would be brought to bear upon us. (b) Then the question of manpower for the UN

force
army would be alleviated, because a number of the soldiers tied to the Canal could be freed for activities in Sinai, and reinforcements would arrive in the meantime (c) Burns did not know that Hammerskjold was opposed, for political reasons, to the slow pace that appealed to him (Burns) as dictated by reality for technical reasons (and perhaps also for political reasoxns that were close to the Canadian's heart).

In my opinion we had to anticipate pressure to expedite greatly the pace of the withdrawal and therefore we must hurryx in formulating the guarantees and the arrangements that we demanded.

On December 20 the Sec.Gen. invited me to an urgent official meeting in order to return to the matter of the pace of withdrawal. He reminded me that in our talk of December 12 we had announced that by the beginning of January our line would be close to El Arish and the greater portion of Sinai would be in UN's hands, whereas, according to Dayan's announcement to Burns, by January 2 our forces would be sitting 150 kilometers from the armistice lines and be holding 3/4 of Sinai.

According to him, he was obliged to report to the Assembly that Dayan's announcement had created a freezing of the situation he proposed that we examine our proposals again, and he is xxx prepared to listen immediately to the guarantees we are requesting. He maintained that for a number of weeks we had been talking about guarantees but had not explained what we mean.

I answered that the program me of withdrawal had been agreed upon with Burns, and if he objected I had no alternative but to convey that to my Government.

In addition to the talk Hammerskjold read us a cable from Burns which showed that he gained the impression from his talk with Dayan xx that we would be prepared to withdraw our forces from the greater portion of Sinai by the first week in Jnauary, therefore he was amazed, claimed Hammerskjold, by the last plan that was handed over in Dayan's name on 19/12, stating that by the end of the first week in January our forces would remain in 2/3 of Sinai and the UN force would not come to within 100 kilometres of our border.

The Sec.Gen. and his advisers prepared a report for the

Assembly on the crisis created but were prepared to delay it until receipt of our reply.

In consultation withe Foreign Minister we advised Israel to announce readiness to expedite the withdrawal because only in that manner was it possible to avoid the Assembly, which cannot be postponed even by Christmas, and to enter immediately into negotiations about "guarantees".

The following day I received an instruction to reply in the name of the Government:

(a) That the report of the Sec.Gen. ~~is~~ was his business and the Government of Israel refrained from expressing an opinion concerning that.

(b) That at the Burns-Dayan meeting arrangements had been made only for a fortnight and that both had agreed to meet again after Christmas to decide upon continuation.

(c) In consideration of the Sec.Gen's request, the Government of Israel gave instructions to evacuate the area west of El Arish in the first week of January and the greater part of the peninsula ~~will~~ would be evacuated at that time.

(d) The Government would like to know what the Sec.Gen. had done to ensure the Assembly decision in relation to the freedom of passage and against the renewal of fedayin activities.

I conveyed the reply to Bunche at an official meeting and stated our questions (Hammerskjold was preoccupied with the crisis with the British and French in connection with the cleaning of the Canal). We agreed that I would meet soon with Hammerskjold in order to hear his replies to the questions.

After the meeting, Bunche told me that our reply had prevented the convening of the Assembly to deal with a ~~xxxx~~ very bleak report.

That night - a few hours before the Assembly recess, the Sec. Gen. delivered an intermediate report on the condition of the withdrawal. This was, as it were, in reply to questions that were put on the progress of the withdrawal, by ~~xxxxx~~ the Jordan representative ~~xxxx~~ in the debate on the Jews of Egypt, but it is possible that the questions and the announcement were prearranged. He took the trouble to emphasise that, according to our announcement on the evacuation of the area west of El Arish, we

had proposed an unsatisfacory arrangement. He said that the completion of the evacuation would take place at an "unspecified date". He expressed his "understanding" that with the continuation of the evacuation the Israel forces would return to beyond the armistice lines.

The Sec.Gen's announcement was received positively. The inclinations of the Asians might have prompted them to demand a discussion but they must have understood that if the Sec.Gen. and the US were not interested in this they would gain little. In any event it was clear that the matter of our intentions concerning Gaza was pending with a large question mark, and that is how the press commented too.

The developments of the 22nd taught us that we had two weeks at the most until the serious decision whether to withdraw altogether or to stop the withdrawal in order to bargain about guarantees.

On the 26th Burns met the Chief of Staff for a discussion on expediting the withdrawal. Dayan proposed withdrawal to a line that passes west of El Arish, leaving over 60% of Sinai in UN's hands and only supply and communication roads to Sharem-el-Sheikh through the village of Tor on the coast of Suez Bay in Zahal's control. Burns rejected this with the contention that the Sec. Gen's instructions were to demand a withdrawal to a line drawn from the west of El Arish in a S.E. direction to the proximity of Eilat, excepting Sharem el Sheikh and Tiran. He agreed to the line proposed in the El Arish sector, but rejected the line in the south east sector, relying upon a cable from Hammerskjold according to which at a discussion with us in New York we agreed to the line which he demanded. The meeting terminated without agreement.

I was requested to explain to Hammerskjold that Dayan's proposal conformed with our agreement with him and that he should instruct Burns to accept it. The matter was arranged at a meeting with Bunche.

I evaluate the position on December 19

After internal consultations with my colleagues I cabled to the Prime Minister on December 19 how I evaluated the situation and what conclusions I proposed:

a) Before the completion of the withdrawal we would be able to get at most a definition of the UN Force's policy, its function and situation, but not finally to determine the fate of Sinai. At most, we would be able to attain a period of non-belligerence on land and sea and we would have to exploit this for the struggle on the next stage.

b) There was a chance of creating a situation of free passage in the Bay for a certain period; a serious limitation on Egypt's ability to base herself anew in Sinai, and prevention of its forces from returning to Gaza. If we attempted more than this or a final solution of the basic problems at this time, we would be disappointed and perhaps lose all because we aimed too high.

World public opinion and especially in the US opposed a return to the previous security situation. The US had already announced this, and it was possible to explore more possibilities by continuing with the informational efforts. On the other hand, the world recognised Sinai as Egypt's sovereign territory; this was the most weighty and decisive legal and political fact of all. No one was prepared to espouse a negation of this sovereignty. Every State, large and small, will make a most penetrating and sensitive account. The fact that State A fears the belligerence of State B does not give A. the moral right

~~practical~~ to occupy B's territory until the danger of war ~~will pass~~ is past.

Therefore the UN ~~does~~ did not see itself authorised to prevent the return of Egypt to Sinai. At most it ~~can~~ could create certain de facto situations by placing its forces at certain points and thereby preventing Egypt from really ~~rooting~~ rooting itself in. One must not expect that Hammerskjold will be able to undertake more than he has promised. Even were another in his place, there would not have been much value to undertakings that were more far-reaching, at the expense of Egypt's sovereignty.

In addition the the recognition of Egypt's sovereignty, four other facts were operating against us:

1. ~~England~~ Britain and France abandoned their conquests without any real guarrantee. We were isolated in our stand.

2. Even our friends were not impressed by our warnings that Israel would be endangered by Sinai. The impression was that/by the very blow that we had delivered to Egypt we had given ourselves the most practical guarrantee against a renewed threat, and to this was added the reality of a UN force which served as brake to Egypt's belligerence. The assumption that in addition to all this Israel deserved an additional guarrantee, in the absence of which Israel would be entitled to remain in Egypt's territory, ~~will~~ would encounter amazement and no support.

3. The UN decisions demanded our withdrawal from Sinai without a specific condition of "real guarrantees" and on November 9 we accepted this judgement with the single condition that arrangements be made with the UN ~~army~~ force. This weak condition we strengthened on November 21 by demanding that these arrangements ~~shall~~ should ensure a situation of "non-belligerence" in the areas that we ~~leave~~ left, but the fact that we ~~will~~ would halt at El Arish ~~will~~ would be considered a new stand.

4. Above all, we must remember that the world ~~does~~ did not recognise our conquest of Sinai as the source of any rights. If the world ~~will have~~ had to choose between two stumbling blocks: The forces of a member State in UN remaining on the territory of another State and reducing the fears that ~~have~~ remained ~~to Israel~~ after ~~her~~ Israel's

military victory, the world ~~will~~ would conclude that the first was far more serious than the second.

To the question what ~~will be~~ would happen when the UN forces ~~leave~~ left after some months, the reply of the world ~~will~~ would be "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof", and that during the months when one ~~can~~ could breathe one ~~will~~ would seek more stable solutions.

"Not only Hammerskjold thinks thus, but also our friends in the US and UN".

As a result of a practical outlook I proposed in this cable that we ~~to~~ aim towards a number of defined objectives.

"The Bay of Eilat

1. Let the Sec.Gen. officially undertake: A) That the Bay is regarded as an international waterway

   B) That the function of the UN force is to prevent actions against ~~the~~ shipping in the Bay.

   C) That Egyptian posts ~~will~~ not be established at Sharm el Sheikh and Tiran and that the UN force does not leave there before the UN is certain that ~~disturbances to~~ interference with shipping will not be renewed.

2. We must think of guarantees whose sources are not in UN documents, but in deeds.

   A) The bringing of Israel naval forces to the Bay.

   B) The early laying of a pipe-line and the establishment of plants in Eilat.

   C) Encouraging the continuous passage of ships in this period, while Egypt is in effect prevented from hindering their passage, that will convert free passage into an international custom.

Sinai

"If the Sec.Gen. will not confirm the complete ~~pro~~ exclusion of Egyptian soldiers ~~from~~ Sinai, we must endeavour to attain at least (a) An ~~xxxxx~~ area void of Egyptian forces between the El Arish line and the international boundary (b) The stationing of UN forces and not Egyptians in El Arish, and other key points in Sinai (c) That the UN forces will act to prevent fedayin activities and will not abandon its posts before agreement is reached on an alternate

settlement.

Gaza

One should endeavour to continue the present ~~xixxxx~~ unclear situation.

Fedayin

To demand from Hammerskjold a clear Egyptian undertaking on the stoppage of fedayin movements everywhere.

Suez

To bring the US, Britain, France, ~~xxxxxx~~ and others to specifically repeat the legal theory of the UN on the freedom of passage for Israel as a part of any legal international settlement, and to make it clear that we intend to implement our right in practice. We will direct our efforts for the confirmation of our rights essentially in the framework of the negotiations between England, France and Egypt".

In the continuation of this cable I suggested that we ask the Sec.Gen. a number of questions whose intention is to obtain assurances:

"How will the UN force ensure freedom of passage in the Bay and Suez and prevent a renewal of an Egyptian belligerent base in Sinai, and the renewal of fedayin activity?"

I also suggested that I announce that the Government is

prepared to discuss the function of the UN force in Gaza but will under no conditions allow the Egyptian army to return there.

In order to satisfy us he will have to reply:

1. That the Bay of Eilat is an international waterway and the UN force will prevent hostile acts there and not depart before an arrangement that will prevent the renewal of the blockade is made..
2. That the UN force will take over the key positions in Sinai in order to prevent the renewal of fighting, the setting up of a military battle-line and particularly to prevent the Egyptian forces from approaching the border.
3. The UN will endeavour to obtain from Nasser confirmation that his agreement to the decision of November 2 includes an undertaking to abstain from attacks, including attacks of fedayim.
4. He will interpret the decision of November 2 on the opening of the Canal according to the 1888 Treaty and the decisions of the Security Council of 1951 and 1956.

The matter of Suez and even the Bay makes, in my opinion, an announcement to the Sec.Gen. essential, saying that in our announcement on the non-existence of the armistice agreement there is no establishment of a legal theory of belligerence.

On the 24th, I received a reaction from Herzog [illegible] of the office to my suggestions in connection with the Bay. He cast doubt on the authority of the Sec.Gen of UN to give us such real guarantees as I had drafted against the renewal of the blockade or about the staying of UN forces remaining in Sharm el Sheikh in opposition to the [illegible] desire of Egypt. Therefore he suggested that we at least demand a clear understanding concerning the period of time that the international force will remain on the coast of the Bay. He did not assume that we could avoid a

resolution ordering us to retire from there and raised the question to what extent ~~xx~~ the States would be prepared to impose sanctions upon us if we claimed that we are prepared to go the moment we receive guarantees on freedom of passage.

The freedom of passage in the Bay is so dear and vital to Israel, the cable added, that we will not be able to give it up, and in the light of experience we cannot rely on retiring from Sharem el Sheikh on the assumption that if the blockade is renewed we will repeat the Sinai campaign.

To this analysis he therefore added the question whether we could dream of a US guarantee against prevention of the freedom of passage in the Bay.

I agreed to Herzog's assessment of the importance of freedom of passage in the Bay, but just for that reason I considered that we must find a way of ensuring the freedom of passage also on the assumption that we will withdraw from Sharem el Sheikh because our chances of staying there for a protracted period seemed to me to be nil. I was afraid that if we aimed at staying we would lose on both fronts.

As I saw chances of safeguarding our interests in the Bay I suggested that we postpone the internal discussion until we clarify what the Sec.Gen and the US are prepared to promise us.

The consciousness that one was not to rely on Hammerskjold and that we must build the case for guarantees on the US was the guiding principle in the cable that I received from the P.M. on December 25 in reply to my cable of assessment and proposals for action.

His approach was that the determinative things were: a) our action, b) the US stand, c) the UN decision.

In the P.M.'s opinion one should approach the Sec.Gen as little as possible and in case of need ~~that~~ one should turn to the Assembly. Instead of negotiating with him it was preferable to utilise the Assembly platform and the Press for an attack on the belligerent activities and the hostility of Egypt.

X The P.M. added that it ~~is~~ was essential to come to an understanding with the US and instructed that in the discussion with

Dulles we insist on:

a. No return to the status quo

b. The demilitarisation of the eastern section of Sinai

c. Our remaining in Sharem el Sheikh until we receive real guarantees such as the undertaking of the US but not that of the Sec.Gen. or the Assembly.

d. Under no circumstances would we allow Egypt to return to the Strip. In the P.M.'s opinion one should not officially annex the Strip, but our security dictates that neither Egyptian nor UN forces should be there; because the UN forces will not be able to prevent the organisation and execution of fedayin activities. Israel will assure the civilian services of the permanent inhabitants and will not oppose UN supervision or responsibility before the UN, but the P.M. does not propose a mandate. We will willingly consult with the US on the solution for the refugees in general and those in Gaza in particular. He intends to ask the Government to accept any arrangement that we will be forced to accept in Sinai, but under no circumstances to surrender in the Bay of Eilat, the islands and the Strip. The Gaza strip is vital from the point of view of our security, and freedom of passage and the Bay are vital from the point of view of our economic existence, and in relation to them we are prepared to go to the bitter end.

One can assume that when Dulles understands that the return of Egyptian forces to the Bay of Eilat is likely to bring ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ a renewed conflagration, he will get down to fundamentals or he will agree to our remaining for an indefinate time until he can guarantee freedom of passage or propose another satisfactory arrangement.

The search for a solution to the problem of Gaza

The fact that we had not made any detailed proposals in relation to Gaza made our stand with regard to this matter unconvincing.

Egypt and their allies argued that under no circumstances can one accept any hold of ours on Gaza as that would constitute

a violation of international law, the UN Charter and the armistice agreement, and the giving of a prize for belligerency; that the refugees and inhabitants of Gaza would rebel against a foreign regime, would strongly insist on the Arab nature of the Strip, and that our withdrawal must therefore be immediate and complete.

The British again supported the idea of an international regime expressing the inclination of important elements in the US and the West generally who were prepared to support our demand ~~xxxx~~ against the return of Egypt, but when faced with the alternative between an~~d~~ Israel regime ~~and~~ a UN one, they preferred the latter. Amongst these were included our veteran friends - liberal leaders of the Republicans and Democrats and/progressive public personalities in whose outlook the UN had a central mission and whose support of the UN was a fundamental principle in their approach to foreign policy and international problems. When they found it necxessary to choose between Israel and the UN in relation to Gaza, they found themselves faced with a more difficult problem than their conservative or isolationist colleagues, to whom the UN was not particularly precious, but almost all of them ultimately favoured the UN. At the end of December among others ~~xxxx~~ the Democratic Senator Douglas and the Republican Yavetz, who had returned from visits to Israel, expressed their views on the issue. After examining the question on the spot, listening to our contentions in Israel and our explanations in the US, Douglas came out with the idea of Gaza under UN trusteeship, and Yavetz, together with his colleague the Republican Senator from New York, sent the Secretary of State a memorandum at the beginning or middle of January, that favoured the placing of a UN force between Israel and Egypt and in Gaza.

In addition to my proposals in my cable of 19/~~12~~ December. we proposed to the ~~office~~ Ministry the establishment of a regime based upon the three elements functioning on the spot, i.e. the inhabitants, Israel and ~~welfare agencies~~ UNRWA . ; local government for the inhabitants through local councils; services and security on Israel's responsibility and refugees being dealt with by ~~the welfare agencies~~ UNRWA. On the assumption that the UN would insist on the UN force, one could consider placing ~~the~~ security matters in the hands of the

Israel Police with the addition of local police and the entry of a ~~symbolic~~ token UN force affiliated to ~~the welfare agencies~~. UNRWA

We consulted with Israel also in relation to our suggestion to rehabilitate the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, and to propose the absorption of a small but considerable number of refugees.

We were under the impression that such a voluntary action, based upon the territorial continuity of Israel and the Gaza Strip, ~~with~~ in Israel's capabilities in the field of development and organisation, and the very preparedness to respond to the urgings that we make a serious contribution to the return of the refugees, could ~~xxxx~~ tilt the balance in favour of our staying in Gaza.

## Contact with the State Department - in December - the request for guarantees

In explaining the background one must return to the contact that we had from the beginning of December. In November, after we had agreed to withdraw, ~~xxx~~ our main point of interest ~~xx~~ in the State Dept. was our request for American action against the USSR threats and the persecution of the Jews of Egypt. Our efforts to move the State Dept. to exert positive influence on the discussions at the UN and the negotiations with the Sec.Gen. did not elicit the desired response, at any rate not in real activity. As our differences of opinion with Hammerskjold increased, so ~~xx~~ did our efforts to ~~pressurise~~ persuade the US to accept responsibility and take the initiative.

This matter also arose in the P.M.'s talk with Lawson on December 3. The beginning of that talk revolved around the USSR~~'s~~ warning against threatening us. The P.M. stated that if the State Dept. for some reason ~~does~~ did not wish to warn the USSR publicly, it ~~is~~ was only right that it should at least do so through ~~in the~~ diplomatic channels.

The essence of the talk consisted of the posing of questions to the US concerning guarantees. As we had started to withdraw, we wished the US to reply to the following questions:

a. What is the guarantee that after the clearing of the Canal there will be freedom of passage in it?

b. What security have we that Nasser will not block it again at the instruction of the Soviets or when it will appear worth-while for his interests? As Hammerskjold had agreed that the presence of the international force is dependent on the willingness of Nasser - who will guarrantee the future of the Canal after it passes into his hands?

c. If we withdraw from the Bay of Solomon, who will guarrantee that the Egyptians will not renew the blockade?

d. If we withdraw from Sinai completely, who will guarrantee that Egypt's ~~aggressive~~ air base for ~~xxx~~ attacks and land will not be renewed?

That day I met Murphy in Washington. He told me that the State Dept. was following our talks with Hammerskjold sympathetically and that in the Government the recongintion that one must keep the UN force in Sinai for a long period and not remove it at Nasser's will, was increasing - even if this causes a quarrel with him.

Four days later, the Foreign Minister, Shiloach and I met with Hoover and Rowntry. Once again the assumption that UN and not Egypt would decide when the international force would withdraw, was verified.

To our demand that the US increases its pressure on Egypt that it desist from persecuting the Jews, we were told that their ambassador in Egypt was unceasingly perstering the Egyptian Government on the subject and it appeared that the Egyptians were retreating to a certain extent. The Americans did not agree to a public declaration on this subject.

That day we received the reply of the Secretary of State to ours of November 30 regarding the USSR's threats. It stated that the US supports the security and integrity of Israel, but it does not intend to publish a new announcement, although it may publish such an announcement in the future. In their estimation there were no concentrations of forces in Syria, and although there may be Russian penetration this was a long-range problem and not an immediate military threat.

Our matter (issue) at the NATO Ministers' Council.

On November 28 an announcement in Eisenhower's name was published concerning the departure of Dulles to the Council of NATO Ministers scheduled for December 11 in Paris. The President's esteem for NATO was mentioned adding that despite "differences of opinion that had arisen between the US and her allies and traditional friends, as a result of a certain international incident, these differences of opinion will not weaken or fray the ties with Britain and France".

The main line of attack was to have been that Nasser in himself and as the servant of the USSR constitutes a direct threat to Europe and NATO, particularly at the weak point of the western line of defence, and that the US dare not allow him to revive and develop destructive activities, and that Israel, on the other hand, is a stronghold of Western democracy and a stumbling block to Soviet penetration in the M.E.

The matter of the M.E. and Israel-Egypt relationships were dealt with in Paris at the general meetings and in private talks with Dulles. Our representatives received conflicting impressions of Dulles' stand. (According to one source, Dulles

tried to prevent the inclusion of the problem of the M.E. on the agenda and thereby to avoid its mention in the official communication published ~~with~~ on the closing of the conference). It appeared that in the general debate he adopted a sharply critical attitude towards the aggressive initiative of ~~England~~ Britain and France and their clash with the UN, negating the idea of breaking Nasser, but that in a talk with Pinay he showed greater flexibility. When he was pressed to reveal the US policy in the M.E., he avoided taking a clear stand, with the excuse that he was absent from work for a long period and that upon his return he would formulate a programme.

In the announcement published at the conclusion of the NATO conference on December 14, they added a passage on the Suez Canal and a passage that stated: "The members of the Council agreed upon the urgent need to bring about, through the UN, a permanent political settlement between Israel and the Arab States, including a just solution for the Arab refugee problem. The need for proper assistnace for the economic development plans of the area was also stressed."

Meeting with Dulles - 29/12 KS

On December 29, I accompanied the Foreign Minister to a meeting with Dulles. This was the first meeting with him after many weeks. The Foreign Minister pointed out that we were trying for avoid a crisis with the UN, and that such a crisis ~~is~~ was likely to occur if the Assembly will tried to remove us from the opening to the Bay before a stable and safe settlement had been acheived, or if it will recommend our withdrawal from Gaza. Least of all did we want to clash with the US and therefore we would like the US to go into the matter deeply and assist us in seeking solutions.

Our requests therefore were:

a. That Dulles should inform us that he supports freedom of passage in the Bay of Eilat and the non-return of Egypt to Gaza;

b. That he should influence Hammerskjold to delay any change in

the Straits and Gaza until a permanent settlement is made and that the US should exert ~~her~~ its influence in the Assembly in the same direction;

c. That the US should guarantee with ~~her~~ its power and influence, any settlement ~~that will be~~ made for the freedom of shipping in the Straits.

Dulles opened with a comment on the past and explained the considerations that had prompted the US to reject the Sinai Campaign. His main complaint was not that we did not consult them (which is one of their main complaints according to ~~England~~ Britain and France) but that we attempted to correct an injustice by the use of force. The system was not permissable as it was likely to ignite a world war. According to him our action had decreased the chances of solving the injustice that had been done to us.

He said that he was not prepared to make arrangements with us behind Hammerskjold's back, because these problems were subject to negotiations with the Sec.Gen. whom the US supports. As a member of the UN the US was prepared to hear our opinions as proposals for action within the UN, and on this assumption he could say that he agreed to a large extent with what we had said.

The US maintains the principle of freedom of passage for Israel in Suez. He also accepts the opinion that the Bay of Eilat must remain an international water-way open to international shipping. He does not know exactly what is the just solution ~~to~~ to the Gaza Strip apart from the fact that it was never Egypt and is not Egypt today. On the other hand it was not included in Israel's borders according to the armistice agreements. Apart from the establishment of these principles, he had no detailed plan.

From here he passed to the presentation of a number of basic problems. He said that the President and he were in confusion and did not know how the Government of Israel saw

the future of the State in the long run. The Foreign Minister replied, pointing out that the main responsibility rested with the Arabs and particularly Nasser who pursued a policy based on hatred.

The opinions that Dulles expressed were not new to me, as I had heard them often before. It was, however, difficult to determine immediately whether this had been an effort to defend himself from our pressure by a counter-attack, and to what extent is was the revelation of concern for our objectives in relation to security problems.

The Prime Minister's reply to Dulles through Lawson and B.Smith

The P.M. found an opportunity to reply to Dulles in a talk with Lawson on the morrow and in a letter that he sent on 2/1/57.

The talk on 30/12 was at Lawson's request. He presented a memorandum on the Israel-Egypt armistice agreement aimed to prove that we were not entitled to nullify the agreement unilaterally. In that talk he repeated Dulles' words about the freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran. The P.M. stated regarding the agreement, that as an agreement it has effect only if both sides maintain it, which was not the case here. Egypt violated the agreement systematically as well as the Security Council Decision and the UN Charter. Neither the Security Council, nor the Sec.Gen. who was sent to the M.E. to ensure the proper implementation of the agreement, nor even the US, at any rate not publicly, made demands on Egypt to desist from the violations. The Egyptian rulers announce that a state of war exists between them and Israel. The P.M. had asked the Sec.Gen who visited him, how the UN could allow Nasser to claim a state of war, and in the

particularly lesser who pursued a policy based on hatred.

presence of 12 people the Sec.Gen. (Col) replied that Nasser could not retreat from this stand because it will harm his status. The P.M. then asked Hammerskjold whether he represented the UN or Nasser. His function was (surely) to ensure the implementation of the armistice agreement and he had nothing to do with Nasser's internal status. What was this protection of Nasser by the Sec.Gen. - by virtue of his being a dictator, or by virtue of his ability to mobilise a large number of votes in the Assembly?

Turning to the problems of Gaza, the P.M. stated that it appeared that the memorandum on the armistice agreement had no connection with Gaza. Were it not for the intervention of the US in 1948, we would have driven the Egyptians from Gaza. Gaza was not and is not Egyptian, and the whole object of Egypt's sitting there was to organise fedayin and disturb Israel. Under no circumstances ~~will we be able to~~ could we agree to Egypt's return to Gaza and it ~~is~~ was also not conceivable that an international force comes there, because Nasser ~~will~~ would renew the fedayin activities under its protection.

As Nasser's promises have no value, as his violation of the Security Council's decision in relation to the Suez Canal ~~will~~ proves, we must stay in the Bay of Solomon until we receive a tested guarantee that the blockade will not be renewed. Only a guarantee from the US does he regard as an effective one, but if the Secretary has other ideas, he will gladly go into them.

To Lawson's question as to what undertaking he expected from the US, the P.M. mentioned the US's announcement that it would put the Seventh Fleet into action if there ~~will be~~ were a disturbance in connection with Formoza. Our remaining in the Bay of Solomon is difficult for us, but we will not be able to allow a renewal of the blockade under any circumstances. Nasser can block the Canal at any time and therefore the world should be interested in assuring the freedom of passage in the Bay.

These ideas were also expressed by the P.M. in a letter to ~~Beadle~~ Bodell Smith, who was impressed by the analysis and the argument, and who sent copies, with his recommendation, to Eisenhower and Dulles and a number of his friends who were influential in

determining US policy.

Memorandum on the freedom of passage in the Bay of Eilat

Following our talk with Dulles I sent him a memorandum on 30/12, as I had promised to do, on our stand in the Bay of Eilat. This memorandum contains lines of argument that were subsequently developed in a wide information drive, and are worthy of mention:

The memorandum opens with a geographical description. Apart from Egypt Israel is the only country situated on both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Sharm el Sheikh, situated at the entrance to the Bay of Eilat was unknown until Egypt stationed cannons there whose sole function was to prevent the entry of ships to Eilat. With the conquest of the place by Israel on November 3 1956, the Bay was opened to ships of all nations with no discrimination.

From the legal point of view the Straits of Tiran are an international water-way because:

a. The way to four States situated on the coast of the Bay passes through them.

b. It is the only pathway to the Bay.

c. The International Court decided that in straits which constitute a part of a water-way serving more than one state, there is the right of freedom of passage even if the area of the straits, partially or wholly, is situated within the territorial waters of one or more States.

d. In 1951 the Security Council rejected Egypt's contention that it has the right to board, examine or hold ships sailing to Israel

e. The US announced in the Security Council that the principle of 1951 also applies to the Bay of Akaba (Eilat).

f. In reply to the US's question in January 1950, Egypt announced that passage in the Straits of Tiran "will remain open as in the past... according to international practice and the recognised principles of international law".

In effect Egypt published regulations discriminating against ships whose destination was Israel and on six occasions opened fire on ships "innocently passing" through those straits.

If the Straits remain open, the economic dependence upon

of the West on Suez will diminish. This has great significance in the light of the possibility that appeared recently that passage in Suez is likely to be conditional both from the practical and political points of view. It is not difficult to complete the link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean by an oil-pipe line, road and rail.

Europe will be able to breath with two instead of one "lungs". The Suez Canal will lose its monopolistic status and the relationships between Europe and Egypt will lose their abnormal tenseness.

The future of Israel will change greatly for the better if it utilises one of the few geographical advantages that it possesses. It will be able to enjoy economic independence and increase its weight in its relationships with the Mediterranian world, Europe and the Commonwealth. A people protects such assets with all its might and main.

If the UN returns the situation to the one in which a blockade existed, then it is failing in its duty.

The Sec.Gen recognises the international character of the Straits.

The withdrawal of Israel is likely to create a void in which the Egyptian blockade is likely to be renewed with the exit of the international force.

Experience in Suez has shown that the stationing of the international force is merely an introduction to the return of the Egyptian army.

A call upon Israel to abandon the Straits before guarantees have been made for free passage is tantamount to the renewal of the blockade. An attempt on the part of Egypt to renew the blockade will constitute a warlike act which will invite and almost certainly bring a response.

The prevention of war in the M.E. is therefore dependent upon the prevention of the blockade in the Straits no less than its prevention in Suez.

An efficient guarantee will have to include not only signed declarations by the UN and the sides involved, but also

the creation of physical conditions in Tiran and on the Sinai coast, and perhaps also at sea, which will prevent disturbance of shipping in advance.

It is possible to prepare such guarantees, and for this purpose time is necessary. In order that the UN guarantee be effective it must be supported by a Great Power such as the US.

It was just for these reasons that the Sec.Gen. agreed on November 28 to postpone the discussion on withdrawal from this area.

Conclusions:

1. The US must again confirm its concern for the permanent freedom of passage in the Straits and join in giving guarantees.
2. Discussion on the withdrawal from Sharem el Sheich andthe islands will be postponed until real guarantees are determined.
3. The Sec.Gen will attend to the arrangement of urgent examinations of guarantees and means of ensuring the freedom of passage in the Straits in the light of international interests.

Dulles was about to meet with Hammerskjold. We assumed that our talk of 29/12, the P.M.'s reply to Lawson and the memmorandum of 30/12 would have some influence upon his stand.

I therefore prepared this memorandum for more general informational needs and sent it to a number of editors and political comentators of the "New York Times", "New York Herald Tribune", and "Washington Post", to a number of Senate leaders dealing with foreign affairs, such as Humphrey and Mansfield, Green and Cooper, to Meany and Reuter of the AFL-CIO and other influential friends such as Arthur Dean, Charles Bowles, Paul Hoffman, Eric Johnston and Phil Ehrlich.

At the beginning of January, we published pamphlets on the Bay of Eilat and the Straits, according to a version we had received from Israel. I called a special press conference for this subject. The results proved that our arguments on this subject are being absorbed. But the idea of the guarantee of freedom of passage had not been clarified. In effect we had not clarified it for ourselves.

Guarrantee for freedom of passage - How? 30

The idea of an Israel guarrantee

On January 4 I had a talk with Rowntree and he asked how the UN would guarrantee freedom of passage: By Assembly decision? I answered in the negative, claiming that the legal situation was clear, just as it is clear in relation to Suez, and that the problem is political and practical, i.e. how to protect international law from being violated by Egypt. In relation to the suggestion to station a UN force, I said that this in the nature of things could merely be temporary, and therefore it does not in itself constitute a guarrantee upon which it is possible to base the economic planning of the development of a waterway and everything bound up with this.

(I also explained how vital free passage to Eilat was to us, also as an answer to the question that Dulles had put to the Foreign Minister at their last talk ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ on the future of the State of Israel. The vision of Eilat is the key to Israel's integration in Asia and ~~her~~ its progress towards international and political independence. Rowntree admitted that the US recognises this).

In reply to questions of Eytan and Herzog, I sent an evaluation that had taken form in my mind at that time, after consultation with experts in international and American law, on the chances of an American guarrantee. My conclusion was that one cannot conceive that the President of the US with the confirmation of the Senate will announce that American forces will act with armed force against the ~~disturbance of~~ interference with shipping in the Bay of Eilat, the reasons being as follows:

a) The US Government does not consider that ~~her~~ its armed forces are necessary to safeguard the freedom of passage in the Bay. ~~She~~ It beleives that the UN can do so with the support of the US. It will not occur to ~~her~~ it even to guarrantee Suez in this form, and there is no comparison between the importance of the Canal to the US and the unimportance of the Bay.

b) The US Government has no direct, vital commercial or

security interest in the Bay of Eilat, and in effect up till now has not guaranteed any other international waterway. One cannot assume that the Senate will confirm such a guarantee, and without its confirmation it is illegal.

c) The State of Israel has exactly the same right as the US to announce that ~~a disturbance of~~ interference with the freedom of passage in Bay of Eilat will be regarded as a hostile act and that we will act with force against it. The implementation of such a guarantee by the bombing of a handful of cannons in Sharem-el Sheikh, if ~~will be~~ are placed there again, is definitely within the military ability of Israel. Israel has and America has not a special national interest in ensuring the freedom of passage in the Bay. There is no legal or political hindrance ~~xxxx~~ to announcing an Israel undertaking to oppose with force any ~~disturbance of the~~ interference with shipping, as such ~~a disturbance~~ interference would constitute a hostile act.

It is difficult for the US to claim that an attack on Israel shipping is an attack on America which justifies American intervention according ~~to para.~~ Article 51 of the Charter without and prior to an appeal to the UN. On the other hand Israel is ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ entitled to claim that an attack on shipping headed for or coming from Israel is an attack on Israel which justifies ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the right of self-defence according to ~~par.~~ Article 51 of the UN Charter. I added: The time has come that with our modest power, we should become accustomed to the idea that Israel has the right and the obligation to define ~~her~~ its security obligations in the world, and this obligation is extremely natural.

At that time it appeared that our demand for an direct US guarantee would at best move the US to announce that she supports freedom of passage in the Bay. I raised the question - with the ~~office~~ Ministry - as to whether it is desirable that I request a guarantee so that the Americans would at least make an announcement concerning the freedom of passage.

# CHAPTER 111

## THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT FOR GAZA AND THE COAST OF THE BAY OF EILAT

(January 1 - 23 )

Towards the opening of the second session of the Assembly on January 2, the activity ~~on our matter~~ at the UN restarted. The State Dept.'s stand, throwing us again and again into the arms of Hammerskjold, obliged us to examine all the possibilities in this sphere, although it was clear from the beginning that sooner or later there would be a crisis between us and him. It was nevertheless necessary to try, ~~even~~ if only to show the US its obligation to see the difficulties face to face and ~~to~~ negotiate with us for solutions.

### Discussions with the Secretary General

On December 31 the Foreign Minister saw the Sec.Gen. at his request. (It was after he had also talked to Dulles). A discussion was ~~aroused~~ provoked as the result of Hammarskjold's claim that the UN was incapable of properly dealing with the incursions of fedayin as Israel refused to allow investigations by the observers because of our attitude to the Jordanian ~~Mixed~~ Armistice Commission.

In relation to Sharem el Sheikh, he said that in his opinion there were two possibilities:

The one was that Israel would hold onto the area in opposition to the Assemly's desire, and ~~will~~ endeavour to bargain for freedom of passage while holding on to the place;

The second possibility was that Israel would first withdraw. He admitted that the second possibility harboured a danger from our point of view, but, he said, he beleived that in the final analysis obedience to the Assembly would advance the freedom of passage and not the opposite.

The Foreign Minister invited Hammarskjold to visit Israel, and, if he could not come, then Bunche. Hammarskjold replied that he was considering visiting the Middle East and hoped that he would accept our invitation.

At the end of the discussion he accepted the Foreign Minister's summary that Gaza and Sharem el Sheikh constitute special problems, and ~~that he~~ noted ~~xxx~~ that a satisfactory solution must be found to these before we are required to withdraw from them.

We decided to come out early with our demands for guarantees. On January 2 I wrote to the Sec.Gen. ~~requesting~~ asking for the following guarantees:

A. Against the renewal of fedayin activities. I mentioned that between December 3 - 29 attacks directed by Egypt had been carried out, and new ones had occured since, and I requested that according to the decision of November 2 he ~~should receive~~ obtain from Egypt and the other Governments affected, undertakings that they would order all those people under their command or influence, in whatever country they ~~may~~ might be, to desist from incursions into Israel.

B. I confirmed that the matter of the withdrawal of our forces from Sharem el Sheikh and the nearby islands, would be left for a later stage - until permanent effective arrangements ~~be~~ were found to assure freedom of passage.

C. I asked what the UN force was prepared to do in order to keep the Egyptian forces at a great distance from Israel, and especially whether the UN ~~army~~ force intends to station itself in Sinai in order to assure this aim.

D. I requested confirmation that the Sec.Gen. ~~will~~ would maintain and implement the principle of freedom of passage in the Suez Canal in relation to Israel too.

E. I conveyed that the Government of Israel was prepared to discuss with the UN the solution to a number of problems of Gaza. I confirmed that the implementation of these ~~problems~~ solutions ~~will~~ would come at a later stage.

In order to save ourselves from the troublesome claim that the State Dept. and Hammerskjold made to the effect that by nullifying the armistice agreements we had renewed the state of hostility, I wrote to Hammerskjold on January 3 ~~on~~ the instruction of the Government to inform him that the announcements we had

made in connection with events that had affected the armistice agreement with Egypt ~~cannot~~ could not be interpreted as Israel recognition of a state of "belligerence" or "belligerent rights" or any other principle of war".

Without connection with the status of any other agreement ~~(read: armistice)~~ Israel and Egypt are signatories to the UN Charter. Their legal relationships are therefore not in a void. They are linked by mutual responsibilities that stem from the Charter. These responsibilities are not ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ compatible with any principle of war or "belligerence" between two member States.

To the letter was appended a memorandum on the legal relationships between Egypt and Israel.

Bunche told Kidron about a talk that had taken place that day between Hammerskjold and Dulles. According to him Dulles had revealed that his legal advisors differed as to our rights to legal passage in the Canal based upon the 1888 Treaty and without the 1951 resolution. Accordingly, Bunche advised that we ~~xxxxxx~~ find a way so that our political declaration on the nullification of the armistice agreement ~~will~~ would not have have ~~jurisdiction~~ juridical consequences that ~~will~~ would nullify the 1951 Security Council decision which was based on the agreement.

Burns and Dayan met on January 4. Dayan agreed to withdraw from Tur and also to a deeper withdrawal than he had suggested previously.

Rafael, Kidron and I again met with Hammerskjold and his advisers on January 5. The Sec.Gen. claimed that Dayan's proposals to Burns created a crisis. We continued to hold 40% of Sinai including all the cross-roads. If the reason for this is the need for communication with Sharem el Sheikh then we might as well deal with this matter immediately in order that it should not hold up the progress of the withdrawal. He ~~is~~ was obliged to report the facts to the Assembly.

We promised to ~~request~~ seek instructions from the Government.

A sharp discussion developed on our requests for guarantees in our letter of January 2. Hammerskjold claimed that the

function of the UN force was to inspect the cease-fire and follow the withdrawal. If Israel wished to alter these functions then ~~she~~ if must appeal to the Assembly. One ~~cannot~~ could not deal with additional functions for the international force before it positioned itself on the armistice line. A discussion of the problem of Sharem el Sheikh and Gaza belonged to the wider aspect of Israel -Egypt relationships, and ~~cannot~~ could be conducted ~~on~~ against the background of non-implementation of Assembly decisions or on the basis of an unrecognised military victory.

In connection with our complaints about fedayin activities, he said that in the armistice commission no complaints had been received concerning the recent incidents. The announcements of Radio Cairo or the press or Ramallah Radio, which generally quote the Israel radio and press, are not sufficient basis for an appeal to Egypt, although he had appealed to them unofficially. Eventually he handed us a memorandum dated January 5 intended to reply to ours of January 2:

A. The UN stand in relation to the legal aspect is determined by the 1951 Security Council instruction, which is essentially based upon the armistice agreement, its instruction of October 1956 and the Assembly decision of November 2, and the Sec. Gen. cannot depart from the framework of these official stands. His personal attitude is known to Israel, but he cannot foresee what the result of the negotiations on the six principles and the ~~Kushta~~ Constantinople Treaty will be.

B. The memorandum repeated what he had said verbally and added that the time had not yet come to request an official undertaking from one party on the implementation of one undertaking in the decision of November 2 in a situation when the second party openly ~~does not~~ fails to implement other undertakings.

C. He repeated his verbal announcement that the aim must be to ensure that the Straits serve as an international water-way. The UN policy, as the Sec.Gen understands it, is to act with all possible speed towards agreements in which it will be possible to deal with questions of this nature. He ~~lectured~~ cautioned that the efforts of the UN ~~will~~ would not bear fruit

if the negotiations were conducted against the background of the results of military actions that still exist in opposition to the Assembly's decision, and ended with the sentence "the avoidance of possible belligerent acts after the withdrawal of Israel forces will obviously be in the realm of authority of the UN force, although it is early to say how it will deal with this matter". (Bunche in a subsequent discussion explained the Sec.Gen.'s approach as follows:

a. The withdrawal of Israel and entry of UN forces with the defined task of preventing belligerence.

b. Negotiation on a permanent settlement that will constitute a guarantee.

c. During the negotiations the UN force will remain at its stations so that freedom of passage would be assured during the intermediate period.)

Continuation of the negotiations with the Secretary General on guarantees

For the discussion in the Government we were requested to clarify with the Sec.Gen. how he interpreted his acceptance (on January 1) and our announcement that we would not leave Gaza and Sharem el Sheikh before guarantees were provided. If he would say, for example, that after complete withdrawal he would be prepared to discuss Sharem el Sheikh and Gaza with us for a month, then we would gain time until the crisis.

We consulted in the delegation and decided that the Foreign Minister would return to Israel for consultations and I would remain to supervise the work at UN and in Washington.

On January 8 Rafael, Kidron and I met Bunch (Hammerskjold was busy with Pineau) for an official meeting. I presented our suggestion in accordance with the P.M.'s instruction and asked whether one might anticipate that a meeting of the Assembly would not be decided on until the following week. Bunche subsequently promised in a private conversation to persuade the Sec.Gen not to allow a meeting.

I asked about the separation of the forces, and Bunche explained that the question was unnecessary as Egyptian forces had not entered Sinai, and the policy of the UN was that UN forces and Egyptian forces would not take up positions in the same place at one and the same time.

When I raised the question of the Jews of Egypt - the news of their persecution had worsened - ~~then~~ Cordier replied that the reason for their suffering was the slow pace of withdrawal from Sinai. We protested strongly about the connecting of the two subjects and asked whether that was the policy of the UN, Cordier stammered that it was not, but it was clear that, in the consciousness of those dealing with the matter, it was.

By January 9 the Zahal forces had evacuated the north-western sector of the Sinai peninsula from the entrance to El Arish in the north to Ras Sudar in the Bay of Suez in the south. In their wake followed Yugoslavs in the north, Indians in the south and Danes and Norwegians in the centre.

On January 10 a meeting took place between Dayan and Burns to deal with the continuation of the withdrawal. Agreement was reached on a withdrawal of another 25 kilometers within five days.

[redacted]

The Foreign Minister and members of the delegation met with the delegations of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and Austria - all together, in order to explain the problem of the Bay. The Foreign Minister's remarks were received with obvious sympathy, some expressing amazement that Hammerskjold had not examined the matter carefully and had not drafted guarantees.

In relation to Gaza the response was less sympathetic but not antagonistic. They pressed for a positive plan and wondered whether a UN regime was not the solution.

I invited to lunch with the Foreign Minister (7/12) the Heads of the Indian, Liberian, Ethiopian, Laotian, Burmese, Japanese and Nepalese delegations. There was a friendly discussion

especially with the Japanese, Ethiopians and Liberians. The Japanese and Ethiopians continued to show practical interest in the question of passage in the Bay, on other occasions.

The Foreign Minister also met with the Latin bloc (8/1). The members of all the delegations participated, in most cases the head and his deputy. The Foreign Minister explained our stand and asked for support for our demand for guarantees. The stress on the need to ensure at least a situation of peace made a particular impression - the methods explained being the prevention of belligerent acts by separating the forces of with UN forces, the prevention of the return of Egypt to Gaza, and maintaining freedom of passage in the Bay.

The discussion took place in full understanding and friendship. Important aid was promised us in the Assembly discussion and in the Advisory Committee, but in relation to Gaza we encountered reservations.

Pinay and Pearson Dr'an spoke to Hammarskjold and with a number of delegations in the spirit of our demands. We furnished Pinay with a memorandum for his meeting with Dulles (on 11/1).

The Dutch Ambassador in Washington and the UN asked the Hague for permission to appeal sharply to Dulles and Hammerskjold and to support us in the Assembly.

Spender, the Australian Ambassador, spoke to Hammerskjold, and Lodge to Dulles.

We did not neglect Dean, Clay, Mcloy and Dewey too.

The opinion in a number of delegations was that one must bring the Sec.Gen., the Americans and of course others around to a public stand to the effect that only the Assembly is entitled to decide on the withdrawal of the UN force from the Bay once it entered there, and such an exit would be possible only after another permanent settlement had been arrived at which would permanently and effectively ensure the freedom of passage for ever.

I considered that during this period it was best not to press the US Government to make announcements lest it adopt undesirable attitudes which it would be difficult to change afterwards. I therefore proposed to Israel that they refrain from

exchanges with Lawson and I desisted from direct pressure in Washington, concentrating on a very wide public campaign while maintaining constant contact with editors of newspapers, and making many appearances on television.

Bunche came to me for a midnight talk (12/1) and told me that Hammerskjold ~~is~~ was beginning to think, under the impression of positive talks that he had had with various delegations, including the Indians, that there ~~is~~ was room to try to pass a resolution in the Assembly that ~~will~~ would empower the UN force to ensure freedom of passage until a permanent settlement, or at least to ~~ensure the~~ end ~~of~~ the Assembly on such a note, without passing a definite resolution. However, Hammerskjold himself ~~cannot raise~~ could not propose such a resolution, and it was desirable that delegations not directly affected should operate in this direction on their own initiative. I understood that Hammerskjold was hinting through Bunche that he ~~is~~ was prepared to listen to suggestions through friendly delegations.

Despite the pressure of the Arabs, the Sec. Gen decided to postpone discussion in the Assembly, even and the publishing of an intermediate report.

The Americans too took pains to impress the opinion that one must seek the solution through the Sec.Gen. and the Assembly.

Pressure on the US to support the giving of guarantees 3

We once again considered the idea of an "American guarantee" It had been clarified, as mentioned, that one could not consider a guarantee that would include an undertaking in advance that the American fleet would act against a disturbance of shipping. But an American announcement of ~~her~~ concern for freedom of passage and ~~her~~ opposition to a blockade, could, in my opinion, have been helpful.

In the opinions of the British and American delegations if was possible to solve the problem by including a declaration in the Sec.Gen.'s report defining the safeguarding of free passage as one of the functions of the UN ~~military~~ force, and then the Assembly would confirm this.

The American stand was that one must not make the withdrawal

conditional upon guarantees of free passage, but together with the withdrawal one must solve this problem. In their opinion the solution was likely to come in the form of a chain reaction. The Sec.Gen. could not wholeheartedly say that the UN force would remain in Sharem el Sheikh until an effective settlement was attained, because he would encounter opposition and perhaps endanger the whole plan, but he was entitled to say that, as one of the functions of the UN force was to prevent bellicose actions, the UN force must remain in the place until all danger of belligerent action had been removed. The Americans intended to propose this to the Sec.Gen. and assumed that he would accept it. Parallel with the Sec.Gen's announcement it was desirable, thought the Americans, to try to change the text of the Afro-Asian resolution that was defeated, by including amendments which, in relation to sections of the November 2 and 7 decisions, would confirm the principle of freedom of passage in the Straits and forbid incursions from Gaza.

In the opinion of the Americans, the Egyptians themselves were interested that the UN should decree from above and impose an arrangement for the Straits, knowing that on this question they had no support.

The British delegate, Dixon, doubted whether a majority could be obtained for the amendments and thought it was preferable not to take a risk, but to rely on the Sec.Gen's report, and therefore one must aim at a positive report on the withdrawal that would present the matter of Sharem el Sheikh as a special issue. Thereby it might be possible to avoid the convening of the Assembly.

It was necessary to try to elucidate what stand was being formulated by the State Dept. and to try to direct it. On 12/1 Murphy came to my home for breakfast with Shiloach and me. It transpired that he accepted our approach and promised to speak to Dulles and Lodge. He told us that the Sec.Gen had told him two days earlier that Israel had a cast iron case on the freedom of passage in the Straits, but did not draw practical conclusions.

Subsequently the echoes of the Pinay Dulles talk reached us from the French Embassy. Pinay supported our demands. Dulles

accepted that it would not be just to demand that Israel withdraws from the remainder of Sinai without insurance against a renewal of fedayin activities. He told Pinay that he was acting in unison with Hammerskjold to find a suitable formulation of guarantees for free passage in the Straits. In his opinion the solution was a broad interpretation of the functions of the UN force.

Our announcement on full withdrawal except from Gaza and Sharem el Sheikh.

In a private conversation with Rafael, Bunche said that the Sec.Gen. was prepared to present a positive report on condition that pending publication of the report we would announce the withdrawal from Sinai and not announce publicly the conditions for the withdrawal from Sharem el Sheikh.
On this basis the Sec.Gen. could announce that the evacuation from Sinai had been attained and the matter of Sharem el Sheikh could be arranged, but in relation to the latter there was a problem of passage and the danger of renewal of hostilities, and therefore he would propose to the Assembly that the UN force be authorised to remain there as long as the danger of a renewal of hostilities existed.

On the 12th, I received the P.M.'s amendments to my proposal for an announcement to the Sec.Gen. In his opinion we were to explain in our announcement that we wished to discuss separately about a narrow strip on the western coast of the Bay (the intention was to remain in a narrow strip from Eilat to Sharem el Sheikh unless the UN would agree to allow the passage of supplies on land). And also to inform the Sec.Gen that we would get out of Sharem el Sheikh when freedom of passage would be assured for Israel shipping in the Bay and Suez. (Mention of Suez was intended to connect the matter with the decision of November 2, to emphasize discrimination and also to create a bargaining position). We would propose the following as an effective guarantee:

a. An Assembly decision that the international force remain in the Bay until a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt.

b. A treaty between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on free passage in the Bay.

c. An effective guaryantee from the ~~P~~powers.

We would also make proposals on Gaza if there ~~is~~ was a need to discuss it at this stage.

a. Israel ~~will~~ would be repoxnsible for safeguarding the xxxxxx security in the area. This function would be performed by the police and the military police would be removed.

b. Is~~r~~rael would be responsible for services and would aid development plans.

c. Israel would facilitate the work of UNRWA.

d. The UN would prepare a practical plan for the settxlement of the Gaza refugees and Israel ~~will~~ would be prepared to contribute to this to the best of her ability.

In a cable that I sent to Israel on 12/1 I added that in addition to our public announcement we must bring Hammerskjold a detailed proposal for a guaryantee, i.e. the posting of a UN ~~army~~ force, and perhaps also a naval ~~survey~~ surveillance by the UN until a permanent settlement was attained. I did not ~~maintain~~ believe that we could make our withdrawal conditional upon a Suez solution. We suggested aiming at confirmation of our rights in Suez separately.

Regarding the Gaza plan, we suggested that we give it the form of an intermediate settlement, and accordingly ~~to~~ say that "the civilian services including the local and Israel police continue to function without prejudice to final settlement" ~~and~~ and, in connection with the refugees, to add a proposal which was practical and attractive on the beginnings of integration of refugees and the ~~integration~~ rehabilitation of the permanent population, and end by inviting the Sec.Gen. to discuss with us the status of the UN in Gaza.

On 13/1 we received the decisions of the Government of that day which affirmed the instructions we had recently received.

The evacuation of the Eilat Bay coast was conditional on the assurance of free passage in the Straits and Suez.

It was stated that Nasser's promises or a decision that the international force would assure freedom of passage did not suffice as it ~~is~~ was not clear whether the UN force ~~will~~ would remain.

In relation to Gaza, it was stated that Israel would agree to the appointment of an UN observer and to report to the Assembly, but not to the entry of UN forces.

In relation to Sinai, it was added that in the desert of Sinai there are no Egyptian settlements, that Egypt never regarded it as a place for settlement, but converted it into a base for an attack on Israel. The Government of Israel appealed to the UN to announce the demilitarisation of the whole of Sinai, or at least that half of it that bordered on Israel.

As to the action in the Assembly, the P.M. and the Foreign Minister instructed that I announce the complete withdrawal apart from Sherem el Sheikh, i.e. a strip on the western coast of the Bay which assured us of freedom of passage, in relation to which Israel wished to discuss with the Sec.Gen. This is without reference to the decisions of November 2 and our announcement of 8/11. And that I hand to the Sec.Gen the Government's suggestions relating to guarantees for shipping in the Straits and demand officially freedom of passage in Suez and also the demilitarisation of Sinai or at least the eastern section.

On 13/1 Hammerskjold invited me to an unofficial talk at his home. He answered my question by saying that it was not desirable that in our announcement to him we detail our proposals on the Straits and Gaza. It ~~is~~ was sufficient that we state generally that we ~~are~~ were immediately prepared to make proposals in accordance with the decisions of November 2.

To my question why he should not suggest that the UN force stay in the Straits in order to prevent hostile activities in the Bay until peace or guarantees ~~would be~~ were arrived at, he replied that even were he to make such a declaration the Assembly would have to confirm it, and therefore he was surprised that the Americans were throwing the responsibility on him, and demanding that he ~~brings~~ put forward suggestions, when it ~~is apparent~~ was obvious from the start that they ~~will~~ would encounter the opposition of a number of members of UN.

Dulles was enthusiatic about the matter of the Straits, but why must he, the Sec.Gen., be the one to implement it?

On our plans for Gaza he said that he did not see how it would be possible to accept Israel security forces. He said frankly that he did not have any clear conceptions and wished it were possible to delay dealing with it.

On January 14, Rafael, Kidron and I met Hammarskjold, Bunche and Cordier to convey our announcement.

I handed him the written announcement and to their question I replied that the Government was prepared to discuss, at an early stage, arrangements for the Gaza Strip with the Sec.Gen.

They had questions on the definition of the strip on the west coast. After a vague discussion, we agreed to another meeting on the solution to the problem of the Straits. It was decided to leave the publication of our announcement on the withdrawal to the Sec.Gen. in his report.

On January 15, El Arish was evacuated after 72 days of Israel rule and a strip some 20 kilometers east of it. In the wake of Zahal, a Yugoslavian unit entered.

In the meantime, a ~~severe~~ harsh Afro-Asian proposal was made, including the threat of sanctions, which encountered strong opposition from the Western delegations. It was again made clear how important ~~was how important~~ a positive report by the Sec.Gen, would be.

We tried to include in the Sec.Gen.'s report - through the US, Canadian and Latin delegations - some positive sections.

Comay and I saw Pearson after a discussion between him and Lodge on the tactical position. We heard from him that they had decided to organise the Western delegations in opposition to a decision in the Assembly that week, and to demonstrate in the debate, the complicated nature of the problem of the Straits and Gaza. If Hammerskjold ~~will~~ insisted, Pearson hoped to move for

the formulation of a separate Western proposal, and with the aid of the Americans to mobilise sufficient support to get it passed.

The Assembly Session of 17/1, the Afro-Asian Proposal

Having ~~left us alone for four weeks, the Assembly returned~~ to deal with our matter on January 17. Two documents were tabled: The Sec.Gen.'s report on the withdrawal and the entry of a UN ~~army~~ force, and the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ resolution of 25 Afro-Asian States which pointed out that Israel had not yet conformed with the Assembly decisions and instructed the Sec.Gen. to report within five days on implementation. At the beginning the Arabs had suggested a more ~~severe~~ radical version but because of the opposition of a number of Asiatic delegations they softened the tone.

In his report the Sec.Gen. contented himself with a factual description of the process of withdrawal and our undertakings for its continuation.

About Sharem el Sheikh he stated that Burns and Dayan would still deal with the withdrawal from that area. The following stage would be complete withdrawal of Israel forces to beyond the armistice lines at a date which had not yet been determined.

In relation to Gaza, he stated that he did not have detailed information about Israel's policy in relation to that area.

Pearson informed us that, in view of the ~~softening in~~ watering down of the Afro-Asian resolution and the omission of the threat of sanctions Canada would vote for ~~their resolution which is but~~ it as being only a repetition of earlier resolutions. Other delegations such as Britain and the US also undertook to do so, having participated in the softening of the proposal. A meeting took place with the European block and the British persuaded all of them, apart from the French, to regard the ~~softened~~ diluted resolution as the lesser of the evils, and not to oppose it.

Lodge's speech in the Assembly was to have crystallised and expressed the American stand. It was important to know to what extent the State Dept. had improved its stand in the light of

our actions and the activities of our friends. Lodge repeated the US's support for the ~~expedition~~ acceleration of the withdrawalx and said that the Afro-Asian resolution was "logical and moderate" and concentrated on the immediate problem. He agreed with the Sec.Gen. that the implementation of the resolution would make it possible to focus attention necessary to improving the situation in the M.E. It was important that the UN ~~army~~ force immediately enter areas evacuated by the Israeli forces, and these areas were the source of tension and the ground for hostile acts. The UN ~~army~~ force would have to stay there in order to prevent hostile acts in the future. He expressed the hope that the Sec.Gen would be able to make an announcement in the near future about the use of the UN army on the Israel-Egyptian border and the Straits of Tiran.

Finally he again called upon the two sides ~~to~~ meticulously to implement the armistice agreement.

Leslie Munroe, the New Zealand delegate, made a helpful contribution. His words expressed the most positive stand that it was possible to hope for on the part of our friends.

He proposed that with the completion of the withdrawal the Assembly would deal with the matter of the Bay and the Strip, at the same time suggesting that important delegations make announcements according to the following points:

a. The decision that the UN ~~army~~ force had completed its function ~~will~~ would be in the hands of the UN and not Egypt.

b. Therefore the decision on the withdrawal of the UN army must be in the UN's hands.

c. The UN ~~army~~ force must remain in the region at least until the solution of the problem of Suez and the Bay, and until there was certain progress towards an overall settlement.

d. One must discuss the demilitarisation of an area between Israel and Egypt and the transfer of the observer machinery to the UN ~~army~~ force.

e. The Assembly must ensure that Gaza ~~did~~ not again serve for attacks on Israel, and therefore it must consider how to bring it under UN supervision.

f. Freedom of passage must be assured for all nations including Israel.

g. The Assembly will would soon have to recommend methods to bring about a general solution to the Palestine problem.

Obviously Monroe's words and other similar speeches expressed the stand of a small minority in the Assembly being almost swallowed in the flood of accusations against us on the part of Krishna Menon and his adherents.

At the meeting of the 17th in the morning the Foreign Minister spoke. She replied to criticism concerning the pace of withdrawal. She pointed out the renewal of fedayin activities, and returned to the four questions she had put to the Sec.Gen that had not been replied to yet, concerning Egypt's claims to belligerent rights, its readiness for peace, the economic boycott and the blockade, and the fedayin activities. The Foreign Minister explained our demands in relation to the Straits, and the national and international importance of freedom of shipping in them; she mentioned the recent Egyptian threats that the blockade in the Bay would be renewed, and analysed proposed solutions. While giving an account of the fedayin activities, she told of the documents that had been found on one of them fedayin which conclusively proved that they were being activated by the Egyptian army.

The Foreign Minister described how life in Gaza was being returned to normal and of the improvements and development introduced. She hinted at our assistance for the solution of the problem of the refugees, and the sin of returning the situation to what it was before. Finally she requested permission for the preparation and discussion of the plans for the Straits and Gaza.

At the meeting of January 18 Hammerskjold intervened in order to reply to a question that had been addressed to him by Krishna Menon. He explained that the four questions that the Foreign Minister had put to him were submitted at the time of the cease-fire discussions and "did not serve as the basis for negotiations; the only basis for discussions was the Assembly's decisions".

I spoke before the end of the discussion on the 19th. I concentrated on replying to the attacks of the Arab speakers, particularly stressing the belligerency and opposition to reversion to the status quo, and repeated our approach to the problems of the Bay and Gaza.

The only resolution, the ~~softened~~ diluted Afro-Asian one, received 72 votes. Only Israel and France opposed, and Costa Rica and Cuba abstained. Before the final vote there was a paragraph by paragraph vote. In the vote on the first paragraph, which expressed regret at the non-withdrawal the Dominican Republic, Ireland, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal and Belgium also abstained. This was the fifth decision on withdrawal. We had five days before the next clash in the Assembly.

Towards the Secretary General's report on 25/1 5

In the light of the progress of the discussion I cabled the following evaluation of the situation to Israel:

There is no doubt that the West achieved the omission of the condemnation, threats and sanctions from the Afro-Asian text in return for its promise of support for a moderate resolution, hence the fate of the resolution was sealed from the start.

Nevertheless the debate revealed a number of instructive ~~inclinations~~ tendencies.

a. The recognition that the withdrawal ~~does~~ did not solve the problem, and particularly our right to free passage in the Bay, was spreading, and ~~is~~ was supported by many States.

b. There ~~is~~ was a desire to attain a solution both to the Straits and to Gaza by ~~placing~~ stationing a UN ~~army while~~ force and exactly defining its functions and authority. They ~~are~~ were not forgoing this approach in relation to Gaza ~~as well~~ either. There ~~is~~ was sympathy for the non-return of Egyptian forces, but no real support for the continuation of our rule. In the eyes of the UN and the Powers, the only way to prevent the return of Egyptian forces ~~is by accepting~~ was to place the whole responsibility in UN's hands, and if we ~~will~~ would not reconcile ourselves to the entry of an international force in Gaza, this force ~~will~~ would not accept the task that we ~~are~~ were interested in placing upon it in the Straits.

The Western plan drafted by Canada ~~is~~ was as follows:

a. Hammerskjold will report on Friday (25/1) and the Assembly will convene on Monday (28/1).

b. Basing it upon a number of paragraphs in Hammerskjold's report, the West will suggest a version that will include the following fundamentals:

1. Withdrawal of Israel forces.
2. Placing UN ~~army~~ force on the Egyptian side of the armistice line north of the Gaza Strip along the length of the international line. The function of the force will be the separation of the forces and the creation of a buffer until the attainment of a settlement in the region.
3. Israel will be required to allow the entry of an international force to Nitzana so that the buffer will not be solely in Egyptian territory. In other words, the ~~placing~~ stationing of the international force will be in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the armistice agreement.
4. The placing of an international force in Sharm el Sheikh and along the length of the west coast of the Bay according to a separate paragraph of the resolution that will define the

function of the force in this region as intended to prevent hostile actions between the coast and the sea until a permament solution is found to the problem of shipping.

5. In Gaza - a gradual passing of the civilian government from Israel to the UN. The UN secretariat examined the possibility of retaining Israel rule, among friendly delegations, and claims that all of them opposed this.
6. While the international force remains, permanent solutions to the problems of shipping in Suez and the Straits and stable security arrangements between Israel and Egypt will be sought.

The Sec.Gen. asked as to Israel's intentions in relation to the continuation of the withdrawal, and for our proposals relating to the Straits and Gaza. To that I replied asking whether he would be prepared to tell the Assembly what he said in our meetings on the function of the UN ~~army~~ force and to add something about the continuation. Hammerskjold answered impatiently and revealed doubts concerning our very legal grasp of the status of the Straits. In effect he began to abandon the positive stand that he had expressed in relation to the freedom of passage in the talk of December 4. He said that it was not a predetermined fact that the Gulf of Akaba constituted a portion of the high seas, that the 1951 decision was based upon the armistice agreements and hence a solution is not as near as we imagine; that the function of the UN ~~army is~~ force was to prevent belligerence, but that there ~~is~~ was a difference between the prevention of belligerence by the separation of forces and preventing it when Israel ~~tanks~~ ships entered Egyptian territory.

To additional questions from us to clarify his conception of the function of the UN ~~army~~ force in Sharm el Sheikh, he stated that he could not reply until he knew Israel's stand on the question of Gaza. There was a clear refusal to separate the two problems.

When I described our plan for Gaza, he asked whether it allowed for the presence of Egyptian rule; when he was answered

in the negative, he asked whether he must note that we maintained that the armistice was null and void. I added that I had nothing to add to the P.M.'s words in the Knesset and what I had said in the Assembly.

The Sec.Gen. warned that he would have to report that Israel was violating the decision of November 2 which demanded the punctilious implementation of the armistice agreement and the agreement itself. Also it was impossible to conduct the UN project in Gaza as long as Israel held on to the place without the permission of the UN.

He also asked how we would react to the question of implementing paragraphs 6 and 7 of the armistice agreement on a mutual basis that would be assured by the UN force, and how we would take the posting of UN force in Nitzana.

To Rafael's question whether in his plan for Gaza Egypt would have some status, he replied that Egypt had legal rights in Gaza according to the armistice agreement, but it was possible to arrange the problem by means of additional agreements that he did not specify.

It was agreed that we would detail our stand on the question of the Straits and Gaza in writing for the report that would be published on Friday.

~~It was apparent that the crisis was nearing its zenith:~~

The Government dealt with the situation on January 22. It confirmed its xxxxxx decisions of December 31, and decided to stand by them. It also decided to present finally its stand in relation to Gaza and the Straits to the Sec.Gen. So that we could explain this stand to the public before it was communicated to the Sec.Gen., It was decided that the P.M. would make an announcement in the Knesset on the morrow, and that we would consider whether the delegation could anticipate the Sec Gen in making an announcement in the Assembly, or by a letter to the President of the Assembly. Only in this way was it perhaps possible to prevent friends from xxxxxxxxxx supporting the resolution on unconditional withdrawal that we could not accept.

In the letter to the Sec Gen we had to explain why we regarded the armistice agreement as null and void, that we did

not claim belligerence, and to propose an agreement with Egypt on non-belligerence and also non-agression. We also had to stress the matter of Suez.

The P.M. suggested that we explain to our friends that we would not agree to the placing of UN forces in Nitzana or Gaza, and I should consider whether it was not worthwhile to stop speaking about a UN force as a buffer xxxxxxfrxxx outside of Sharem el Sheikh, as this demand ~~brings~~ produced a counter demand to place a force on our side too, instead of which we should counter-claim the demilitarisation of east Sinai.

I prepared the letter according to the Government's instructions and sent it to the Sec.Gen. on the evening of the 22nd. The following morning we met with him.

Hammerskjold rejected our stand as not ~~showing~~ offering a solution. He maintained that one could not accept our demand in relation to Gaza which ~~is~~ was merely a demand that the international force be placed between the Strip and Egypt in order to remove the legal ruler and maintain rule in our hands, and that he did not accept our demand in relation to Sharem el Sheikh which implied demanding a peace treaty while neutralising an area that is Egyptian territory.

I answered that our stand xxx on the question of the Straits ~~is~~ was nearer xxxx to that of the Sec.Gen. as expressed in December, and that, in relation to Gaza, ours was the first constructive programme proposed.

The Sec.Gen and his advisers replied that in the franework of the withdrawal there ~~is~~ was no room for talk about a future programme for Gaza, and that they were not entitled to discuss the division of Egyptian territory. ~~Accordingly~~ It appeared that during January he had dissociated himself from even the few positive opinions that he had expressed in December.

It was clear that there was no hope of bringing Hammerskjold nearer to our opinions. Comay and I spoke to Pearson. I told him about the exchange of opinions with Hammerskjold. Pearson described an objective that he had discussed with other elements including Hammerskjold and the US, that one must direct the dis-

cussion not necessarily along the lines of the proposed Afro-Asian condemnation, but on the basis of a Western proposal that would suggest lines for a solution. In his opinion there was no solution to Gaza without the entry of UN forces. When I explained the security and other difficulties, he admitted that from the practical point of view perhaps I was right, but the UN cannot free itself from psychological, legal and political considerations. He said that he understood our approach to the armistice agreement, but considered that the nullification of the agreement would make it difficult for us to ask the UN to fight against Egypti doctrine of belligerence. He asked that we again seriously consider the UN force as the solution to our security problem in Gaza.

When we spoke about Sinai, he agreed to the idea of demilitarisation, but suggested that we consider the demilitarisation of a uninhabited area also on our side; this was important only from the psychological and principle point of view, but it could be decisive. (At that time, Senator Knowland also spoke to me along the same lines).

On January 23, a political debate took place in the Knesset in the wake of the P.M.'s announcement on the Government's policy as it had crystallised in relation to the withdrawal, the Straits and Gaza. The Government's policy was confirmed by a large majority and the decision of the Knesset gave public expression to this policy.

CHAPTER IV

## CRISIS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HAMMERSKJOLD

(January 24 - February 11)

### The Secretary General's report of 24/1

The Secretary Gen. completed his report on 24/1 and published it the following day.

On the 27th, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem levelled severe criticism at the report and the Sec. Gen. His legal formulation on belligerent rights in the Straits he desribed as a masterpiece of obscurity, the whole style and aim of the report were negative and unconstructive "Hammerskjold merely wishes to renew a regime that brought about a tragedy."

We again tried to mobilise the State Dept. Discussions that Shiloach had conducted a few days previously with the Dept. of State revealed differences of opinion within the Dept; for there were proponents of our stand - headed by Murphy, and others who opposed, headed by Rowntree and Lodge. The Secretary himself was sympathetic, especially on the matter of the Straits, but had not reached a clear and binding stand.

After Hammerskjold's report was published, I asked to see Dulles. As he was busy with discussions in the Senate he asked Murphy to see me.

I met Murphy on the 26th, together with Shiloach. I analysed Hammerskjold's report in a very critical vein, and maintained that his objective was to almost close the door in Sharm el Sheikh, and altogether in Gaza. I criticised the perverse style and legal premises.

I gave Murphy a list of things that Hammerskjold had said in the past on the freedom of passage and which he had now abandoned, I explained that if there were legal difficulties in Gaza then one must find a solution that was not necessarily juridical, as, from the point of view of the economic and security requirements of the Strip and its inhabitants as well as for the

inhabitants of Israel, there was nothing unacceptable in the plan we had tendered.

If the US had not yet identified itself with the development programme, it was important that she did not close the door to such a possibility as Hammerskjold had done. Finally I stated that dealing with this problem by threats and condemnations would not stop us and would only add tension.

Murphy replied to this that there was nothing in all the talk of sanctions etc. and that the Asians knew that they had no chance in that matter. Such methods would not solve the problem and would only make it more difficult to solve. He was disappointed by the axaggerated carefulness of Hammerskjold. The State Dept would prefer that the Sec.Gen takes bold steps to place an international force in Sharem el Sheikh and Gaza so that the Assembly should identify itself with the report and Egypt give in to it.

The US was working with Canada and others in preparing a proposal in the light of the lack of such initiative in Hammerskjold's report. If he was in our shoes he would attach more importance to the Straits because of the long-term interest than to Gaza whose value was doubtful. (In many talks in this period Murphy put out feelers to see which of the two demands was more important to us).

In summary, he stated that the US had hoped that Hammerskjold would be more positive than he was in his report, but it would continue to aim at an Assembly decision that would fundamentally satisfy Israel's concerns.

He asked our personal opinions as to what would occur if the Assembly refused to give satisfaction to our demands in any form. I stated that under such circumstances we would not budge, because one did not sacrifice long-term interests such as freedom of passage in the Bay for the sake of a temporary convenient attitude in the Assembly.

That day Comay spoke to Pearson and his advisers. Pearson described the report of the Sec Gen as positive despite the vague style. He said that he was attempting to formulate a reso-

lution that would have chances of obtaining the necessary majority in the Assembly, that would not satisfy all our demands, but would at least calm us, and which it would also be possible to persuade the Egyptians to accept, and which would give a serious and continuous function to the UN ~~army~~ force.

The proposal that he was envisaging would express concern that we had not complied with the decision about withdrawal and demand that we complete it, would mention the Sec.Gen's report in a positive light, would stress the need to ensure quiet after the withdrawal, would call upon the sides to confirm the armistice agreement again in full, would exchange the observer structure ~~with~~ for the UN ~~army~~ force, placing it within the Strip, along the border and within the Nitzana region. A UN supervised regime would replace Israel rule in Gaza, and an undertaking would be given by all the States involved not to disturb shipping in the Straits and the Bay until a legal clarification of its status, in the meantime maintaining air and land supervision over the freedom of passage ~~by~~ through the UN ~~army~~ force.

Pearson hoped that the US stand would be close to his. According to him the Sec.Gen's report confounded the Asians as it did not provide a suitable basis for condemnation.

## The Assembly of 28-29/1. Lodge supports the Secretary General and shows progress

On January 28 in the morning the Assembly returned to our matter with the Sec.Gen's report and our memorandum before it. ~~(See Lodge's speech of 28/1)~~

Lodge's speech revealed great progress in the Americans' stand, especially in relation to the problem of the Straits. His words strengthened Pearson, who at that time was formulating a Western resolution. The text of his resolution was still far from our demands, and we refrained from undertaking what we would do if it was accepted, but we continued in our efforts to improve the Western approach through friends and through contact with the initiators themselves.

I spoke after Lodge. Before I explained our stand I

~~Meticulously~~ analysed Hammerskjold's report insofar as it applied to the Straits and Gaza.

.... (~~See Eban's speech of 28/1~~ ~~[redacted]~~ )

## Results of Saud's visit

The visit of Saud to the US, and especially the refusal of New York City to pay him respect, converted this event into the focus of controversy between wide circles of progressive public opinion and the Government. The controversy centred on the protest against the prohibition against Jews entering Saudi Arabia, and this storm emphasised the public criticism of the State Dept's policy, and what it implied in relation to us.

Perhaps, in the long run, we were helped by the "uncomfortable conscience" of the Government in relation to Saud, but during his visit ~~the~~ its dark shadow ~~of its dealing with~~ affected our problem, ~~was seen~~. It was almost obvious that the Government would refrain from changing its stand publicly before completing the bargaining with Saud. Rumour had it that Eisenhower undertook that he would adamantly insist on the evacuation of the occupied areas, although he added that the US would oppose any belligerence against Israel and would have to support Israel in the matters of the Straits.

## The Assembly Meeting of 1-2/2

The Assembly continued its discussions on February 1 in the afternoon. Before it were two resolutions, put by Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Norway, the US and Yugoslavia. The one expressed regret that the withdrawal had not been completed and called for its completion. The second recognised that in the wake of the withdrawal there must be action that would ensure progress for the creation of peaceful conditions, and called upon Egypt and Israel to conform strictly with the armistice agreement. After the withdrawal of Israel from Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza, ~~the~~ strict adherence to the armistice agreement would make it necessary to place UN forces on the Israel-Egypt armistice

line and the implementation of other arrangements recommended by the Sec Gen's report, taking into account the considerations expressed in the report in order to facilitate the creation of conditions that ~~will~~ would bring about peaceful conditions in the area. Finally the resolution instructed the Sec Gen to implement these steps and report on them to the Assembly.

This resolution, with all its flaws, showed additional progress towards international understanding that there was no point in words about withdrawal unaccompanied by ~~xxxxxx~~ action to deal with the hostile conditions on land and sea ~~embodied~~ exemplified in ~~the examples of~~ Gaza and the Straits of Tiran.

The debate continued on the morrow. Among the speakers was Lodge (~~See his speech of 2/2~~ )

This speech proved considerable if not complete advance in the US stand. This was the first attempt to connect the withdrawal and the need for assurances, even though without it assuming the form of a response to conditions. He cooled off those who were enthusiatic about condemning us, and at the same time apologised that it was impossible to provide everything that was justified. It appeared that this speech aroused the Arabs. They got in touch with Saud and he brought the matter up with the President, and Lodge received an instruction to strengthen his stand.

As the debate continued it transpired to what extent the initiators of the resolution were not at one with each other. Pressure from Egypt sufficed to bring Krishna Menon to his feet to interpret the resolutions in a definitely Egyptian spirit, and this sufficed to bring Lodge to voice another interpretation, also smacking of compromise. Lodge explained that when he talked of withdrawal he meant withdrawal that ~~will~~ would take place within days, not more than was necessary from the physical aspect, in effect less time than was demanded for the withdrawal of the British and French, and here he added something that sounded like a warning: "I must say with the utmost seriousness that I cannot foresee what results are likely to flow from Israel's non-~~conformation~~ conformity with the Assembly as expressed by the resolution being discussed"

Here Fawzy got up to convey the stand of his Government "which is at one with the resolutions under discussion":

.... (See minutes 2/2 )

Our decision to abstain and not vote against was made under strong pressure from friends, including France, Holland, Italy and a number of Latin States, and especially from Pearson, who urged and explained that, if we opposed, he would find it very difficult to continue in his efforts to support us. This was not to imply that they themselves would abstain, but that a bridge would be retained, narrow though it be, between us and the Assembly.

We realised that only this line would crease the right atmosphere for the continuation of the struggle. By our abstention we were able to influence the speeches of friends who promised to give a more favourable interpretation for the purposes of the struggle with Hammerskjold and other debates in the Assembly.

In explaining his abstention, the French delegate said that he voted against the first resolution in accordance with the consistent stand that France had adopted and for the same reasons that still existed, in their opinion, and, that he abstained from the second because "although it contains praiseworthy initiative by virtue of the measure of assistance that it contributes towards bringing about peace and security in the area, it is essentially a series of insufficient and insufficiently defined recommendations, that leave room for conflicting interpretations as has become evident in the course of the debate".

There is no doubt that he expressed the opinions of many who voted otherwise, and what is most important, also the consciousness that, in view of our resolute stand and after the tactical failure in finding compromise with the Afro-Asian bloc, there was no hope of finding a solution to the crisis in the Assembly. The lesson of this failure must have lingered in the hearts of the Americans, and it was around this that the struggle that we were about to begin outside the walls of the UN - in Washington - revolved. It was clear that the balance of power in the Assembly would preclude any effort to determine a clear and defined policy; even on the question of freedom of passage

in the Bay of Eilat - where the majority was prepared to take up a positive stand - there was no possibility of formulating a resolution for two reasons:

A. The existenec of an Asian-Soviet minority constituting more than one third.

B. The stand in principle of a number of friendly States - particularly Latins, who had difficulty in speaking or voting in our favour as long as we were sitting on the conquered territory of another State - and that despite the agreement of the Latins to our demands in themselves. The roots of this stand ~~are embedded~~ were fixed deep in the political consciousness of these States and this is not the place to go into them.

In a cable to the ~~office~~ ministry I assessed the situation created as a result of the Assembly decision as follows:

a. The US was impressed by the deadlock that existed in the Assembly preventing practical decisions and therefore ~~she is~~ was inclined to remove the matter from the Assembly for a certain period in order to plan its thoughts and give Hammerskjold an additional opportunity to reach a solution.

b. From the moment that the US explained to the Asians and others that there was no possibility at this stage of a solution through UN sanctions (because of internal and international legal considerations and also because of the nature of US relations with Nasser at the time), it transpired that one ~~cannot~~ could not find a solution other than through consultations and negotiations.

Consequently the following possibilities arose:

a. For the first time, the Assembly's policy was expressed not merely in a routine call for withdrawal (this time without a defined period of time), but also in a call for consultations in order to determine what would follow, to ensure "safeguarding of peaceful conditions in the area", which constituted progress in itself. (A basic flaw was the adherence to the armistice regime and the limiting of the consultations with the Sec Gen to measures proposed in his report, which were too detailed in relation to Gaza and too unclear in relation to Sharem el Sheikh.)

b. The possibility was created of negotiating, while being able to hold on to one decision as against the other, and made the withdrawal conditional upon knowing what activities would ensure peaceful conditions. Henceforth we would strengthen our demands for "satisfactory arrangements" by the demand for the maintenance of the aims of both resolutions at one and the same time.

c. The second paragraph in the resolution facilitated and obligated Hammerskjold's appealing to Nasser in order to obtain an undertaking on the abstention from hostile acts as the first condition to the attainment of the demands made of us. The matter of belligerency must be the key note in future negotiations.

d. A number of delegates at the UN are asking what will Egypt do if ~~she~~ it ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~will be~~ were convinced that ~~she cannot~~ it could not get us out of ~~US~~ its territory by the power of the Assembly's UN force, and that she had no alternative but to change a number of ~~her~~ its attitudes in essence. We must endevour to bring this about, and here there ~~is~~ was crucial importance ~~in~~ to the US's hesitations ~~in~~ about adopting forceful methods. It was vital that the hesitations should continue and this ~~was~~ was largely dependent upon public opinion which we ~~will~~ would continue to ~~nurture~~ foster.

e. One ~~can~~ could assume that even after the Sec Gen's consultations with the two sides, the problems of Gaza and the Bay ~~will~~ would remain unsolved, and the Assembly ~~will~~ still ponder the issue. Hence the importance of conducting the negotiations in writing so that public support ~~will~~ could easily be mobilised

During the debate important cards were added to our hand for the continuation of the negotiations - the many friendly expressions of opinion that were to serve us well in the coming stages; and on the other hand the clear recognition in the Western camp and among the Americans that there ~~are~~ were no prospects ~~of~~ for progress in the poisoned atmosphere created by the Afro-Asians. Before trying to analyse ~~the~~ continuation of ~~xxxx~~dealings with the matter outside the Assembly and UN, we still had to fortify the consciousness that ~~succour~~ salvation could not be ~~obtained~~ had by dealing with it inside the Assembly.

The Secretary General and the US press for withdrawal 7

On February 3, I received a letter from Hammerskjold drawing the Government's attention to the Assembly's decision. In the light of the section that talks of clarification of measures proposed in his report, the Sec Gen invited me to meet him the following day in the hope that by ~~until~~ then he would be able to learn the stand of the Government.

Our line of argument was intended to acquire proof that Egypt ~~is~~ was undermining the UN's efforts. While negotiating with the Sec Gen, we hoped to gather material in writing for informational purposes, so we decided to exchange opinions with him in writing . I sent him a memorandum assuring him of our cooperation with the UN with the aim of bringing peace to the area according to the principles of the Charter, and asking him to ask the Goverbment of Egypt whether ~~she is~~ it was prepared to undertake, after the withdrawal of our forces, a mutual avoidance of all hostile acts on land, sea and in the air.

Relying upon the second decision, I asked the Sec. Gen. whether, immediately after the withdrawal of Israel forces from Sharm el Sheikh and the strip of the Bay, UN forces ~~will~~ would enter ~~there~~ to prevent hostile acts and remain ~~there~~ until other authoritative arrangemnts ~~will be~~ were made with the parties concerned to ensure the freedom of passage and the prevention of belligerency.

I pointed out that the nature of the second resolution ~~is~~ was likely to raise problems only capable of solution at the highest government level, and I asked him whether he would be prepared to travel to the area to deal with these problems. He answered that if it ~~will be~~ were necessary he ~~will~~ would be prepared to travel, but that he would not wish to travel before the completion of the implementation of the first resolution.

I read him the memorandum, including the request to ask Egypt the question on belligerence. Hammerskjold replied that he would only be able to reply to it after a discussion with the Advisory Committee, but he dealt with a number of points immediately: He maintained that the evacua-

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tion of Gaza implied also the withdrawal of the civilian authorities, and asked whether our plan included withdrawal and the entry of the UN ~~army~~ force, and whether we rejected in principle and under all circumstances the placing of UN forces in Nitzana.

I replied that our stand had been explained. He replied that if that ~~is~~ was the case there ~~is~~ was not very much to talk about, and pointed out that the Egyptians had already called for an urgent renewal of the debate in the Assembly. I answered that we did not mind if the Assembly convened, we would read it our questions about Egyptian belligerence.

Bunche asked whether, on the question of refraining from belligerence, we would be satisfied by a reaffirmation of the armistice agreement with Egypt. I replied with a definite negative, because the Egyptians had endeavoured to demand for themselves belligerent rights for eight years within the armistice agreement.

Subsequently I remained for a/talk closed with Hammerskjold. We spoke of his attitude to Israel and his plan for a trip to the region. I stressed that the Israel people ~~is~~ was prepared to stand its ground even if pressure and threats ~~are~~ were applied.

The following day Bunche informed me in the Sec. Gen.'s name that he and the Advisory Committee accepted that the questions that we had put in the memorandum were important and are connected with the second decision, but until we clarified our position in relation to Un forces in Gaza and Nitzana, he had no basis for confronting Egypt with our questions. He added that Hammerskjold proposed the placing of UN forces in Sharém el Sheikh with the intention that after a certain period of time they be relieved by observers who would supervise the implementation of the undertakings received, according to him, from Fawzy on Egypt's refraining from ~~placing cannons~~ mounting guns in Sharem el Sheikh. But for reasons of principle he did not intend to deal with these questions with us until we withdrew, and he hinted that perhaps a third party (the US) would be prepared to ensure that when Israel ~~leaves~~ left, the danger of a blockade would not be renewed.

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I maintained that the definition of the guarrantee and our agreement to its effective nature, must preceded our exit.

In the evening the Sec. Gen. informed me that the Asians were demanding a meeting of the Assembly on 7/2 and that ~~the Sec Gen will~~ he would have to report, and consequently if we ~~have~~ had something new we ~~are~~ were requested to forward it to him by the 6th at midnight.

## Eisenhower's letter to the Prime Minister on 3/2

In the meantime we received a copy of Eisenhower's letter to the P.M. of February 3, which was presented by Lawson in Jerusalem.

~~(See press conference of earlier of 3/2)~~ (See attached copy)

On February 6, I again cabled to the office an assessment of the situation:

a. The Sec Gen tended to return the matter to the Assembly on the basis of non conformity on our part, and to avoid ~~from~~ any attempt at a positive solution.

b Because of pressure from the Arabs, and particularly Saud, and the difficulty that the Assembly had had in widening the background to a solution, the US tended to ~~maintain~~ urge the termination of the episode by forcing us to retreat on the basis of the little hope contained in the second resolution of the Assembly (February 2). The US ~~is~~ was not anxious to clash with us, but ~~she is~~ was attempting to soften our stand by means of careful pressure.

c. The basis of our differences with the US and the West ~~is~~ was not only the difference in principle on the need for guarrantees before the withdrawal, but in relation to the actual solution that we demand. Apart from the matter of the Straits, we ~~are~~ were divided ~~from~~ with the West on all our basic plans, i.e. the entry of UN to Gaza, the future of the armistice agreement, and the placing of UN forces on both sides.

The central fact ~~is~~ was that also those who support our stand, recognise the armistice agreement as the only political and legal framework,

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The central fact is that also those who support our stand, recognise the armistice agreement as the only political and legal framework,

Copy

February 3, 1957

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I attach the greatest importance to the efforts of the United Nations to resolve the situation brought about by the recent hostilities in Egypt. In my message to you of November 7, 1956 I emphasized our belief that it was essential that Israel forces be withdrawn to the general armistice line, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 2. I was gratified at your reply on the following day which stated that upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the international force entering the Suez Canal area, Israel would willingly withdraw its forces.

Nearly three months have passed. British and French forces have been withdrawn from Egypt. Israel withdrawal to the General Armistice line has not yet been completed. This delay in implementation of pertinent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly has resulted in continuing tension in the Near East and has impaired efforts to work toward the achievement of lasting solutions to the problems which provoked the Near East crisis.

On February 1, 1957 there were tabled in the United Nations two further resolutions addressed to the situation in the Near East. The first of these calls again upon Israel to withdraw its forces behind the General Armistice line. The second calls for scrupulous observance of the 1949 armistice agreement and recognizes that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress toward the creation of peaceful conditions. Provision is made for the placing of the United Nations emergency force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary General's report of January 25, 1957, with a view to achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions there. It is recalled that the Secretary General indicated useful measures which might be developed in the case of Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh.

Other nations deeply and directly interested in the establishment of peaceful conditions in the Near East have joined the United States in sponsoring these resolutions. We believe that the measures set forth in the Secretary General's report, which these resolutions are designed to implement, lay a sound foundation for the establishment of peaceful conditions in the former area of hostilities, the prevention of further outbreaks, and the solution of the problems of Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh.

./.

The essential first step must be the completion of the withdrawal of Israel forces behind the general armistice line. It is my earnest hope that this withdrawal will be completed without further delay.

You know how greatly our nation values close and friendly relations with yours, and we wish to continue the friendly cooperation which has contributed to Israel's national development. We like to feel that our friendly sentiment is reciprocated by Israel. Therefore, I feel warranted in urging most seriously that Israel should not continue an ignoring of United Nations resolutions which, taken as a whole, mark, I believe, an important step toward bringing tranquillity and justice to your and neighboring lands. Such continued ignoring of the judgment of the nations, as expressed in the United Nations resolutions, would almost surely lead to the invoking of further United Nations procedures which could seriously disturb the relations between Israel and other member nations including the United ~~Nation~~ States.

The United States Government has made great exertions to promote constructive United Nations action and I greatly hope that your government will make its own indispensable contribution.

I was distressed to learn of your recent illness but am happy to hear reports that you are mending rapidly.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower.

and our wholesale rejection of this eliminated the possibility of crystalising a common line between us and any European group, or with the Commonwealth or American continent, both in relation to our demands and in relation to our chances of progress in the Assembly.

It was difficult to estimate the chances of the Arabs in mobilising support for the idea of sanctions; at the same time it was also difficult to see the chances of mobilising a third of the members against a complete palnned attempt.

More important than the Assembly forum was the fact that the US had undertaken (and based its M.E. policy on the balance of this undertaking), to achieve, one way or another, the withdrawal of our forces from all places beyond the armistice border, including Gaza. Under these circumstances, there was the danger that if the US saw a serious possibility of removing our forces, while meeting part of our demands, it would prefer that alternative to that of compulsion, whose chances were not clear".

## Ferment in the Congress

On February 6, the efforts that we had made bore fruit. 41 Republican members of Congress signed a call to the Government to oppose any withdrawal of the Israel forces until Egypt opens negotiations on the questions dividing us.

A similar appeal was made by 75 Democratic members of Congress, who demanded that the US insist on freedom of passage in Suez and the Straits before the area was evacuated. In his reply to them Dulles repeated the need for immediate withdrawal. He pointed out that the question as to whether the Straits were territorial or international waters could perhaps be determined by an international court of justice, but in any circumstances, the US accepted freedom of passage in the Bay.

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In the meantime the sharp protest in Congress and the press against the possibility of sanctions against Israel and for guarantees, increased.

Knowland defined the possibility of sanctions on the part of the US as immoral and insupportable, at a time when other states ignored the decisions of the UN with ~~nothing been done about them~~ impunity, and described the US policy as discriminating.

The Democratic Senator from Illinois, Douglas, stated in the Senate thatUN pressure upon Israel to withdraw from Gaza and the Straits ~~is~~ was dangerous and likely to have tragic consequences. Others made similar statements. Asympathetic manifesto ~~arose~~ emerged from the meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive, which had met that day in Miami. This manifesto included sections on the demilitarisation of Sinai, and granting the UN trusteeship over evacuated ~~on~~ the areas combined with Israel services in Gaza.

(This was still during the visit of Saud. "El Ahram" in Egypt ~~said~~ wrote, nevertheless, that Eisenhower had told Saud that one cannot question the existence of Israel).

At that time, the words of the Foreign Ministry spokesman were published in Jerusalem saying that Israel ~~stands~~ stood by the policy that was confirmed by the Knesset on January 22 regarding Gaza and Sharem el Sheikh. In Gaza, the Military Governor had completed arrangements to set up a local council and the Ministry of Finance had reorganised the national budget on the basis that a portion of the sources of income in dollars would cease.

## Senator Knowland's announcement

The mention of sanctions in Dulles' announcement roused strong reaction on the part of the Republican leader in the Senate, Senator Knowland. He complained of discrimination against Israel, at a time when there were no sanctions against the USSR.These words

aroused great ferment and it appeared that in their wake, opposition of Democratic senators would be triggered off in the same direction.

In my contacts with him at the Assembly meeting, I sensed increasing friendship. He was particularly appalled at the discrimination that the UN was adopting in relation to the demands of Egypt on the one hand and Hungary on the other.

I used to meet him every fortnight to review the situation but his announcement about the sanctions was the first outwards expression of the spiritual distress that I had discerned in these talks.

We decided to make our differences with Hammerskjold public. On February 6 we published, at the UN, an analysis of our stand in the negotiations with the Sec. Gen., including the questions that we had asked and had not been answered.

Hammerskjold invited me to a talk with him that evening, expressing regret that the Assembly session scheduled for the morrow had been cancelled (apparently at the instigation of the US). He maintained that our announcement to the press had been distorted, and therefore he had given an announcement of his own.

He maintained that he was not prepared to hand our questions to Egypt until he had received answers to his questions, because our questions constitute the placing of conditions, and require answers under compulsion. Even had he received a reply from Egypt in relation to belligerence, he would not forward it to us, as long as we insisted on holding the conquered territories.

He also told us the answer to our letter to him of the previous day, wherein he gave preference to the entry of UN forces to Gaza and Nitzana over clarification of the question of belligerence and the Straits.

The meeting of the Government that took place in Jerusalem that day again affirmed its stand. On Saturday February 9, demonstrations and public meetings were to take place all over Israel.

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The Prime Minister's letter to Eisenhower - 8/2

(See English version) pp 163a, b)

After the talk with Hammerskjold on Febraury 4, I consulted with the Government, and the following day I wrote to him again, adding to the effect that we attach great importance to the first two questions in our memorandum relating to Egyptian belligerence and the functions of the UN force. I added that the answers to our questions were likely to create a convenient background for the clarification of this questions to us.

Hammerskjold replied to this on the morrow in a letter aimed at changing the order. He insisted that Israel first inform him of its agreement to withdraw from Gaza and the placing of a UN force on the border, and then it would be possible to continue with the clarification of these two questions. As long as he did not receive such replies, he would assume that the Government's stand was negative.

We decided not to reply to these questions and let him worry about it for two or three days. It was clear that if he were to pass our questions on to Nasser he would get negative answers, and then Egypt would appear to be undermining the effort to find a solution and not us, as Hammerskjold would have it appear. The press and the members of delegations supported our opinion, that Israel was entitled to know whether after the withdrawal, Egypt would continue to stand by belligerence.

The US Government looks into the matter carefully.

During the first week in February, there were increasing signs that the US was departing from the stiff resolute attitude which demanded withdrawal without any effort to elucidate the matter of freedom of passage in the Straits and a new regime in Gaza.

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Dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your message dated 3 February. I am sincerely grateful for your personal interest and fully share the wish for the continuance and deepening of the friendly relations between the United States and Israel. The Government of Israel is at one with you in deep concern for the establishment of peace and tranquility in the Middle East. In response to your appeal of 7 November we stated the evacuation of our troops from the Sinai desert, although it was the overwhelming sentiment of our people that effective assurance for our security must first be obtained. We continued our withdrawal despite the fact that Egypt refused to abandon its state of war against us. Our troops have evacuated Sinai - an area of more than 50,000 sq. kilometres - except for a narrow strip on the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which ensures freedom of navigation in the Gulf. We have informed the United Nations that we have no intention to hold this strip and will evacuate it as soon as effective assurances will be forthcoming for continued freedom of passage....

I have to record with regret that in this matter the United Nations has applied different standards to Egypt and to Israel. For eight years Egypt acted in disregard towards Israel. It defied an express resolution of the Security Council in denying us free transit through the Suez Canal and broke its pledged word in regard to the freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. I refer to a solemn undertaking made by Egypt through the American Ambassador in Cairo on 28 January, 1950. This policy took a heavy toll of Israel lives and caused us severe economic damage. It was part of an overall plan to eliminate Israel by force. Those who have the power and the authority to intervene took no effective steps whatever to halt these flagrant violations of international obligations....

We are prepared to withdraw our forces forthwith from Sharm-el-Sheikh if continued freedom of passage through the Straits is assured. We are equally ready to evacuate our military forces from the Gaza Strip without delay and to leave there only a civil administration and police, in suitable relationship with the United Nations. Such agrangements alone would ensure peace and stability in the area, would give to the local population a real share in the administration,

(1636)

would set them on the path to economic self-sufficiency, and would offer the hope of working out a better future for the refugees in an atmosphere free from Egyptian incitement.

Under the charter of the United Nations are we not like other States entitled to security from attack? With deepest respect I would ask you, Mr. President, why no effective action was taken by the Government of the United States in the General Assembly, to give us such security?..

In your letter you referred to the possibility of United Nations "procedures" being invoked against Israel for not having carried out in full the resolutions of the General Assembly. No such "procedures" were ever invoked against Egypt, which for years past has violated resolutions of the Security Council and provisions of the Charter and continues to do so. At a time when public opinion in most of the free countries of the world has come to acknowledge the justice of our Stand, is it conceivable that the United States, the land of freedom, equality and human rights, should support such discrimination and that United Nations "procedures" should be invoked to force us back into a position which would again expose us to murder and blockade?

Mr. President, in the law which we received more than three thousand years ago on Mount Sinai and which has become part of mankind's heritage, the message went forth that there shall be no discrimination between man and man and between nation and nation. Throughout millenia of persecution our people have not lost faith in ultimate justice, peace and human equality. It is unthinkable that now that we have recovered our independence in our ancient homeland we should submit to discrimination. Our people will never accept this, no matter what sacrifice it may entail. Israel though small is entitled to ~~xxxxxx~~ security, freedom and equal rights in the family of nations. Like any other independent nation, Israel is free as of right and our people are determined to defend their independence.

The question is not a legalistic one. It affects the very foundations of international morality: will the United Nations apply one measure to Egypt and another to Israel?...

More than any man now living, you, Mr. President, may be able to help in putting an end to all this hostility and establishing peace between our neighbours and ourselves. Permit me in conclusion to thank you for your kind interest in my well-being which I deeply appreciate.

Murphey's questions - whether we preferred Gaza or the Straits - the matter of hinted of a plan that would satisfy us on the matter of Eilat but not on Gaza. Lodge's speeches on January 28 and February 2 were more realistic and positive than the decisions taken by the Assembly. When it became clear that the decision of February 2 could not effect ~~cannot achieve~~ our withdrawal, various circles in the US Government began to ponder about an effort to satisfy our demand within the framework of mutual relationships.

On February 10 a fruitless meeting with Hammerskjold took place, he maintaining that withdrawal preceded not merely the attainment of an arrangement for freedom of passage and security in Gaza, but also a discusion of such arrangements.

American public opinion in January and the beginning of February

The change that began to show in the US stand was to a great extent due to the conceptions and demands that had become enrooted in public opinion, as it was expressed by the press and Congress. This sphere is worthy of consideration as it is vital for the understanding of the background to the Government's policy.

The issue which we had aroused with the Sinai Campaign became a central one for every thinking American. The campaign itself, the sharp political changes that it brought about, brought a feeling that the UN, Egypt, Israel, and what is important from this point of view, American itself were becoming involved in an insoluble problem; that only the US could solve it, and that the American people had a moral obligation to voice an opinion on how its Government should go about it.

The problem was not a routine M.E. quarrel, it became an internal American problem - a problem which attracted all shades of opinion and characteristic American political interests, in the American political spectrum.

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The public dealt with the problem itself, but it was only natural that inclinations and considerations not connected directly with the Israel-Egypt clash should steal into the discussions.

The deeprooted hatred of Communism, for example, worked against Nasser as a Communist fellow-traveller. "Isolationists" who sought flaws in the UN were able to criticise the discrimination that the UN showed as between us and the USSR, India and Egypt. Christians who feared for the status of Christianity in the light of the spread of Islam under Nasser. Democrats were able to criticise Republican policy. The Southern cotton interests, afraid of Egypt's competition in the field, were glad to see him defeated. Shipping and commercial concerns saw the necessity of teaching a lesson to someone who had clashed with the freedom of shipping, and dared to nationalise international investments.

On the other hand we encountered inclinations harmful to us in public opinion, e.g. [illegible], hatred for "colonialism", exaggerated consideration for the Arab and Moslem world etc.

* * * * * * * * * *

One can say that, as between Egypt and us, public opinion was in our favour by November and December already. Egypt was proved guilty of belligerence, and of undermining the aspiration for peace, and Israel was declared innocent of the accusations of initiating war, "plotting" with Britain and France and everything involved in this. But here also, ended by public opinion, despairing of a direct Israel-Egypt solution.

During January and the beginning of February, as between us and the UN, the balance was beginning to sway in our favour. The UN and in concrete form its Sec Gen, were found guilty of partiality and barren legalism, we - of violating

The public dealt with the problem itself, but it was only natural that inclinations and considerations not connected directly with the Israel-Egypt clash stole into the discussions.

The deep-rooted hatred of Communism for example worked against Nasser as a communist fellow-traveller. "Isolationists" who sought flaws in the UN were able to criticize the discrimination that the UN showed as between us and the USSR, India and Egypt. Christians who feared for the status of Christianity in the light of the spread of Islam under Nasser. Democrats were able to criticize Republican policy. The Southern cotton interests, afraid of Egypt's competition in the field were glad to see him defeated. Shipping and commercial concerns saw the necessity of teaching a lesson to someone who had clashed with the freedom of shipping, and dared to nationalize international investments.

On the other hand we encountered inclinations harmful to us in public opinion e.g. [illegible], hatred for colonialism, exaggerated consideration for the Arab and Moslem world etc.

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From the end of January and the beginning of February, there was the case between us and the US - on sanctions on the one hand, and the demand for public guarrantees on the other. The case on sanctions ended with a judgement in our favour, and we gained from the very discussion. Our chances of obtaining guarrantees became dependent upon our success in weighing public opinion against the Government's hesitations about our demands.

During the second half of January well defined positions were placed before the public on the part of Israel, the UN and the US.

The differences of opinion between us and the US on the one hand, and us and the UN on the other became combined in the consciousness of the public, with the public American discussion of the Eisenhower programme, which was in itself a sort of reply to the M.E. crisis. All these served to incite public opinion, and the reactions were not long in coming.

The decisive opinion in the community became evident in the application of pressure in two directions: The urge that Israel complete the withdrawal, and the demand of the UN and the US that they provide Israel with guarrantees against the return of the status quo.

The demand to attain peace between Israel and Egypt that was so adamant in November, was not shelved, but remained as an abstract wish. The public assumed that there was no chance of an overall solution, and that it was better to grasp partial solutions that could more readily be implemented.

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In general the press did not accept Hammarskjold's conception. The "Washington post", for example wrote on the 15th January:

Our demand for assurances regarding the freedom of passage in the Bay of Eilat and the Straits of Tiran had general support that got stronger and stronger in public opinion, both because of the justice of the demand, and also to a certain extent because of the attractiveness of the vision of creating an alternative to the Suez Canal. On January 18, for example, the "Philadelphia Enquirer" wrote:

The Gulf of Aqaba should be kept open under international agreement for the shipping of all nations, just as the Suez Canal should be kept open. The Gulf has broader significance than its use for the passage of supplied to Israel from the East. It is an alternative to the Suez Canal for the transport of oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and, as such, has deep importance to the West. Aside from Egypt, Israel is the only nation with outlets on both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. From its port on the Aqaba Guld, pipelines could be built to the Mediterranean, replacing or supplementing the Suez Canal as a means of transport. Handing command of the vital Aqaba link back to the Egyptians, to deny its use at the whim of Nasser, does not make sense".

There was also basic support for Israel's demand for security against the renewal of Egyptian hostility from Sinai and especially from Gaza, but the settlement that we proposed for Gaza met with more opposition than support.

While, in November, we found some newspapers that joined us in the opinion that Israel must remain in Gaza and Sharem el Sheikh — in January there were none. The question of Gaza was seen as a question of rehabilitating the refugees no less than a question of the security of Israel. The report of the Director of UNRWA and the discussion on it at the UN, posed a difficult question, that Egypt had undermined, but that the Israel solution did not completely solve either. The thought that Israel would enjoy rights in Gaza, while the main burden of obligations towards the population would continue to bother the UN, was not acceptable. There were serious doubts whether the Arab population would accept Israel rule, and whether the imposition of such rule would not arouse more ferment than bring calm. There were also qualms about the correctness of such an arrangement from the point of

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international law.

Instead of this, the press caught on to the idea of placing a UN force between Israel and Egypt as the only solution. Almost all demanded the placing of an international force in Gaza and the Straits, and many papers also proposed certain plans for a buffer area, and demilitarised, neutral or international zones between the two states, including also Gaza and the Straits, continuing along the border or even embracing the Sinai desert too.

These plans were supported by various arguments: Not only security against disturbance of the shipping, but also the security of Egypt against an ~~XXXX~~ Israel attack; creating more favourable conditions for the solution of the problems of the refuggees of Gaza; the creation of an international communications area between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; the establishment of a base for the prolonged maintenance of the UN army. force.

On January 18 the "Minneapolis Star" wrote:
"UN occupation of Gaze could serve at least a three-fold purpose. It could remove a bone of contention between Egypt and Israel. It could provide a military base for UN police forces, which it seems more and more likely, may be in the Middle East for some time. And it could serve as both a test area and a center of operations for a UN program to resettle the Palestinian Arab refugees, who constitute one of the most, if not THE most, aggravating source of trouble in the Middle East."

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On January 27 the "Louisville Courier Journal" wrote:

....The other is a proposal to internationalize both the Gaza Strip, plus part of the Sinai Peninsula, running down to the Gulf of Aqaba and including the islands at its mouth. This would not be easy to negotiate, but it would be no harder than the temporary proposition, which has already incurred loud objections from Egypt... The advantages of such a scheme are many. The Gulf of Aqaba would be opened to all traffic, not just the ships Egypt is disposed to let pass. Pipelines and airfields would not be subjects to dispute, and the armed forces of Arabs and Israelis would be separated by a permanent barrier. Israel would have the security of a free port on the Gulf, other Arab states would benefit from easier access to their oil ~~fields~~ and President Nasser would have the peace he professes he longs for..."

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there was also a recommendation that a solution be enforced by the UN army. The "Syracuse Post Standard"of January 29 wrote:

"... The logical solution, of placing the disputed areas under supervision of the UN Emergency Force, is rejected by both sides...

The key to the whole issue is obvious ... It is to have a UN force strong enough to march into the disrupted territories and hold them until the dispute is settled."

The hurry to achieve a solution was mixed with sharp criticism, or at least disappointment in the approach of Hammerskjold and the UN majority, and a demand that the US takes a lead and the initiative.

This demand was linked with criticism of the Eisenhower Doctrine. One of the main criticisms of the Doctrine was that it avoids seeking basic solutions to the problems of the region - the Israel-Arab conflict and Suez. But the fact that it was difficult to question the Doctrine itself made it easier for the government to explain away this fault with general excuses borrowed from the wealth of concepts of global political strategy.

The Government of the US was, therefore, able, at the beginning of January to think that it could still leave the problem in the hands of the UN, and there was nothing to prevent it from increasing the pressure on Israel to obey the UN decisions even to threatening.

But when, at the ~~beginning~~ end of January and the beginning of February, words were heard ~~from the mouths of~~ spoken by Lodge, Dulles and Eisenhower that were interpreted as threats of sanctions, the press was not long in reacting in the same terms as ~~was~~ were heard in the Senate.

Most of the press objected ~~against~~ to the thought idea of sanctions. There was a great identification with the criticism expressed by Senator Knowland. There were some who questioned whether Israel should be punished because ~~she~~ it stood up for ~~her~~ its rights. The assumption was expressed that sanctions of the Assembly ~~are~~ were a doubtful means from the practical and legal point of view, and that the UN would do well to try its hand in directions where it has greater chances of success.

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"... The logical solution, of course, is having the disputed areas occupied by UN troops, in reasonable numbers, to assure peaceful withdrawal of the aggressor forces, in relations by both sides...

The key to the whole issue obviously ... is to have a UN force strong enough to separate the disrupted participants and hold them until the dispute is settled."

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Some of these opinions are expressed in the leader of the "New York Herald Tribune" on February 10 on the "Question of Sanctions".

There was also a more "practical" approach, supporting Dulles' warning of sanctions, (see the "Minneapolis Tribune" of February 10 article under the heading "Sanctions for Peace", and "The Christian Century" of February 20, under the headline "Israel continues defiance of the UN".)

When it transpired that the US was being pulled in different directions - on the one hand by the Afro-Asian bloc in favour of sanctions, and on the other being attacked by Congress and Israel's friends - there was advice from the press not to stall on the sanctions vote and try to solve the problem by negotiations.

These opinions are reflected, for example, in the "Daily News" of New York of February 12 in the leader headed: "Why not stall a while?"

The relative progress that took place at the UN with the acceptance of the decision of February 2 was not sufficient for the majority opinion. Many papers objected to the lack of clarity and were not surprised that Israel had rejected it as insufficient. The majority believed that the UN was continuing with a one-sided approach and that Israel's insistence on guarantees was justified or understandable.

Again the cry rose for the US to show leadership at the UN, or through it, and there were even a few voices that called for independent action.

The sharpest expression of central conceptions in public opinion can be found in the leader of the "Washington Post" of February 11. This was apparently the first paper specifically to demand, as a conclusion, an American guarantee through the UN and, if need be, an independent American guarantee for the security of the borders and the freedom of passage; it may very well be that this paper knew of the content of the talk that Dulles was to have with me that day.

## CHAPTER V

## CLARIFICATION AND DIVISION OF OPINION IN NEGOTIATION WITH THE US GOVERNMENT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR GUARANTEES BY HER.IT.

(FEBRUARY 11TH-24TH)

### MEMORANDUM OF FEBRUARY 11

I have already pointed out that at the beginning of February there were signs that the US stand was wavering under the pressure of public opinion and circumstances.

The uprising in the Senate that embraced proponents and opponents of the Government made a great impression, especially at a time when the Government needed the Senate for the confirmation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. On 11.2. the matter of sanctions collapsed under the pressure of the Senate and press. The Senate session became a great demonstration against sanctions and discrimination. Among the main speakers were Senators Sparkman, Smith, Humphrey and others.

Our stubborn stand, as expressed in our talks,memoranda, appearances and the P.M.'s letters, proved that we were not prepared to give in. The visit of Saud and the negotiations with him ended and the pendulum could now more easily move from the Afro-Arab line to a more balanced position.

There was disappointment with Hammerskjold's methodsof dealing that did not succeed in implementing his many fields of authority in order to attain a solution (we heard criticism, that he was not conducting serious negotiations but does his duty by writing reports and calling the Assembly, from the American delegation at the UN. There was also criticism of the content of the negotiations which he conducted with us and the Egyptians. They told us, for example, that in their opinion he should have passed our questions to the Egyptians and allowed them to answer as they wished. Also

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the approach of the Sec Gen to the question of Suez did not satisfy them. During that period he prepared a suggestion as the basis for negotiations with Egypt that was rejected by Britain, France and the US).

On February 11 was the sign. That morning, accompanied by Shiloach, I went to a meeting with Dulles. The meeting was due to take place early but was apparently postponed because they had not managed to prepare everything; we found Murphy and Wilkins with him.

The Secretary opened by saying that the President and he had read "with sympathy and very carefully" the P.M.'s letter, and had prepared their reply to the letter in the form of an Aide Memoire that was read to us immediately, saying (see page 173a).

The Secretary continued and said that ~~in the line that was expressed in the memorandum there is a certain satisfaction with~~ went a considerable way towards meeting our stand. I replied that the memorandum constituted an extremely important document and that I would pass it to my Government without delay. At the moment I must again explain our policy in matters where opinions are divided. I explained the unbearable legal position that existed before October 29 and our firm decision not to return to it. I detailed our arguments in the matter of the Straits, Suez, Gaza and the vision of laying a pipeline and a roadway for transportation between Eilat and the Mediterranean.

Dulles answered that the US Government sympathised with our objectives. In effect, until the Suez campaign, it was sympathetic also to the demands of Britain and France. But she considers that the method that these two powers and Israel have chosen is mistaken and dangerous. The US considers today too that it is possible to achieve the just aims towards which Israel is striving by other means. He proposed to us to consider seriously the American undertaking on freedom of passage contained in the paper

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AIDE MEMOIRE



"The United Nations General Assembly has sought specifically, vigonously, and almost unanimously, the prompt withdrawal from Egypt of the armed forces of Britain, France and Israel. Britain and France have complied unconditionally. The forces of Israel have been withdrawn to a considerable extent but still hold Egyptian territory at Sharm El-Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba. They also occupy the Gaza Strip, which is territory specified by the Armistice arrangements to be occupied by Egypt....

"We recognize that the area has been a source of armed infiltration and reprisal back and forth contrary to the armistice agreement, and is source of great potential danger because of the presence there os so large a number of Arab refugees about 200,000. Accordingly, we believe that the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General should seek that the United Nations Emergency Force in the exercise of its mission, move into this area and be on the boundary between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

"With respect to the Gulf of Akaba and access thereto - the United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto. We have in mind not only commerical usage. But the passage of pilgrims ~~and~~ on religious missions, which should be fully respected.

"The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950 the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Akaba was only to protect the islands themselves against possible damage or violation and that this occupation being in no way conceived in a ~~p~~spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian Coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of the nations."

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Courst of Justice, the United States, on behalf of the vessels of United States registry is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

"It is of course clear that the enjoyment of a right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with the

United Nations resolutions. The United States has no reason to assume that any littoral state would under these circumstances obstruct the right of free and innocent passage.

"The United States is prepared publicly to declare that it will use its influence in concert with other United Nations members, to the end that, following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures will be implemented" (the UN decision of February 2 that the UN Emergency Force "move into the Straits area as the Israeli forces are withdrawn".

We believe that our views and purposes in this respect are shared by many other nations and that a tranquil future for Israel is best assured by reliance upon the fact, rather than by an occupation in defiance of the overwhelming judgement of the world community".

that he handed us. It has inestimable value as compared to the undertaking to refrain from belligerence given by Nasser that cannot be relied upon. The US Government would not give an undertaking of this nature did it not consider that it had the power to implement it. He mentioned my words on the oil pipeline and said that if Israel ~~will~~ holds onto Sharém el Sheich, it may be that a pipeline will be laid but no serious element will endanger itself by sending oil through it, which would not be the case were the arrangement proposed in the memorandum to come into effect. The US knows well what moral and political responsibility ~~she~~ it is accepting upon ~~herself~~ itself if Israel ~~will~~ withdraws from Sharém el Sheich in accordance with ~~her~~ its request and Nasser ~~will~~ subsequently renews the ~~blockade~~ blackade.

I explained that we do not minimize in the slightest the US's promises and that I am convinced that our Government will examine the matter carefully.

Here I requested an explanation from Dulles concerning the US stand on Gaza. Is ~~she~~ it tied to the idea of the evacuation of the civilian government from the ~~capital~~ Strip or is she only demanding a military evacuation? Dulles stated that he ~~is~~ was not au fait with the question and that the US Government had not yet taken a final stand on this point.

Dulles ~~continued and~~ urged that Israel and the US should aim at cooperation in serious matters that were about to be discussed. We will discard the talk of sanctions; this talk is not serious and/or clear. For what are sanctions? The most serious sanction envisaged for both the US and Israel would be if two enlightened States such as these would be/were unable to cooperate in an effort to relieve/tension the area. "~~This~~ It would be a tragedy if we had to admit failure".

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After the talk with the Secretary we lunched with Murphy. He explained that what was written in the documents on the US stand in relation to shipping in the Straits would be published with great ~~festivity~~ ceremoniality and that the US expects that other maritime nations, including Israel, would make identical declarations. The main ~~gxxx~~ guarantee lies in the clear understanding that every maritime state would implement ~~her~~ its rights to passage, but for the sake of safety a UN force would be placed in the Straits. The US Government considers that ~~her~~ its declaration and ~~her~~ announcement on the intentions to implement the right of American shipping in the Bay converts the Bay in fact to an international waterway. Dulles was prepared to publish the announcement the same day but preferred to wait until we could manage to mobilise other states to take a similar step. The State Department preferred that Hammerskjold should place a UN force in the Bay without an Assembly decision, but was concerned about his hesitant stand.

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After the talk with the Secretary we lunched with Murphy. He explained that what was written in the documents on the US stand in relation to shipping in the Straits would be published with great flexibility and that the US expects that other maritime nations, including Israel, would make identical declarations. The main guarantee lies in the clear understanding that every maritime state would implement her rights to passage, but for the sake of safety a UN force would be placed in the Straits. The US Government considers that her declaration and her announcement on the intentions to implement the right of American shipping in the Bay convert the Bay in fact to an international waterway. Dulles was prepared to publish the announcement the same day but preferred to wait until we could manage to mobilise other states to take a similar step. The State Department preferred that Hammarskjold should place a UN force in the Bay without an Assembly decision, but was concerned about his hesitant stand.

Murphy revealed flexibility in relation to our claim in favour of [illegible] being satisfied with a withdrawal of the army from Gaza without questioning the civilian regime but insisted on the entry of a UN force. If Israel will convince the UN that it is possible and desirable to maintain Israel rule, all the better, but there are no chances that Egypt will give up her rights in favour of Israel, at best there is the chance that she would give them up to the UN.

We explained that we are convinced that if a proper clarification would take place we could convince them that the interests of the Strip and the peace of the area justified the civilian rule remaining in our hands. We proposed that an early clarification take place between us and the US Government on the problems of the government in the Strip, on the assumption that if we together reach an agreed plan it would not be difficult to draft a formula that would be acceptable to the Assembly.

He promised to recommend this to the Secretary.

I suggested to him that the US Government influence Hammerskjold to defer the Assembly discussions as much as possible so that we could continue with our discussions in a quiet atmosphere.

It transpired that from the procedural point of view the Secretary expects that we should come to an agreement with him on the basis of the document, and the US would deal with the matter at the UN and with Hammerskjold. I promised that after a talk with the Foreign Minister I would bring my first impression and demand a final answer from Jerusalem as soon as possible.

From an additional talk with Murphy on 12.2, it appeared that the State Department was satisfied if in the first stage and at any rate until the 14th we would express readiness in principle to solve the problems according to Dulles' memorandum, and would begin to discuss the stages of implementation. There appeared to be a possibility of implementing part of the plan affecting the Straits at a first stage without waiting for the clarification of all the details involved in withdrawing from the Strip.

The Foreign Minister recommended that we should act in that way, that is, announce our agreement in principle and promise the implementation of the Eilat paragraph in the plan before completing the clarification about the implementation of the Gaza paragraph.

Murphy

To my question on Suez he reacted that the US Government maintains freedom of passage for Israel in Suez too and would act in order to honour the 1888 Treaty.

We strongly ~~maintained~~ rejected the return of Egypt in any form, and Murphy expressed understanding, but stressed the difficulty in persuading the Assembly from the political point of view, and especially from the legal aspect, ~~that~~ as according to the armistice agreement Egypt had a right to the Strip. I explained that, in particularly Egypt's objection to the theory of non-belligerence freed the UN from any obligation to insist on Egypt's right according to the agreement. I promised a memorandum that would explain this conception in greater detail. We proposed that the State Department starts a practical clarification with us on the ~~xxxxxxx~~ future government in the Strip. We proposed that in the first instance the discussion be non-committal. I said that we hoped to prove the benefit ~~that is~~ entailed in our approach. That day Hammerskjold's report, in which he announced the deadlock that had occurred in the negotiations with us, but expressed a strong qualification to sanctions both from the legal ~~and~~ point of view and from the point of view of practical effect and common sense, was published.

Dulles' conversation with me, the Sec Gen's pronouncement - with the US's permission-against sanctions and the discussion in the Senate gave February 11 the most dramatic character. In the evening Dulles gathered the senior reporters and ~~lectured~~ spoke to them on his proposals, laying special stress on the matter of shipping and with a certain blurring of the matter of Gaza. In the beginning he intended to keep his proposals secret but because of the echoes from the Senate he decided to leak the matter out in order to stop the discussion on sanctions.

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success in receiving guarantees from the US. The government's step in giving us this memorandum changed the tactical position fundamentally. All the friendly newspapers began to praise Dulles on the initiative intended to satisfy Israel's essential interests.

The "Washington Post" that had hit out at the Government all the time in our interests, wrote on the morning of February 13 "now Israel's turn has come to be reasonable". In similar vein the "New York Times" and "New York Herald Tribune" wrote. The Times reporter, James Roston, telephoned me three times and stressed with feeling that Israel ~~xxxxxxxx~~ would ~~will~~ commit a great sin if ~~she~~ it neglects this historic opportunity to change ~~her~~ its status in the Red Sea and the Bay of Eilat.

In the meantime we received reliable information that in the State Department appeals had been prepared to a dozen maritime States asking them to join the American doctrine on the nature of the Straits as an international waterway, and to send ships to Eilat in the near future in order to materialise this fact. It was hinted to me that the Americans would be prepared to hear reasonable alterations to the meorandum as long as Israel would agree to bring about conditions that would facilitate the withdrawal.

This turning point in the American approach confused the Arabs at the UN! news that reached us described differences of opinion. The common conclusions were more or less that the Arabs must continue to demand sanctions and to wait until Israel replied to Dulles' proposals before calling for the Assembly to convene. There was an opinion that Israel would ~~will~~ reject the American initiative and then one could rely on the US to side with the Arabs. They also decided that Egypt must reject any demand to ~~undertake to the~~

promise the Assembly or the Sec Gen to maintain freedom of passage. Fawzy expressed his strong hope that Israel will reject the US suggestions in order that she should return to her previous solitude.

n OUR MEMORANDUM TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 15.2

(See English original attached)

To the memorandum was attached a list of points for clarification in connection with the Bay of Akaba.

1. The matter of clarifying the concept "free and innocent passage".
2. Adding the words "or otherwise" after "forcibly" in order to nullify any means of disturbance to shipping such as the Egyptians sinking ships to create an obstacle.
3. A question on the steps that the US Government is about to take in order to practically implement her freedom of shipping in the Bay.

The Secretary replied by saying that he had read our memorandum with disappointment. He was afraid that the Government of Israel did not understand the essence of American initiative, and did not react as the US had expected. The factual situation is that the UN Assembly decided on an unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces to the armistice lines. Because of considerations that were serious in her eyes Israel had difficulty in obeying the decision and the US Government considered that if Israel knew the US's relationship to the two problems raised by the P.M. in his letter to the President it would make it easier for her to implement the UN decisions. The US Government did not make any proposals to Israel. As a member in the UN she can exert influence and as a maritime power she can adopt a certain

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The Government of Israel deeply appreciates the sympathetic interest of the President and the Secretary of State in its problems and their willingness to devote earnest study to the quest for solutions. It regards this constructive interest as a further expression of American friendship for Israel and of American concern for peace in the Middle East. Israel has noted with satisfaction the affirmative approach of the United States to the question of free navigation in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran.

The Government of Israel expresses its agreement in principle with the approach to this question defined by the Secretary of State in his aide-memoire of February 11 and in his conversation with the Ambassador of Israel on that date.

In particular, Israel is appreciative of the following elements in the U.S. position:

1) The affirmation that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that all nations, including Israel, have the right of free and innocent passage in the gulf and through the straits giving access thereto.

2) The invocation in the aide-memoire of the assurances conveyed by Egypt to the U.S. on January 28, 1950.

3) The statement of the readiness of the U.S., on behalf of vessels of U.S. registry, to exercise the right of free and innocent passage, and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

4) The suggestion that as a precautionary measure the UNEF move into the area of the straits as the Israeli forces are withdrawn.

The Government of Israel is impressed by the statement of the Secretary of State to the Ambassador expressing awareness of the responsibility which would rest upon the U.S. if Israel were to withdraw and the Egyptian restrictions were to be resumed.

While giving full weight to these policies and attitudes, the Israel Government is conscious of the danger which would arise to the freedom of Israeli shipping in the Gulf and to peace in the area if Egypt were to resume occupation of the straits of Tiran before the attainment of a settlement. For many years Egypt has maintained restrictions in the Suez Canal contrary to the convention of 1888 and to decisions of the Security Council which, under article 25 of the Charter have binding effect on all members of the U.N. These policies, together with corresponding restrictions in the Gulf of Akaba, have cut Israel off from her freedom of commerce with large parts of the world have inflicted enormous losses and burdens upon Israel's economy, and have constituted a danger to peace and security in the Middle East.

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Despite the disapproval of the U.N. and of the maritime community, including the U.S., no effective steps were taken to ensure the termination of these practices.

Recent expressions of Egyptian policy give ample grounds for the belief that, if no preventive measures are taken, the Egyptian restrictions in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran will be resumed, with consequent peril both to Israel's national interests and to peace in the area.

In order to meet this danger, the Government of Israel supports the suggestion that units of the UNEF move into the straits as Israel troops withdraw. But it holds that these units should be stationed along the Western coast of the Gulf of Akaba until a peace settlement is achieved, or until an agreed and permanent arrangement for freedom of navigation is otherwise secured. In this connection Israel has noted the proposal made on behalf of the U.S. by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the U.N. on January 28 and February 2, 1957.

Failing such an arrangement for the stationing of UNEF, the Government of Israel suggests that a precise guarantee be afforded for the specific protection of Israel bound shipping exercising its right of passage in the straits and the gulf.

Israel believes that the aide-memoire and the oral observations by the Secretary of State in his conversation with the Ambassador on February 11 signify the sincere intention of the Government of the U.S. to provide an effective guarantee against interference with free navigation in these international waters. Accordingly, the Israel Government is ready to enter into immediate conversations with the U.S. on specific steps for an early settlement. It is desirable to coordinate the sequence to be adopted in such matters as a public declaration of U.S. policy embodying the guarantee of free navigation concurring declarations by other maritime powers the evacuation of the Sharm el Shaikh area by Israel forces and the entry of UNEF into the evacuated area and the definition of its functions. A preliminary list of other specific points suggested for discussion is submitted as an annex to this aide-memoire. The Government of Israel has studied the observations in the aide-memoire of February 11 on the Gaza Strip. It has, in particular, noted the following elements:

1. The recognition that this area, until recently under Egyptian occupation, "has been a source of armed infiltration and reprisal" and of "great potential danger because of the presence there of so large a number of Arab refugees.

2. The observation of the Secretary of State that the U.S. has not crystallized a final view on the future of the Gaza Strip but that this future "should be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the U.N." The Government of Israel wishes to add the following comments:

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The Gaza Strip, occupied during the invasion of 1948 was never Egyptian territory. The Armistice Agreement under which Egypt occupied the Strip was continuously broken by Egypt. In violation of the U.N.Charter and of the decision of the Security Council against belligerent acts, Egypt conducted hostile acts against Israel. These actions were based on a doctrine of "a state of war" with Israel, which Egypt still declines to relinquish, despite the fact that this doctrine, and any actions arising therefrom, were repudiated by the Security Council in 1951. In these circumstances there is no basis for the restoration of the status quo ante in Gaza by the return of Egypt to an area which she used exclusively for the purpose of establishing an aggressive base against Israel. Israel's stand on the Gaza question is influenced by three problems:

a. The security of Israel and especially that of its villages and settlements in the South and the Negev.

b. The welfare and economic situation of the local population.

c. The problem of the refugees.

Israel is prepared to make a supreme effort to raise the standard of the residents of the area from the fearful poverty which grew increasingly disastrous during the Egyptian occupation. The Government of Israel is ready to make its contribution to a U.N. program for settling the refugee population of the Gaza Strip. Israel's contribution, within this framework, will consist both in the payment of compensation and in the settlement of a part of the refugee population of Gaza. Israel is confident that the U.S. will understand the significant effect of this step for the solution of basic problems which have been deadlocked for several years. In view of the vital importance of the Gaza problem and of the contribution envisaged by Israel towards its solution, it is suggested that the Government of the U.S. and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the U.N. This examination, which should include an investigation of the position in the area by a suitable mission, should not take a long time. The steps immediately envisaged are the withdrawal of Israel forces and the discussion of a suitable relationship between the U.N. and the local and Israel administrative services. Israel believes that it is necessary to prevent a recurrence of the turbulent conditions out of which the recent hostilities arose. There should be a new era in the relations between Egypt and Israel. By constantly violating the armistice, through the invocation of belligerent rights and the conduct of blockades and hostilities, Egypt distorted the fundamental character of the Armistice Agreement as a transition to peace, and emptied it of its central purpose. At a time when the agreement had full legal force, Egypt regarded it as an expression of "a state of war". In these

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circumstances, Israel cannot legitimately be requested to return to the status quo ante, and to resume adherence to an agreement which Egypt has nullified throughout a period of 8 years by claiming and exercising a policy of belligerency inconsistent with its terms. At the same time, the Government of Israel declares that it does not seek or claim any belligerent rights against Egyptians and that it undertakes to abstain, on the basis of reciprocity, from any hostile act whatever against Egypt. The aide-memoire of February 11 deals with the questions of Gaza and the Gulf of Akaba since problems exist in both areas in connection with the withdrawal of forces. While no context of withdrawal arises in the case of the Suez Canal the Government of Israel emphasizes its hope for U.S. support in securing the implementation of Israel's rights under the 1888 convention. On many occasions, the most recent of which was President Eisenhower's public statement on February 6, the U.S. has noted the violation by Egypt of its obligations under the 1888 Convention in respect of Israel bound shipping. The U.N. has devoted great efforts to secure the clearance of the Suez Canal for navigation. If the Suez Canal is to be reopened physically and then to be operated with discrimination, the U.N. will have inadvertently become responsible for expediting the renewed violation of international law. It is inconceivable that the Suez Canal can be opened by the U.N. and remain closed to any of its member-states. It is essential, in the interest of peace and security, to ensure that Egypt refrains from interference with Israel and Israel-bound shipping exercising the right of free and innocent passage in this international waterway. The Government of Israel would welcome a clarification of U.S. policy on this point, The constructive and affirmative approach expressed by the Secretary of State in the conversation and aide-memoire of February 11 confirms the belief that the U.S. and Israel have a common aspiration to strengthen peace in the Middle East. In view of the great measure of proximity between the viewpoints of the two governments on the questions under discussion, the Government of Israel desires to hold urgent conversations with the U.S. Government in order to clarify the issues and to promote an early solution. Israel hopes that the U.S. will help to create such international conditions in the immediate future as will allow swift progress to be made in such discussions, designed to bring about a settlement of problems which, until the Secretary's initiative on February 11 were in a position of acute deadlock.

Annex:- Preliminary list of points on the Gulf of Akaba arising out of the aide-memoire of February 15, 1957.

1) It is Israel's understanding that the term "free passage" as generally accepted in international law means passage of ships irrespective of flag or destination of cargo, without previous authorization of the littoral state or states, and without the right of the littoral state or states, and without the right of the littoral state to suspend such passage, furthermore that "innocent passage" means passage of a ship whose conduct is not essentially injurious to the safety and welfare of the litterol state. (Hyde, International Law 1945 p. 517). It is suggested that these two definitions by explicity stated in any declaration to be made by the U.S., setting out the policies envisaged in the Aide Memoire.

2) Reference is made to the statement in the Aide Memoire "that no nation has the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage etc." It is suggested that in any formal declaration of purpose these words be amended to read "forcibly or otherwise". The object is to preclude interference by the enactment of obstructive regulations, the penalisation of ships exercising innocent passage, or by such methods as the blocking of the waterway by placing obstacles in the navigable channel. Such interference by regulation, intimidation and physical obstruction have been followed by Egypt in the Suez Canal. It is consequently submitted that Governments prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage should specifically decline to recognize the validity of regulations imposed by any of the littoral states, with the effect of frustrating the basic aim of free and innocent passage.

3) The Government of Israel would welcome information on the steps proposed by the U.S. in order to exercise its rights of passage in the gulf and the straits at an early date. Israel would welcome a discussion of methods whereby the U.S. might "join with others to secure general recognition of this right". It is presumed that this involves cooperative effort with other maritime nations who have an interest in developing navigation in the gulf and the straits.

policy in relation to the Bay and Straits and she is prepared to publicly announce what that policy is. But the US Government has no authority to ~~come in the stead~~ take the place of the Sec. Gen. and the United Nations and ~~to~~ conduct negotiations in the name of the Assembly. Dulles pointed out that this point was stressed in his memorandum to us. Nevertheless he assumed that if the Israel Government would know what the US policy ~~is she~~ was it would decide to respond positively to the UN's demands.

I replied that in our opinion there was no misunderstanding on the part of the State of Israel. The situation as it appears to us is that the US Government, when it became clear to ~~her~~ it that conditions did not exist enabling us to withdraw from the Straits and the Strip and that the Assembly and Israel had reached a cul de sac, had decided to make a contribution by ~~placing her~~ using its full weight in the Assembly to assist in creating conditions that would enable the stabilisation of security and preventing a renewal of the blockades and hostile acts.

As the result of an examination of the meorandum of the US Government, and from the words of the Secretary, it appeared to us that there is not a wide gap between our approaches. On the question of Gaza, we, too, agree to the evacuation of the forces as a first step and ~~also~~ the Government of the US also stated that one has to examine anew the civilian future of the strip. We consider that the ~~Xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ US Government can together with us and with ~~xhe~~ other members of the UN, bring about an authoritative examination of this problem. We are convinced that any unbiased examination will reach the conclusions that we are proposing.

In relation to the Straits, we are not suggesting anything but the clarification of formulations and the clear establishment of the functions of the UN army force in the spirit and the letter of the official announcements made by Lodge.

Here Dulles answered and maintained: the UN demanded unconditional withdrawal. The British and French obeyed whereas Israel refused. Tension was created in the Assembly and in the area. Many delegations began to demand the taking of serious steps against Israel. Israel had a serious alternative: whether to endanger ~~herself~~ it by continuing to rebel against the Assembly or accept the ~~dangers~~ risks involved in accepting the Assembly's authority. The US Government considered that when Israel ~~would~~ clearly knew what the US policy was ~~she~~ it would accept the danger involved in obeying the UN decisions.

To his regret, he learnt from our memorandum that we are not satisfied with this and that we are demanding a two-sided agreement. This is not possible. It would arouse bitter opposition on the part of many members of the UN, on the part of the Sec.Gen, the Arab States and particularly Egypt. The US could not replace the UN. He again proposed that we should be satisfied with the fact that the US Government is prepared to accept and announce that the policy described in ~~her~~ its memorandum ~~is~~ was the national policy of the US. The Secretary added that he was impressed by a number of comments in our memorandum and ~~is~~ was prepared to change and improve various formulations according to our suggestions, but he ~~cannot~~ could not agree to two-sided negotiations between us ~~on~~ or a ~~the~~ programme that the US would enforce upon the UN.

Here I attempted to move the discussion to a clarification of the detailed points in the memorandum but Dulles avoided this and returned to the central point saying that the US Government was prepared to declare ~~her~~ its policy. If there are difficult points ~~she~~ it is prepared to consider our suggestions for the clarification of the document, for its improvement and strengthening,

she is prepared to announce that she will maintain this policy as a member of the UN but cannot conduct negotiations on a two-sided agreement on matters that fall within the Assembly's jurisdiction.

Finally he again urged us with all the means at his disposal to respond to his Government's appeal. When I said that we must not go blindly into a situation where Israel will be faced with harm by Nasser in the free passage - which would lead to a renewal of war, he answered that in this event Israel would not stand alone in the struggle. In ending he pointed out that the tension and pressure in the Assembly were increasing. We only had a day or two to respond to the US Government's appeal. If we do not reach understanding soon, the debate with all its force would be aroused in the Assembly. He stated that he had telephoned the President after reading our memorandum and that immediately after our meeting he would have consultations with him in Thomasville, Georgia, would return to Washington on Saturday and receive me at any hour I choose.

I summarised the situation in a cable that I sent on 16.2, saying:

1. Dulles decided, in view of the angry attack of the Arabs and Hammerskjold, that his memorandum constituted the outer limit of his preparedness to assist apart from corrections and certain clarifications in the promised announcement.

2. One can assume that he will recieve the President's confirmation to this line today.

3. The press and our friends tend to maintain that we are exaggerating.

4. One can assume that he will inform us that that is his policy and that we must accept or reject it as it is.

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On the morrow Dulles returned to Washington. He immediately phoned Rowntree and ~~set~~ fixed a meeting with us in the house of the Secretary. Palmar, Wilcox and Rowntree were present.

I said that I had not yet received a reaction from my Government but I had managed to consult the Foreign Minister in New York. In our opinion there is not a great gap between the aims of the two governments and we are surprised that the US sees our reaction as a rejection of the proposal and ~~tends~~ is inclined to return the discussion to the Assembly. In our opinion it is worthwhile continuing with the two-sided clarification and aiming at agreement. Dulles ~~stopped~~ interrupted me and pointed out that by the efforts of the US the Assembly discussion ~~was~~ had been postponed on a number of occasions, but that the Asian-Arab bloc pressure was increasing so that it should not be further postponed, and the bloc was urging that the suggestion proposal of sanctions against Israela be dealt with. He doubted if the US could continue to stand against this pressure especially when ~~she is~~ it was not convinced that there ~~is~~ was a chance of advancing matters by negotiations between us.

I said that we have three possibilities:

a. The Assembly decision on placing a UN army force in the Straits to safeguard freedom of passage,

b. the undertaking of the US and maritime powers to protect the freedom of passage with by force,

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b. the undertaking of the US and maritime powers to protect the freedom of passage with force,

c. an Egyptian undertaking on ~~her~~ abandonment of belligerence, blockade and boycott.

The memorandum hints at such an arrangement but one must improve it in order to minimise the dangers.

Dulles answered that he and the President understand us but cannot provide a method that has no dangers, and that they do not desire to delude Israel. The one thing that he can tell us is that the lesson of the last few months must arouse the governments of the world to oppose ~~harm~~ injury to the security and rights of any state; the period of apathy has passed, never to return.

The US Government cannot assure the guarantee demanded by Israel, in a more ~~festive~~ ceremonial manner than that mentioned in the ~~xxxx~~ memorandum. The President cannot go beyond his jurisdiction, the giving of an internatinnal guarantee which indludes the use of power obliges him to go to Congress and the Senate, a matter which is not possible today. The US ~~also~~ cannot guarantee either, that the Assembly will define the functions of the UN army as we ~~xixhx~~ wish. In the UN, too, it is not possible, in existing circumstances, to achieve more than was achieved in the decision of February 2.

The President and he know that Israel ~~stands~~ faces before a difficult decision but they believe that their proposal ensures desirable results. The US policy does not stem from ~~passing~~ transient considerations but from an overall approach to the problems of the world and from an evaluation of the UN as an instrument to prevent war. This is a question of supreme importance. If we will respond and evacuate Gaza and the Straits the US and mankind will owe a great debt of gratitude to Israel and he believes that this debt will be repaid.

I asked what the US would do if, despite everything, Egyptian

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belligerence would be renewed.

Dulles answered that it was essential to place a force at the disposal of a defence against belligerence, he had already mentioned in a previous talk that he is not a "pacifist" and the US knows the size of the responsibility that will fall upon her if the hostility will be renewed after our withdrawal. They will establish intimate consultations with us on how to prevent hostility.

I responded with appreciation but stressed that with all her goodwill, the US is likely, as a result of international considerations, demand of us that we avoid military reaction against a renewal of Egyptian belligerence. We have learnt by experience and hence our difficulty in depending upon a promise that does not contain a clear guarantee.

We did not progress further and great tension prevailed in the room. I promised to transmit the matter to the P.M. and pointed out that it may be that the Government will wish to invite me to hear things in detail but that if the Assembly will gather soon and deal with sanctions the matter will affect the continuation of the discussion in a decent atmosphere. I therefore demanded that the Assembly discussion be postponed as far as possible.

Dulles asked to meet me again immediately the Government's response was received. He also annnounced that the President had decided to publish the State Department's memorandum tomorrow and would not oppose our publishing our memorandum of reply.

## Eisenhower's announcement of 17/2 and our reaction

In the wake of our meeting Dulles consulted with the President. That evening the State Dept. published their memorandum of 11/2 and the President made an announcement, which stated, inter alia, that the US accepts the fact that Israel has certain justified claims against Egypt, and that it is only right to try to correct them. One of the decisions of the Assembly of 2/2 showed, in his opinion, a way of doing so. (see Eisenhower declaration of 17/2 p. 186a)

Haggarty, who supplemented the President's announcement, described, to the journalists, Israel's reply to the memorandum as "negative".

The President's announcement, even though it aroused the ire of certain friendly circles, had its effect and made us appear, in the eyes of wide circles of public opinion, as having refused - and forced us to defend ourselves.

~~The the new york journal American of February 19 xxxx~~

A reaction to the President's words appeared in Jerusalem on the morrow. After an urgent meeting of the Government, Lawson was called to the P.M. to hear his reaction. The Foreign Office spokesman made an announcement that explained, inter alia, that the American announcement does not reply to the fundamental question - how the freedom of shipping will be assured with the withdrawal of Israel forces from the west coast of the Bay.

In New York the UN delegation addressed a question to the press and ~~xhs~~ public opinion:

Israel is faced by a serious question; how will she and friendly governments feel if her forces ~~will~~ withdraw, and the blockade and fedayin activities ~~will be~~ are renewed. There is no doubt that one should devote more time ~~in order~~ to ensure that

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" The Department of State is today making public a memorandum which the United States gave to the Government of Israel on February 11th. It relates to Israeli withdrawal to within the armistice...

" The United States is aware of the fact that Israel has legitimate grievance and should, in all fairness, see a prospect of remedying them. The United Nations General Assembly by its second resolution of February 2nd, endorsing the Secretary General's report, gave such a prospect. We believe that the prospect is further assured by the view which the United States has formulated and communicated to Israel in its memorandum of February 11th. There, the United States took note of Israeli views with reference to the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Akaba and made clear what the United States would do, after Israel's withdrawal, to help solve the problems that preoccupy Israel. Our declaration related to our intentions, both as a Member of the United Nations and as a maritime power having rights of our own.

" The Unied States believes that the action of the United Nations of February 2nd and the statements of various governments, including the United States memorandum of February 11th, provide Israel with the maximum assurance that it can reasonably expect at this juncture, or that can be reconciled with fairness to others.

" Accordingly, the United States has renewed its plea to Israel to withdraw in accordance with the repeated demands of the United Nations and to rely upon the resoluteness of all friends of justice to bring about a state of affairs which will conform to the principles of justice and of internatinnal law and serve impartially the proper interests of all in the area. This, the United States believes, should provice a greater source of secruity for Israel than an occupation continued contrary to the overwhelming judgment of the world community."

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That evening I received the P.M.'s instructions. In his opinion we would not be able to move from two ~~stands~~ positions:

a. One cannot evacuate the coast of the Straits without effective guarrantees for freedom of passage;

b. One can under no circumstances allow Egypt to return to Gaza, now or after some time.

True there appears to be a change, or the chance of a change ~~xxxxxxxx~~ on the part of the US, but one must remember:

1. At the moment we have freedom of passage in the Straits, and what is proposed to us implies giving up the actual freedom that we have, without a corresponding substitute.
2. At the moment, for the first time after eight years, the Gaza Strip is no longer a spring-board for sabotage and murder in in our southern settlements and the Negev, and that it a vital matter of the first order, and we are also asked to give this up.
3. The People of Israel is prepared to have sanctions imposed upon it rather than give up these two positive things.
4. World public opinion does not support us on the matter of Gaza but public opinion is not a frozen general thing. If something is just one can explain it to public opinion, in those lands where there is a free public opinion, and there are things that require a great deal of time. And if we are right in relation to Gaza, we will succeed in explaining this. If we do not succeed and we are faced by the alternative: satisfying public opinion or the security of Israel, we shall choose the latter.
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Positive 1 - Diversion from the formalistic relationship of the Sec Gen. There is a preparedness to discuss with us before the withdrawal.

Positive 2 - A clear statement on the part of a massive power that the Straits constitute an international waterway. Although they assume that a court will not negate this assumption, the position is that not we must prove that this is an international waterway, but Nasser must prove the contrary.

Positive 3 - America promises to sail a ship of hers through the Straits, and will invite other ~~states~~ States to do likewise. One can assume that if the US does that, ~~England too~~ Britain will do so too. France will certainly also do so, and perhaps other States ~~too~~.

Positive 4 - America is publishing an Egyptian undertaking given 7 years ago, saying that the Straits are an international waterway, and that passage will be free as in the past, according to international practice, and the principles of justice of nations. This publication has great value in moulding public opinion.

Positive 5 - There is a change, although only a chance and not a certainty, that oil tankers will come to Eilat, and perhaps - I stress perhaps - also a chance of international assistance in laying an oil-pipeline from Eilat to Haifa. True, in the minutes there is no mention of this, but in the wake of the movement of ships

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in the Bay, this is possible. All these increase the chances of Eilat becoming a regional port of international importance. For this reason I always regarded the Straits and the Bay as of greater importance for our future than the Gaza Strip.

Now the negative:

1. The minutes definately makes Israel shipping in the Straits conditional upon our withdrawal to the armistice lines. I.e., as long as we do not leave Gaza and permit the Egyptians to return, we do not have, according to this document, the right to free passage in the Straits.

2. There is no guarrantee to free passage for Israel in general, neither on the part of the UN, nor on the part of the US, even if we withdraw behind the armistice lines. Nasser will be able to ~~disturb~~ interfere with our ships, even if the ships of other nations ~~will~~ sail in the Bay, as occured in Suez, even though our right was established both by the ~~Kushta~~ Constantinople Treaty and the Security Council decision.

3. A UN force is proposed, but this does not prevent the return of Egypt tothe Bay and the Islands. It is almost certain that, ~~with the~~ on its return ~~of~~ Egypt ~~she~~ will ~~disturb~~ interfere with our shipping. The opinion of experts in international law is that our right of permanent shipping, is fixed in a recognised document according to international law. But a law does not apply itself, and where there is no government, police ~~and~~ or judges - the law that thou shalt no kill, is of no avail. If the UN does not undertake to safeguard the law, Nasser will transgress the law as he has done in the past.

This is the positive and the negative in relation to the Straits. In relation to Gaza there is another positive element: It was stated that the future of the Strip will be decided by the UN, but the nega-

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The matter of the Straits is more important to us than Gaza, BECAUSE in Gaza we are essentially interested in preventing evil (the return of Egypt and the fedayin activities); in the Straits we seek an outlet to Asia and East Africa through a port of international importance, and an alternative to Suez.

Dulles' reply to the P.M. closes the door to agreement, and we must show up the discrimination in the Assembly, as well as Egypt's announcement that she will not permit Israel passage in the Straits of in Suez, the renewal of fedayin activities from the conquered territory in UN's hands, and to announce that our existence and security require: The withdrawal from the Straits only upon the receipt of effective guarrantees for freedom of passage, and a regime in the Gaza Strip with the cooperation of the local inhabitants, the UN and Israel -- and we will not budge from this position even though they threaten and impose sanctions.

At the same time the P.M. sent a personal dispatch to Dulles through the Ambassador Lawson. In this dispatch the P.M. explained his appeal as an effort to avoid a fateful misunderstanding for our two peoples. He requested to postpone the Assembly and to bring about the establishment of an unbiassed delegation composed of unbiassed states, that would visit Israel, and if necessary also Egypt, in order to attempt to reach an arranged agreement on the problems of Sharem el Sheikh and Gaza.

"Withdrawal under existing conditions implies a tragedy for Israel. If the UN with the support of the US will decides to force Israel to retreat under pressure of sanctions, it will be an historic injustice and a mortal blow to the moral foundations of the regime of international life. If the UN will behaves in this manner, it implies discrimination.

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The P.M. added:

"In the light of the exchange of views between you and Ambassador Eban last week, my hope has been strengthened that the step which I am proposing is likely to bring about an acceptable and just solution. If this hope is not realised, then we will just be losing a short space of time in an additional effort to save Israel and the UN from tragic developments. I have invited Eban to return immediately for consultations".

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On 17/2 in the afternoon I went with Shiloach to meet Dulles at his home. We found Palmar, Wilcox and Rowntree there. The talk was conducted in an atmosphere of crisis. I conveyed the P.M.'s opinion concerning the plan. Here the talk was interrupted as Dulles was called to the phone by the President. I continued to criticise the sections of the proposal. Dulles commented that the comments ~~are~~ were interesting but of no value as the Government of Israel had apparently

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I said that it was my intention to leave for Jerusalem immediately and he promised to do everything possible to postpone the Assembly discussions.

These talks in the Secretary's house aroused great tension in public opinion. Scores of pressmen watched the entrance to the house and every time I entered or departed I was faced by a forest of cameras and microphones. After the memorandum of February 11 had reduced the tension and encouraged the impression that we were approaching a solution, it transpired that now there was again quite a wide gap between the stands of Israel and the US.

## PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

That day (17.2) I cabled to the P.M. that in my opinion we must aim not at discussions in the UN, as proposed in his cable, but at an arrangement with the US Government which was the first to take the initiative in seeking a solution. I proposed that we negotiate with the Americans on a compromise between their stand and ours:

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I claimed that it was a mistake to assume that our remaining in Sharem el Sheikh assured us of passage in the Bay. By our remaining there we are ensuring, as it were, the principle of free passage but in the meantime we are likely to lose passage itself. Public opinion does not accept our remaining in Sharem el Sheikh which is Egyptian territory, and one cannot expect that foreign states and especially Asian and African states will engage in commerce with us through the Bay and it is doubtful whether oil will be sent to us through Eilat. (During those days the representatives of Asian states told us definitely, including Ceylon, Iran and Burma - that they would not think of having commercial dealings with us as long as we remained on Egyptian territory. Scandinavian representatives told us the same thing in relation to the passage of their ships). I added that the fact that we stayed in Sharem el Sheikh in itself did not safeguard us against Egyptian interference with our shipping in the Bay. If Nasser was interested and prepared, he was capable of interfering with such shipping by means of a naval force in the Red Sea or airforces from other bases. At the present, the UN force is separating us from the Egyptian army, but when the UN force exits from Sinai a war between us and Egypt can start with Nasser justifying his action according to paragraph 51 of the Charter, that is, the right to self-defence. I am not certain that Nasser will fight alone.

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The importance of Eilat and the Straits is essentially economic. However our remaining in Sharem el Sheikh is likely to blacken our international relationships and in any event to sabotage the whole

economic ~~battle~~ struggle which is so intimately bound up with these relationships. We will find that the gain in holding onto Sharem el Sheikh will be outweighed by the loss of great economic assets.

On the other hand it is possible to add onto the American suggestion, which in itself does not provide complete security, certain factors with whose assistance the vision of Eilat will be realised. These factors are;

a. Legal: Establishing the international character of the Bay in international law by means of the announcement of the US and other maritime states.

b. The fact of shipping: The creation of practice and an atmosphere of international shipping in effect.

c. Establishing the "hinterland" of the Bay by the creation of economic facts in Eilat and in connection with it - something that will not be easy, in the deadlock which has taken place today, in all our international financial projects which are mainly American.

d. Political: The desire of the maritime powers to safeguard and protect their shipping.

e. Military - Israeli: The establishment of an Israel air and sea force sufficient to deter Egypt especially as the right of shipping is supported by world public opinion. A warning that a disturbance of our shipping will encounter a reaction of defensive force constitutes a serious guarantee.

The whole value of our remaining in Sharem el Sheich is merely tactical, to force somebody to bring forward another plan, therefore it was successful in sofar that it assisted us in impressing the idea of Eilat in world consciousness and forced the US to establish the international character of the Bay. However, there is a cruel need to weigh-up whether this tactical value has not been used

economic matrix struggle which is so intimately bound up with these relationships. We will find that the gain in holding onto Sharem el Sheikh will be outweighed by the loss of great economic assets.

On the other hand it is possible to add onto the American suggestion which in itself does not provide complete security, certain factors with whose assistance the vision of Eilat will be realized. These factors are:

a. Legal: Establishing the international character of the Bay in international law by means of the announcement of the US and other maritime states.

b. The fact of shipping: The creation of practice and an atmosphere of international shipping in effect.

c. Establishing the "hinterland" of the Bay by the creation of economic facts in Eilat and in connection with it - something that will not be easy in the deadlock which has taken place today in all our international financial projects which are mainly American.

d. Political: The desire of the maritime powers to safeguard and protect their shipping.

e. Military - Israeli: The establishment of an Israel air and sea force sufficient to deter Egypt especially as the right of shipping is supported by world public opinion. A warning that a disturbance of our shipping will encounter a reaction of defensive force constitutes a serious guarantee.

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up and if the time has not come to abandon the merely tactical approach for the sake of the matter itself.

In summary: Freedom of passage is possible without remaining in Sharem el Sheikh; and it is possible to stay in Sharem el Sheikh without freedom of passage.

I suggested that we insist that our agreement to accept the American suggestion in relation to the Straits, after it is corrected, ~~will~~ be qualified by American acceptance of our proposal on Gaza (the withdrawal of forces, a UN delegation, and agreement that Egypt will not return).

I again urged that we do not reject the American proposal on the Straits because the refusal would ~~bring in its wake~~ produce a crisis the like of which we have not known, and ~~particularly~~ a superfluous crisis. at that

## FORMULA A PLATFORM FOR A SETTLEMENT ~~AND~~ - FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT

Before my departure, the delegation prepared a ~~platform~~ formula for a settlement that the Foreign Minister ~~gave her consent to~~ endorsed and which I intended to present for the consideration of the Government when I arrived for consultations. The platform defined the following headings:

Gaza

a. Withdrawal of the military forces for the sake of demilitarising the Strip.

b. Entry of UN forces (the scope of the authority and the date would be discussed separately).

c. The non-return of Egyptian government.

d. An intermediate government for Gaza, which would be worked out by a committee of investigation of the UN that would recommend a settlement of the problems of the civilian government.

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Bay of Eilat

a. Withdrawal of forces.

b. American recognition of Israel's right to shipping and the right to protect it the moment that Egyptian forces will try to renew the blockade.

c. Inviting the US and/maritime other powers to join her definition of the/nature of the Bay and the right of passage within it to everyone including Israel. legal

d. Placing a UN force with defined functions and authority - in accordance with Lodge's words.

e. The US and other powers will start sending ships to Eilat.

An Israel Declaration of Freedom of Passage:

1. Israel as a shore power declares ~~her~~ joining the American doctrine on freedom of passage, etc.

2. Israel declares that an attack on Israel shipping is tantamount to an attack on Israel territory and Israel will therefore implement ~~her~~ right according to Paragraph 51 of the Charter which deals with justified self-defence.

Separate Assurances:

a. The President's letter to the P.M. on the US Government's responsibility if shipping ~~will be disturbed~~.

b. Support for the development of an alternative artery to Suez.

c. Israel's rights ~~on the part~~ of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

d. A renewed confirmation that they would act in order to enforce our right in Suez.

e. The removal of the limitations that were imposed on 29.10. and the continuation of the plans that were rejected ~~according to this~~.

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published in the press and temporarily relieved tension. The Americans grasped that this journey was in order to avoid answering the Asians who demanded that the US join the "sanctions" camp. An hour before my departure, I consulted with the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson. In his opinion the most decisive "sanction" would not be UN sanctions, but a continuation of the existing deadlock which constitutes a complete paralysis of progress and Israel's rebuilding, tying the hands of friends who are not able to assist. His definite advice was that we should rely upon the placing of a UN force in the Straits to safeguard the freedom of passage - and in Gaza to prevent fedayin activities and infiltration.

## A STORM IN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION ON SANCTIONS AND GUARANTEES.

When Dulles was asked at a press conference on 19.2. if Israel has changed her stand after the memorandum of 15.2., he answered in the negative but stressed that the consultations had not ended and he hoped that Israel would accept the US proposals.

When he was asked if the US would support the idea of sanctions, he avoided the question, saying that the subject would be dealt with on the morrow at consultations with the President. In any event he had prepared for himself a way of withdrawal by distinguishing between various forms of sanctions: moral, economic, military.

This matter also did not pass lightly. The hints in the President's and Dulles' words on renewed pondering about sanctions provoked a stormy reaction in the press and the Senate.

Senator Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic leader in the Senate,

stated that he hoped that the crisis on withdrawal would not renew talk about sanctions or ~~imposition~~ coercion. According to him it was in the interests of the US that the consultations should continue. He also wrote a very impressive letter in this spirit to Dulles.

The political committee of the Democratic faction in the Senate unanimously decided on 19.2. to appose the imposition of sanctions on Israel, and Johnson intended to place this decision before the President. The Democratic Senator Mores announced his support of Israel's opposition to retreat from Gaza and the Straits before receiving guarantees. In similar vein Senator Mansfield (Democrat) and other members of the Senate and Congress spoke.

Senator Knowland the head of the Republican ~~faction~~ faction and member of the US delegation to the Assembly, proposed in the Senate ~~to~~ abandon the thought of sanctions. He recommended that the US should propose a resolution to the UN saying:

a. That all members of the UN must fulfill their obligations in relation to the Charter, refraining from belligerence and honour the Assembly decisions.

b. If an aggressor does not obey the resolution within 30 days of the decision, the UN would impose economic, diplomatic and moral sanctions upon him.

c. The UN will announce that all Israel soldiers will withdraw from the areas of Akaba and Gaza and these areas will be occupied and governed by the UN until: 1. the majority of members of the Assembly will decide that their withdrawal will serve peace and international order, or 2. a peace settlement will be signed between Egypt and Israel.

d. The Assembly will recommend the creation of a neutral belt between Israel and her neighbours that will be subject to the military policing of UN until the armistice agreement will be

replaced by peace.

Senator Bridges, Republican, published a cable that he had sent to Dulles saying: "Israel is not an aggressor state .... as the sovereign free government of a state the Government of Israel must protect her soil and people. In this crisis, Israel is doing exactly what any sovereign state would do under similar circumstances. The stand of Israel in this crisis is definitely justified".

To this he added "therefore I shall oppose with all my power and ability the imposition of sanctions or any other means of ~~imposition~~ coercion upon the State of Israel either by the US or UN."

The rebellion that came from many influential circles in Congress forced President Eisenhower to interrupt his holiday in Georgia and return to the Capital. For 20.2., he invited ~~to him~~ twenty-eight Congress leaders from the two parties ~~in order~~ to deal with the problem of sanctions, if no change ~~s~~hould occur as a result of my journey. Nixon, Dulles and Lodge ~~also~~ participated in the meeting. The results of the consultation were not published but it became known that opposing opinions were expressed. It was subsequently ~~told~~ revealed that Dulles spoke of "moral sanctions", not necessarily economic ones and maintained the opinion that an agreed solution would perhaps be found.

## THE EISENHOWER BROADCAST ON FEBRUARY 20 AND EXCHANGE OF DESPATCHES BETWEEN HIM AND THE PRIME MINISTER

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the content of his speech.

Because of its urgency, the State Department asked Shiloach to accept the despatch and telephone it immediately to the P.M. and endeavour to obtain an immediate reaction.

In his message, Eisenhower referred to the Aide Memoire of 11 February whose object was to give expression to the US assurances, reinforcing those of the UN with regard to the Gulf of Akaba and the Gaza Strip. He went on to warn that, in the absence of an immediate positive Israel decision, the Assembly (scheduled to meet on 21/2) might pass resolutions which could involve serious applications and adopt measures which might have far-reaching effects upon Israel's relations throughout the world.

The President added that he intended to broadcast to the American people on the subject that evening.

The P.M. answered through Shiloach, who relayed the reply to Rowntree.

In his reply, the P.M. expressed his appreciation of the President's friendship. At the same time he pointed out that he had not yet received Eban's report. When he had heard the report, he would call a meeting of the Cabinet. He could not tell in advance what the Cabinet would decide, but whatever its decision was, it would have to be submitted to the Knesset.

Half an hour after Shiloach returned to the office, Rowntree phoned to say that Lodge had succeeded in postponing the Assembly debate for twenty-four hours. Shiloach pointed out that in the meantime it was discovered that my plane was delayed for a few hours and urged that he endeavour to postpone the debate for a few days, if need be with the assistance of other delegations ~~who are~~ that were interested in a positive outcome.

(see Eisenhower's speech of 20/2 attached)

(Certain overtones in the speech are likely to appear as the fruit of Arab considerations in the policy of the Government at the time. During those very days, in Cairo, a conference of the kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Presidents of Egypt and Syria were taking place. The US Government was interested in strengthening Saud's hand at this meeting so that he would prepare them to accept Eisenhower's Doctrine and be able to oppose Nasser's and Kuwatly's arguments.

Eisenhower's Broadcast - 20 February 1957

8.

The Prime Minister of Israel, in answer to a personal communication, assured me early in November that Israel would willingly withdraw its forces if and when there should be created a United Nations force to move into the Suez Canal area. This force was, in fact, created and has moved into the canal area.

Subsequently, Israeli forces were withdrawn from much of the territory of Egypt which they had occupied. However, Israeli forces still remain outside the Armistice lines. They are at the mouth of the Gulf of Akaba, which is about 100 miles from the nearest Israeli territory. They are also in the Gaza Strip, which by the the Armistice Agreement, was to be occupied by Egypt. These facts create the present crisis.

We are approaching a fateful moment when either we must recognize that the United Nations is unable to restore peace in this area or the United Nations must renew with increased vigor its efforts to bring about Israeli withdrawal.

Repeated, but, so far, unsuccessful, efforts have been made to bring about a voluntary withdrawal by Israel. These efforts have been made both by the United Nations and by the United States and other member states.

Equally serious efforts have been made to bring about conditions designed to assure that if Israel will withdraw in response to the repeated requests of the United Nations, there will then be achieved agreater security and tranquillity for that nation. This means that the United Nations would assert a determination to see that in the Middle East there will be a greater degree of justice and compliance with international law than was the case prior to the events of last October-November.

It was a matter of keen disappointment to us that the Government of Israel, despite the United Nations action, still felt unwilling to withdraw.

However, in a further effort to meet the views of Israel in these respects, Secretary of State Dulles, at my direction, gave to the Government of Israel on February 11 a statement of United States policy. This has now been made public. It pointed out that neither the United States nor the United Nations had authority to impose upon the parties a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement which was freely signed by both Israel and Egypt. Nevertheless, the statement said, the United States as a member of the United Nations would seek such disposition of the United Nations Emergency Force as would assure that the Gaza Strip could no longer be used a a source of armed infiltration and reprisals.

The Secretary of State orally informed the Israeli Ambassador that the United States would be glad to urge and support, also, some participation by the United Nations, with the approval of Egypt, in the administration of the Gaza Strip. The principal population of the Strip consists of about 200,000 Arab refugees, who exist largely as a charge upon the benevolence of the United Nations and its members.

With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Aqaba, we expressed the conviction that the gulf constitutes international waters, and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the gulf. We announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

The Government of Israel has not yet accepted, as adequate insurance of its own safety after withdrawal, the far-reaching United Nations Resolution of February 2, plus the important declaration of United States policy made by our Secretary of State on February 11.

Israel seeks something more. It insists on firm guaranties as a condition to withdrawing its forces of invasion.

This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of U.N. disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdraval? If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order. We will, in effect, have countenanced the use of force as a means of settling international differences and through this gaining national advantages.

I would, I feel, be untrue to the standards of the high office to which you have chosen me if I were to lend the influence of the United States to the proposition that a nation which invades another should be permitted to exact conditions for withdrawal.

I do not believe that Israel's default should be ignored because the United Nations has not been able effectively to carry out its resolutions condemning the Soviet Union for its armed suppression of the people of Hungary. Perhaps this is a case where the proverb applies that two wrongs do not make a right.

We cannot consider that the armed invasion and occupation of another country are "peaceful means" or proper means to achieve justice and conformity with international law.

We do, however, believe that upon the suppression of the present act of aggression and breach of the peace there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law. Peace and justice are two sides of the same coin.

727/ס/מצר Eisenhower Broadcast (concluded)

Perhaps the world community has been at fault in not having paid enough attention to this basic truth. The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law. And we shall in this great effort seek the association of other like-minded nations which realize, as we do, that peace and justice are in the long run inseparable.

There can, of course, be no equating of a nation like Israel with that of the Soviet Union. The people of Israel, like those of the United States, are imbued with a religious faith and a sense of moral values. We are entitled to expect, and do expect, from such peoples of the free world a contribution to world order which unhappily we cannot expect from a nation controlled by atheistic despots.

It has been suggested that United Nations actions against Israel should not be pressed because Egypt has in the past violated the Armistice Agreement and International law. It is true that both Egypt and Israel, prior to last October engaged in reprisals in violation of the Armistice agreements. Egypt ignored the United Nations in exercising belligerent rights in relation to Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Akaba. However, such violations constitute no justification for the armed invasion of Egypt by Israel which the United Nations is now seeking to undo.

Failure to withdraw would be harmful to the long-term good of Israel. If would, in addition to its injury to the United Nations, jeopardize the prospects of the peaceful solution of the problems of the Mid-East. This could bring incalculable ills to our friends andindeed to our nation itself. It would make infinitely more difficult the realization of the goals which I laid out in my Middle East message of January fifth to the Congress seeking to strengthen the area against Communist aggression, direct or indirect.

The United Nations must not fail. I believe that-in the interests of peace -the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel .

We should not assume that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Akaba. If, unhappily, Egypt does hereafter violate the Armistice Agreement or other international obligations, then this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations.

Once this block is removed, there will be serious and creative tasks for the United Nations to perform. There needs to be respect for the right of Israel to national existence and to internal development. Complicated provisions insuring the effective international use of the Suez Canal will need to be worked out in detail. The Arab refugee problem must be solved. As I said in my special message to Congress on January 5, it must be made certain that all the Middle East is kept free from aggression and infiltration.

In summarising the echoes of the Esienhower broadcast, Shiloach cabled to the Foreign Minister on 21.2 conveying that friends, even though they were very angry at the hard words of the President, had reached the conclusion that we had reached the end of any possibility of additional bargaining with him. We must decide between accepting the plan and rejecting it.

Everyone is warning that we should not build upon the manifestations of opposition to Eisenhower's policy, in the Senate and Congress. He had proved on a number of occasions that

when the need arises he is prepared to disregard considerations of internal policy, for example when he cast a veto against the "village constitution" and "the gas law" on the eve of the last elections despite the contention of the leaders of his party that this could defeat him in the elections.

The main strength of Eisenhower among the American people is the general consciousness that no one is as responsible as he for the peace and security of the American people and the world; form the moment that he places the problem before the people and Congress as a question of the national security of the US there is almost no chane of opposing him.

In discussions with leaders of Congress and prominent people he had already begun to charge that, by refusing to respond to his urging, we are perhaps assisting, unconsciously, the Soviet plot in the Middle East and bringing the danger of war closer.

ECHOES IN THE PRESS TO EISENHOWER'S BROADCAST

The outstanding reaction in the Press was that Israel should respond to the President's urging while adding the great weight of his undertaking to insist on ourrights. But the reaction was not uniform. A number of newspapers were scornful and were even angry at the moral flaw in Eisenhower's saying that while one cannot consider sanctions against the USSR because it is large and independent, sanctions on the State of Israel are likely to have an effect.

The central reactions in the Press can be found in the leader called "Last Chance for Compliance" published in the "Washington Post" on 21.2 The comments that the President had united Congress behing him are worthy of note. This proved to be no exaggeration.

Government Decisions and the Prime Minister's speech in the Knesset - 21/2

As a result of the discussions and consultations the Government decided that I was to continue the negotiations with Dulles with the following aims:

1. To differentiate between the matter of the Straits and Gaza and to arrange one of them even if the second cannot be arranged;

2. If freedom of passage is assured in the Straits (deploying UN forces, Government guarantees, arrangements with other States

or another arrangement that will be satisfactory to the Government of Israel) - we will withdraw from there;

3. Under no conditions must Egypt be returned to Gaza, either directly or indirectly.

The Government will welcome a UN Committee and discuss with it the problems of the Strip (security, rehabilitation of the inhabitants, the problem of the refugees).

(see P.M.'s speech - pp 205a, b, c, d, e, f, )

BEDELL

BEADLE SMITH'S DESPATCH TO THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE REQUEST OF EISENHOWER.

In the meantime the desire to come to an arrangement with us and to avoid a frontal clash made Eisenhower and Dulles take another unusual step. On 21.2. General ~~Beadle~~ Bedell Smith was invited to the White House and from there he attempted to get in touch with the P.M. telephonically and to persuade him to accept the US suggestion and to withdraw from the two conquered areas.

Beadle Smith was hesitant to do this before he was convinced that the intentions of the President and Secretary of State were sincere and well-meaning. The three went into an intense clarification on the basis of documents in writing that had been exchanged between the governments and their heads.

Ultimately ~~Beadle~~ Bedell Smith accepted the task, adding that thereby he was placing on the scales his personal honour and the esteem that the P.M. and Israel's representatives had for him.

Because of the late hour and for reasons of ~~carefulness~~ caution he preferred not to contact the P.M. directly but to send him a despatch. He phoned Shiloach (as it transpired subsequently it

## The Prime Minister's Statement in the Knesset on 21.2.57.

Fate has willed it that our small and young State should have to [illegible] a hard and bitter controversy with two great world forces, for which perhaps no country in the world has a greater esteem than Israel, namely the United Nations and the U.S. And it is a controversy over a moral problem of profound significance in international relations.

Shall the United Nations, with the assistance of the U.S., show discrimination between dictatorial Egypt and democratic Israel? Shall those who seek to destroy us be allowed to trample underfoot all their undertakings and international obligations, to violate the U.N. Charter and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, to despatch murderers and saboteurs into our country and subject us to economic siege, boycott and blockade - while Israel shall not be permitted to fight for her life, and defend her rights, her sovereign equality and her security? Shall the U.N., with the assistance of the U.S., subject us to sanctions because we will not submit to the double moral standards of the Egyptian dictator, who insists that others shall observe all obligations that are to his advantage, while he ignores any bilateral agreement or international obligation which confers advantage on the other side? Will the U.N. and the U.S. set the stamp of their approval on a regime of shameful and deliberate discrimination in international relations? These are the bitter questions which are now occupying the attention, not only of our own country, but of everyone the world over who, like ourselves, is not prepared to accept the rule that might is right.

### Unflinching Opposition

Any attempt to compel us to ac[illegible] mockery of justice and a system of discrimination will meet with unflinching opposition of the people of Israel. If the U.N. does not maintain the same justice for all nations, the moral [illegible] of the U.N. will be undermined.

Even in the midst of this tragic controversy, we shall not be misled into a sweeping condemnation of others. Wherever we look there are lights and shadows, and let us not be too hasty in condemning anyone on account of the shadows, while ignoring the lights - and the converse also holds true. We must bear this great principle in mind when we are dealing with the U.N. and the U.S.

Undoubtedly, the U.N. is still far from perfect, and we have grave and bitter complaints against it, which are not confined to the last few days. But we will not on that account reject this great world organization. The vision which is personified in the U.N. is the vision of our prophets, and the principles on which it is based are the principles of peace, justice and equality among nations. These principles are no less precious to us than to any other people in the world.

The people of Israel, by its faith, its needs and its position in the world, is bound to be loyal to these principles with all its heart, and to cooperate to the utmost of its modest capacity in preserving them and establishing their authority in international relations.

The fact that there are certain member states in the U.N. which do not respect human rights and freedoms, and even some which maintain a regime of slavery and slave trading, does not affect the value and importance of the principles of the U.N. We must realize that the implementation of the ideal of the U.N. is a historic process, which will not be completed in a day or a year, and we must make the fullest contribution in our power to the speeding-up and the consummation of this process. On no account must we despair of the hopes which the great majority of the peoples of the world have reposed in the U.N.

### U.S. Achievements

But even in the midst of our painful controversy with the U.S., we shall not forget for one moment that the American people has carried out

on an enormous scale, in a great and rich country and in the course of several centuries, the pioneering work of redemption that we have been called upon to perform in a small and impoverished country within the space of a few years: the building and development of an underpopulated land, the absorption of immigrants from many countries and their integration into a single nation; the moulding of a democratic regime based on human liberty, respect for the individual and creative initiative, without compulsion and dictatorship - and that we share with the American people a common attachment to the heritage of the Bible. We are neither obliged nor entitled to give blind assent to every position taken up by the U.S. Government, but our resistance to any injurious proposal will not weaken in the slightest our feelings of respect and friendship for the American people and our gratitude for the moral and material assistance we have received from that Government and people. And we shall not relax our efforts to convince the American Government and people of the justice of our cause.

Relations with Britain

There was a time when we had a tragic conflict with another great country, with the British Government, which from 1939 onwards openly violated its obligations and undertakings towards the Jewish people. On that occasion we did not submit to injustice, and in opposition to the policy of the White Paper we organized so-called "illegal immigration" for the purpose of saving as many Jews as possible from the Nazis, and building up the ancient homeland of our people. Bitter [illegible] and determined opposition to the policy of the Mandatory Government did not prevent our appreciating the moral greatness of the British people when with supreme heroism it faced the Nazi butchers. Tens of thousands of our sons and daughters volunteered to fight in Jewish units in the ranks of the British Army in Europe and the North African desert. Although at one and the same time we did everything in our power to frustrate the White Paper policy.

If the nations take the disastrous course of extending direct or indirect assistance to the Arab rulers in the designs which they and their allies are harbouring against Israel, we shall not submit. We shall resist it with every ounce of our moral strength.

I am confident that we shall not be alone in this struggle. In every country and in every people there are men who will speak out against international discrimination against a small people, which is devoting superhuman efforts to the rebuilding of its ancient, desolated homeland, absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees from all parts of the world, and creating a society based on foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the light of the vision of Israel's prophets, and on the fostering of science and all the achievements of the human spirit in our own day and in the days to come.

Points of Issue

What are the matters at issue between ourselves and our neighbours? The matters at issue do not date from February 3, 1957, or the second of November, 1956, or even from October in the same year. They extend back to founding of the revived State of Israel itself.

When the Assembly decided at the end of November, 1947 on the setting-up of a Jewish State in this country, the rulers of the Arab countries, headed by Egypt, announced that they would oppose the implementation of the Assembly's decision by force. The State of Israel was established in the middle of May, 1948 and on the very same day its territory was invaded by six Arab countries under Egyptian leadership. At the 309th session of the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko, the representative of the Soviet Union, said that "the states which have organized the invasion of Palestine have utterly failed to take into account the decision of the Security Council". And yet there was no demand either by the Assembly or

the Council that the invaders should withdraw, and nothing but the self-sacrificing courage of our sons and daughters enabled us to expel the enemy from our country.

In the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, which was signed in February, 1949, it was laid down in the first article that "The conclusion of the Armistice Agreement between the armed forces of the two sides is accepted as an essential step towards the restoration of the armed dispute and the restoration of peace in Palestine." For eight years Israel has been demanding "the restoration of peace" in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations of all U.N. member states under the Charter. Yet, throughout this period of blatant nons of the organs of the U.N. have taken a single step against this double violation of the Armistice Agreement and the U.N. Charter.

In violation of the Armistice Agreement Egypt has declared that a state of war exists between herself and Israel and has been responsible for a long series of acts of hostility, including economic sabotage and the blockade in the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits. And yet nothing has been done by any organ of the United Nations.

Suez Canal Blockade

In 1951 Israel submitted a complaint to the Security Council against interference with Israel shipping in the Suez Canal. Egypt justified this interference on the grounds that a state of war existed between herself and Israel, although she had formally undertaken, by the Constantinople Convention of 1888 that freedom of navigation and passage should be assured to all peoples both in time of war and in time of war. The Council rejected Egypt's contention and left it down that a state of war was incompatible with the Armistice Agreement and that Egypt was not entitled to interfere with Israel's freedom of passage in the Canal. Despite this finding the Security Council, in violation of Article 25 of the Charter, has not throughout these years nothing was done by the organs of the U.N. to deal with Egypt's disobedience to the Security Council resolution by Egypt. We are not aware of a single action by any U.N. organ against Egypt's non-compliance with the Security Council decision. And the question arises: Does the duty of compliance apply only to a small and democratic state, while a dictatorship is free to act as it pleases, even in violation of international law, the U.N. Charter and the decisions of the Security Council?

On October 13, 1956 the Security Council again unanimously forbade any discrimination, overt or covert, against any state in the Suez Canal but Egypt immediately declared that no Israeli ship would be permitted to exercise the right of passage. Once again nothing was done by the U.N. organs to right the wrong.

In 1950 Egypt occupied two uninhabited islands in the Gulf of Akaba which had never belonged to Egypt at any time. In a communication to the U.S. Government dated January 20, 1950, the Egyptian Government declared that the occupation of the islands was not intended to be permanent for the purpose of interfering with maritime traffic in the waters between the two islands and the Egyptian coast in Sinai, and that these waters would be maintained in accordance with international custom and the recognized principles of all nations. The Egyptian dictator has violated this undertaking, and stationed an armed force at Sharm-el-Sheikh for the purpose of interfering with Israel shipping in the Straits. And yet neither the U.S., to whom Egypt had given this express undertaking, nor the organs of the U.N., which were charged with guarding the principles of the Charter, did a single thing throughout these years to prevent this violation of international law and to ensure free navigation for Israel in the Straits.

And now, after eight years, we have for the first time ensured freedom of passage for Israel and the other nations in the Tiran Straits. The

Government of Israel has announced its readiness to withdraw the Israel Army from the shores of the Straits of Tiran as soon as free navigation in the Straits is assured, either by the stationing of a U.N. force on the coast of the Straits until peace is concluded between Israel and Egypt, or in some other way; for the Egyptian Government proclaims night and day that as soon as it has the power it will not permit the passage of Israel shipping either in the Suez Canal or in the Tiran Straits.

Israel dare not unconditionally abandon the defence of her rights and her security in the Straits.

The Security Council decision forbidding Egyptian acts of hostility and blockade was taken six years before the Assembly resolution of February, 1957. Why is it that the U.N. organs are doing nothing to enforce this decision, which has been in existence for six years? Why do they recognize nothing but the Assembly decision of this month? Why has Egypt not been required - and is still not being required - to comply with the decision which was laid down six years before February 1957?

Shall there be one law for the Egyptian dictator and another law for democratic Israel?

Free Passage

Israel [illegible] the Suez Canal [illegible] Security Council decision [illegible] Tiran Straits by international law. [illegible] Egypt in the years [illegible] the Government of Egypt in flat contradiction to the U.S. [illegible] declaration in the Straits would be free for all ships. That right has been violated by the entire force of the Egyptian dictator, who openly declared that he will continue in the future to prevent our ships passing through the Canal and the Straits; nor is there the slightest doubt that the Egyptian dictator is allowed to return to the Straits he will stop Israel shipping as he has been doing all along in the Suez Canal. Israel, therefore, is entitled to be assured of effective guarantees from the United Nations for freedom of passage; Israel has no need and no desire to occupy the desolate coastal strip of the Straits, but she cannot withdraw from the area without security that the Egyptian dictator's acts of violence against her shipping, which the United Nations tolerated for years, will not be repeated.

As is well known the Gaza Strip has never been Egyptian territory; its life and economy were always bound up with the land of Israel. When the Egyptians invaded Israel in 1948 they occupied the Strip.

At that time the Gaza Strip became a temporarily occupied area by virtue of that invasion, in other words by virtue of a violation of the Assembly's decision of the U.N. Charter. Many of the delegates to the U.N. contended then that Egypt must not be rewarded - even temporarily - for her aggression, a contention which is now brought up against Israel although in the Sinai campaign Israel did not attack Egypt, but acted in self-defence.

Oppressed Population

What did Egypt do in the Strip in the course of these eight years? She oppressed and impoverished the population and transformed the Strip into a base for military aggression against Israel and a centre for gangs of murderers and saboteurs who set out to attack the people of Israel and their property. The documents which fell into our hands in the course of the expulsion of the Egyptian army from Gaza at the beginning of November 1956, laid bare all the murderous designs and aggressive plans against Israel prepared by the Egyptian dictator and his subordinates several years before the Sinai campaign.

The Egyptian dictator dealt with the Armistice Agreement in the same way as he did with all his international undertakings and obligations: he treated it as a scrap of paper. In fact, he published it for all practical purposes, and we cannot be asked to permit the return of the Egyptian invaders to the Strip by virtue of the document which Egypt has made null and void.

Egypt cannot enjoy the benefits of the Agreement which for years she has been trampling underfoot, for the purpose of re-establishing in the Gaza Strip her base for aggression, murder and sabotage against Israel. No matter what may happen, Israel will not [illegible] the restoration of the status quo in the Strip.

As we see it, there are three main problems in the Strip: 1) Security for Israel and the settlement of the boundary line; 2) The economic rehabilitation of the residents of the area; 3) A solution for the problem of the refugees living in the Strip.

Israel desires basic discussions with the U.N. and cooperation with it in order to find a solution to these three problems. Israel is prepared to withdraw her military forces from the area.

The unfortunate deadlock of recent weeks in the settlement of the affairs of the Straits and the Gaza Strip has been broken to some extent in the last few days by the initiative of the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, and his meeting with the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel in Washington on January 7th.

[illegible]

The Government of Israel has given careful consideration to the important document which was issued following the consultation of the Secretary of State with the President of the U.S. and with the Prime Minister of Israel. The Government welcomes the declaration of the United States Government to safeguard the freedom of navigation in the Straits and the Gulf as an international waterway, and to resort to the United Nations Government's undertaking of 1950 on this matter.

The Government also sees an important step forward in the willingness of the U.S. to despatch her ships to the Straits and invite other governments to do likewise. The Government could not, however, ignore the present certain danger that Egypt will again interfere with Israel's freedom of navigation, as she openly proclaims her intention to do, and the fact that American and other ships will be passing through the Straits does not in the slightest degree detract from this danger.

This is clearly demonstrated by the situation in the Suez Canal. Ships of all nations passed through the Suez Canal. There is a treaty, the Constantinople Convention of 1888; there is an express decision of the Security Council of 1951, which laid it down that Egypt is not entitled to interfere with the passage of Israel ships in the Canal. And yet Israel was robbed of this recognized right; the Egyptian dictator violated the Constantinople Convention and the Security Council decisions, and throughout these years not a single step was taken to put an end to violation of international law and the U.N. Charter.

For these reasons the Government of Israel considers essential that the U.N. Emergency Forces should be stationed on the shores of the Straits to safeguard freedom of navigation of Israel ships until peace is concluded with Egypt, or until some other reliable and effective arrangement is made to this end. In the last debate in the General Assembly the representative of the U.S. said it was essential that units of UNEF should be stationed in the Straits until peaceful conditions necessary for freedom of navigation in these international waters could be achieved.

As for the Gaza Strip, it should be [illegible] that Egypt will not return to that area either directly or indirectly, and the U.N. and Israel should arrive at an agreed [illegible] which will guarantee security for Israel and her settlements in the area and the Negev. will provide for the rehabilitation of [illegible] impoverished during the period of Egyptian [illegible] and will pave the way for a solution to the problem of the refugees by the U.N.

Ready to Help

Israel is prepared to help in the [illegible] habitants and to contribute to the maximum [illegible] tion of the refugee problem.

The Government of Israel has declared that [illegible] herself in a state of war with Egypt, and is [illegible] of non-aggression which shall prohibit all [illegible] of mutuality.

The Government has decided to make a further effort to reach an understanding with the U.S. Government. Ambassador Eban, who is returning tomorrow to Washington will convey to the American Government the position of the Government of Israel. We hope that [illegible] further discussion.

Yesterday the [illegible] U.N. [illegible] U.N. should [illegible] Israel to [illegible] the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba.

In spite of the painful [illegible] words, I cannot forget for a moment that [illegible] only the elected leader of [illegible] the [illegible] the destruction of what [illegible] the most [illegible] regime in human history.

President Eisenhower [illegible] a [illegible] his [illegible] with great moral [illegible] and [illegible] and standing of the [illegible] reply as I did, [illegible] only [illegible] [illegible] solution is a [illegible] [illegible] people who [illegible] fighting, and [illegible] of the strongest and [illegible] - [illegible] the family of nations, [illegible] for centuries because of its [illegible] and the vision of a future. It was [illegible] the answer I did to the President of the [illegible] sense of responsibility, the crushing [illegible] on the representative of this small [illegible] struggle for survival against the many who [illegible] I tried to explain to the President that [illegible] on to the central strip of the Straits [illegible] and that all we are asking is security [illegible] the Straits, of which we were robbed by the [illegible] Egyptian dictator without the U.N. lifting a finger [illegible] of piracy. I also informed him that we are ready [illegible] forces from Gaza without delay and that we are [illegible] arrangements with the U.N. to safeguard peace and security in the Strip, economic rehabilitation for the residents, and [illegible] the refugees, so that they should no longer be a prey [illegible] Egyptian dictator.

Meaning of Pressure

I am confident that every [illegible] stands the grave meaning of the 'pr[illegible] by the President of the United States [illegible] "pressure" is [illegible] with all the no[illegible] upon [illegible] I venture to say that [illegible] Charter than the inj[illegible] iscri[illegible] because we are [illegible] and perhaps [illegible] we condemn is not the discri[illegible]ti[illegible] but the discrimination between ours[illegible]

In his speech, the President ri[illegible] member states must from now [illegible]rd [illegible] international law and [illegible] Those [illegible] now the U.S. has not adequately done [illegible] main victim has been Israel. For [illegible] y[illegible] of hostility - boycott, blockade and [illegible] against Israel. Does it not follow from what [illegible] wrong will now be put right, and without delay, by the U.N. assembly, and that Israel will be assured of peace and security and the observance of her rights on land, at sea and in the air? If the U.N. were to act in this way it would immediately solve all the problems [illegible] troubl[illegible] th[illegible] and ourselves as well - in the [illegible]tion with the Straits and the question of compliance or non-compliance on Israel a[illegible] will not arise at all.

at the effort to imply his respect U.N. has perm[illegible] a e Egyptian [illegible]

Right to Peace

Israel's right to peace and security is no less valid than Egypt's right to war and destruction. [illegible] since the ev[illegible] called for peace and [illegible] ity and mutual respect.

[illegible] subject to discrimination in [illegible] relations.

We have belief [illegible] of humanity. We appeal [illegible] to [illegible] peace and justice [illegible] to stand [illegible] friends of for the people of [illegible] enter[illegible] to secure peace and security.

was from Sherman Adam's room in the White House), and requested him to transmit the following despatch:

"I had a chance again today to read extensive extracts of your personal letter to me to the President and the Secretary. I have also expressed to them my views. Following my talks with them and after reading both the published and private exchange of messages, I want to give you my opinion that, stripped of all diplomatic verbiage, the formal and personal exchanges constitute in effect a strong moral obligation on part of this administration.

"I would strongly urge that your instructions to Eban be sufficiently flexible and not simply rigid positions and requests for formal commitments which can hardly be given under present conditions. I want personally to make clear to you my own considered opinion that from all I know the moral obligation as the President and the Secretary view it is very strong. It justifies putting yourself in the hands of the President of the U.S.A., a man who you know is your friend and in whose honesty of purpose you can have no doubts. I know you share my view of him. I also want to point out that if the present crisis comes to an unbreakable deadlock, Israel and U.S. will be placed in a most difficult position.

"The U.S. I am sure is reluctant to have the issue debated and decided in the U.N.; however, if the thing comes to an ultimate discussion in the U.N. the U.S. will have to take a stand. It will have to face up to a final vote.

"I want to impress upon you that the situation requires flexibility and can be saved as long as that be maintained.

Please don't let Abba return with too rigid a position."

Bedell Smith also requested that the P.M. be informed that he (B.S.) would be invited by the President and the Secretary of State to participate in discussions on the answer that I was to bring from Israel and to serve them as an advisor in the development of relationships between us in that episode.

This appeal must necessarily have made an impression and affected the P.M.'s considerations and that of his advisors.

In his reply of February 22, the Prime Minister informed President Eisenhower that Ambassador Eban was returning to the United States the next day and would notify the US Government of the Government of Israel's considered attitude. He expressed his appreciation of the personal interest shown by the President and the Secretary of State, and gave his assurance that it was Israel's fervent desire to cooperate to the utmost possible degree in the attemtp to arrive at a reasonable solution. In view of thegreat political and moral importance of the problem, the Prime Minister expressed his hope that there would be an opportunity for further calrification, which - the Government hoped - might lead to a way out of the deadlock.

## THE ASSEMBLY SESSION ON 22.2

In the meantime the anticipation at the UN ~~towards~~ of the Assembly session ~~increased~~ mounted. According to the hopes of the Arabs, it was to have placed us again in the dock.

The Afro-Asians prepared a resolution. At the beginning already during the second week in February the Russians had announced to the Egyptians that for reasons of principle they would ~~xx~~ not be able to support the imposition of sancti ns by the Assembly as it is not authorised ~~for this by~~ the Charter. to do so The Egyptians demanded that they ~~should~~ change their opinion.

On 18.2 the Russians came with a proposal of their own requesting the Assembly to recommend to the Security Council that sanctions be imposed upon us - this step angered the

Egyptians even more because the Russians' proposal had no chance of passing the Assembly, and even were it to pass it was clear that when it arrived at the Security Council it would encounter a French veto.

The British proposed to the Americans, as a possible solution, that the decision to withdraw should include a sentence saying that after the completion of the ~~wi~~ Israeli withdrawal the Assembly announces that the State of belligerence between the sides no longer exists.

In the meantime it transpired that members of the American delegation who were ready to take us to task in the Assembly in the event that the negotiations in Washington were to fail, were busy mobilising friends at the UN under threat of an Egyptians military action against us with the aid of Russian volunteers which was likely to bring about world war. They gave the impression that there was something to be relied upon in this description of danger (it may be that the President ~~attained~~ obtained the support of members of Congress ~~by~~ through this fear; the echoes of this argument were heard quite clearly in his broadcast on 20.2.). They also prepared the text of a resolution which contained a combination of ~~xxxxxxx~~ Pearson's last plan and the Afro-Asian condemnation with a hint that steps were likely to be taken against us.

After repeated postponements under pressure from us and by the efforts of the US and other States, and ~~after~~ as - according to the UN Secretariat's claim that it was impossible to postpone it anymore - the Assembly was invited to assemble on Friday 22.2. to discuss our matter affair. (According to the original timetable they had hoped that the Assembly would disperse a week before).

When the Assembly foregathered we were faced ~~by~~ with three paragraphs items:

1. The Sec Gen's report on the fulfillment of the decision of February 2;

2. A report on the UN ~~army~~ force;

3. A resolution of ten states (whose units were participating in ~~the UN army~~ it) confirming the report on the UN ~~army~~ force.

The discussion on the two latter paragraphs was very short. The Assembly voted to confirm the report without opposition and went over to the discussion on the first. The echo of negotiations in Washington was heard in the debate from the outset. ~~(See the Sec.Gen.'s remarks)~~.

It was clear that it was Hammerskjold's effort, and to an extent that was not clear, also the effort of the Egyptians, to take the wind out of our sails and demonstrate to the world that the problem ~~is~~ was likely to develop in a very dangerous form, without leaving Israel any foothold in the Strip.

(The P.M. suggested that the delegation publishes a reply which would express surprise that:

a. The Egyptian stand was conveyed by the Sec.Gen. and not by the Egyptian delegation.

b. There is no reply from the ~~Syr~~ Egyptians on the basic question of terminating belligerency; apparently the Sec.Gen. had not discussed this with theEgyptians.

c. Egypt, ~~who~~ which for eight years not only did not lift a finger to improve the economic situation of the inhabitants of the Strip, but even neglected it, ~~had~~ suddenly woken up to their interests. On the other hand it is known that Israel is exemplary in developing programmes and if ~~she will be~~ it is allowed to implement them there will be a chance of lifting the inhabitants from their poverty and stabilising their economic position).

Malik proposed an Arab-Moslem ~~xxxxx~~ resolution in the

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Malik proposed an Arab-Moslem resolution in the

name of six states only (Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan). The resolution mentions the seven previous UN decisions and "sees with deep concern" their non-implementation by Israel. The resolution condemns Israel and calls upon all states to deny it military, economic or financial aid, and to report to the Sec.Gen. on the non-implementation of this resolution. The resolution was not put up to the vote as its initiators were not certain that there would be sufficient support. It was instructive that the majority of the Asian bloc did not wish to join this initiative. Most delegations were interested in delaying the discussion in the light of the negotiations that were about to be renewed between Dulles and us, Also the presence of other vital subjects on the agenda of the Assembly affected this position (such as Cyprus, and the status of the Hungarian delegation). It was therefore made easier to postpone the continuation of the debate until 26.2.

CHAPTER VI

## COMPLETING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US WITH THE AID OF FRANCE

(February 24 - 28)

On 24/2 early in the morning I returned to New York, where I reported to the Foreign Minister. Then I continued to Washington for meetings with Dulles. When I reached New York, I found a cable from the F.M., instructing me that if Dulles asked me, after I had presented him with our stand as formulated by the Government, what are the additional arrangements that we are requesting to ensure shipping, I could add:

1. That American ships should sail in the Bay, should set up trade through Eilat, including bringing oil on a permanent basis;

2. That the US Government should publicly announce that ~~she~~ it recognises that if, after the withdrawal, Egypt disturbs Israel shipping in the Bay and the Straits, Israel will have the right of self-defence, i.e. to adopt any forceful method necessary to ensure the freedom of passage for ships in the Bay and Straits;

3. That it should be clear that the definition "free and innocent" includes war-ships , i.e. that Israel war-ships have the full right to sail in the Bay and the Straits;

4. ~~In the event that it will be~~ (if it is) impossible to carry a resolution through the Assembly to the effect that UN forces be de-

ployed on the western coast of the Bay until peace is achieved, the Assembly should decide that a naval force of the UN will sail in the Bay and the Straits, with a similar definition and period of stay;

5. That the US will ~~attain~~ secure as large a number as possible of similar announcements by States on the recognition of the Bay as an international waterway, on the fact that they will send their ships through the Bay, and in particular on paragraph 2 above.

The P.M. stated ~~in ending~~ that an arrangement that would include all five of the above paragraphs would be an acceptable ~~one for~~ to the Government of Israel, even without the deploying of UN forces on the coast of the Straits, until peace was attained.

~~I arrived with Shiloach for the talk with Dulles,~~ and there ~~I found Herter, Fliger, Wilcox and Rowntry~~. Dulles welcomed me and pointed out that in response ~~xxx~~ to the P.M.'s request, the US had succeeded in postponing the Assembly debate until 25/2, and he regretted that they had not succeeded in preventing the opening of the discussion on the Friday past.

I opened with a description of the prevailing mood in Israel: There is a feeling of security in the justice of our demands, and at the same time a lack of willingness to continue with the difference of opinion with the US. I explained the impression that had been made on the P.M. and his colleagues, by the President's fears for the security of the world on the one hand, and the moral obligation that he and the Secretary had undertaken if, after the Israel withdrawal in responce to the US request, the Egyptian blockade and belligerence from the Strip would be renewed. I stressed the great difficulty in dealing with the US proposals while ~~the~~ threats and sanctions loom over us. The State of Israel reached its conclusions despite the threat of sanctions. From here I passed on to our minimal demands.

~~In the subjects under discussion.~~

([redacted])

In concluding the talk it was agreed:

a. That a joint announcement would be published on the meeting.

b. We would prepare a minute on all the points and texts upon which it was agreed in the discussion.

c. I would see Hammerskjold to clarify those matters under his jurisdiction and especially the matter of the Strip.

d. An additional effort would be made on the part of the US delegation to postpone the continuation of the discussion in the Assembly.

e. An effort would be made on the part of the two sides to conclude the discussions quickly.

This talk took place in an atmosphere of definite relief of tension. It was clear that the chances of an agreement with the US had been renewed and the danger of a continued clash had been averted. Immediately upon the conclusion of the talk Dulles informed the leaders of Congress that the gap between Israel's stand and that of the US had decreased considerably.

In summarising the results of the talk in a cable to the P.M. I pointed out that the Secretary accepted all the principles in the addendum that had reached me on my return as well as a number of new suggestions of mine which ensure a more stable stay of the UN force. He also agreed to separate the question of the Bay from civilian problems of Gaza, that is, our right in the Straits is recognised after the withdrawal of our forces from Sharém el Sheich without making the removal of the civilian administration dependent upon it.

In relation to Gaza he revealed an inclination to agree on behalf of the US to a non-Egyptian international regime and grasped our suggestion for a committee, but added that precisely particularly on the question of Gaza the plans are being made at the UN, and

the US ~~does not want to decide.~~ had no say in the matter.

In Dulles' opinion it was possible to accept the "content if not the form" of our request, but he proposes that I see Hammerskjold to whom he would recommend our plan.

I stressed that the non-return of Egyptian rule both military and civilian, directly or indirectly, is for us an incontestable condition.

It was agreed that we would draw-up a joint minute which would summarise the points agreed upon at that meeting, and that we would continue the discussion on the matter of Gaza after I saw the Sec.Gen. That night I sat with Shiloach and Raphael until late and summarised the minutes in the form of questions and answers. We showed the document to Rowntree, Wilcox, Felger, and Burgess and certain changes were suggested. The text that appeared on 26.2. after accepting the changes is as ~~follows~~ attached.

After the talk with Dulles on February 24 the situation was as follows: on the question of the Straits we were near to "a satisfactory settlement" on condition that Hammerskjold would agree not to return the UN force without a definite confirmation of the Assembly.

On the matter of Gaza, the US was prepared to stand for international responsibility both for administration and security. However, ~~she~~ it did not see the possibility of implementing this without Hammerskjold supporting such a regime and without receiving the confirmation of the Assembly or the agreement of Egypt. It was clear that the US interpreted the Egyptian announcement of February 22 as readiness to accept the "content" if not the the form of an international regime. At the end of the meeting with Dulles a joint announcement was published.

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At a meeting in Washington on February 24, 1957 the Ambassador of Israel sought clarification of the attitudes and intent of the United States on matters discussed in the Unites States Memorandum of February 11, 1957.

The clarifications sought and received were as follows:

1. The Ambassador inquired, whether in addition to any symbolic exercise by the U.S. of its right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran, U.S. shipping would regularly use these waters for actual trade, including the conveyance of oil to Elath when appropriate facilities were established.

   The Secretary stated that it is the intention of the U.S. to maintain trade and shipping under the American flag in the Gulf of Akaba. The U.S. cannot impose orders on commercial companies; but it will do all it can to encourage such traffic. If a shipping company has any apprehension arising out of the special circumstances prevailing in the Gulf and the Straits, the U.S. will be ready to allay such apprehensions. The U.S. foresees a normal flow of American flag shipping in the Gulf of Akaba.

2. The Ambassador inquired whether the U.S. understood "free and innocent passage" to mean passage of all ships of commerce or war, provided that their conduct was such as to inflict no injury on any coast State.

   The Secretary of State stated that the American definition of innocent passage was that set out in the words of the International Law Committee. "Passage is innocent so long as a ship does not use the territorial sea for committing acts prejudicial to the security of the coastal State or contrary to the other rules of International Law." The Secretary confirmed the Ambassador's understanding that innocence of passage was only a question of the conduct of the ship, and not its category, cargo flag or destination.

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3. The Ambassador referred to the possibility that the units of the UNEF which would move into the area of the Straits of Tiran on Israel's withdrawal might include naval units. While the territory in the Sharm el-Sheikh area was under Egyptian sovereignty, the waters, according to the Memorandum of February 11, possessed an international character. A naval unit of UNEF would have greater freedom from subjection to the will of any single nation than would a military unit stationed on the soil of that nation. It would thus be easier for the U.N. to stipulate that such a naval unit or patrol should remain until peaceful conditions were in practice assured.

The Secretary said that the U.S. would approve the use of naval units by the UNEF in the Straits of Tiran if circumstances warranted it. In his view, there would be no need for the General Assembly determination to achieve this result. The Secretary General had enough authority under existing resolution if the Advisory Committee were to support the idea. The U.S. was prepared to work for such an agreement if circumstances warrant it.

4. The Ambassador referred to the inability of the U.S. to guarantee the protection of Israel flag ships in the Gulf of Akaba "The Secretary had said:
"The President has inherent power to use the forces of the U.S. to protect American ships and their rights all over the world; but he has no power, in my opinion, to use the vessels of another flag unless he is given the authority by some Congressional resolution or by a Treaty". The Ambassador informed the Secretary that his Government intended to make a declaration announcing that Israel would, if necessary to protect Israel ships and their rights against attack. This declaration would be made within the terms of Article 51 of the Charter. Israel hoped that the U.S. would express its recognition of such a declaration by the Government of Israel.

The Secretary stated that he saw no inherent obstacle to this recognition. The U.S. would agree to recognise Israel's right to protect its shipping in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. He would, of course, have to see the text of any such declaration before the U.S. could commit itself finally to specific recognition thereof.

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5. The Ambassador referred to the passage in the Memorandum of February 11 in which the U.S. expressed its readiness to "join with others" to secure general recognition of the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits. He asked whether the U.S. would use its good offices to secure the association of other maritime countries with the U.S. doctrine, with the American intention to exercise free passage in practice, and with recognition of Israel's.

The Secretary said that some maritime powers had already indicated their willingness to identify themselves with the doctrine and intention announced by the U.S. Some would join with the United States in such a statement, while others would make independent parallel declarations in accordance with their own constitutional positions and juridical concepts.

6. The Ambassador noted that in the Memorandum of February 11 the U.S. had favored the entry of UNEF units into the Straits of Tiran area on Israel's withdrawal. He inquired whether the U.S. would be prepared to state its position on the function and duration of tenure of UNEF, as set out by Ambassador Lodge in the General Assembly on January 28 and Feb 2.
He also referred to the fact that the President of the U.S. in a public address on February 21 had expressed his understanding that under Resolution 11 of the General Assembly adopted on February 2, 1957, the UNEF forces in the Straits of Tiran would have the function of "assuring non - belligerency".
The Ambassador inquired whether the U.S. would be prepared to restate these definitions of the functions of UNEF as representing the policy of the U.S. in the United Nations. The Ambassador informed the Secretary that in the Memorandum submitted to him on January 5, the Secretary General of the U.N. had stated that "the prevention of possible acts of belligerency would of course be within the mandate of UNEF."

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would gladly state its views in the functions of UNEF and the duration of its tenure in the terms set out by the President on February 21 and Ambassador Lodge on January 28 and February 2. These statements represented the policy of the U.S. as a member of the U.N.

7. The Ambassador referred to his Government's apprehension that the UNEF, having entered the area of the Straits of Tiran, might be withdrawn at the time when such withdrawal would lead to belligerent acts. He inquired whether the U.S. would accept the proposition that the Secretary General would notify the General Assembly, before agreeing on the U.N.'s behalf to the withdrawal of the UNEF from the area of the Gulf of Akaba, so as to give the Assembly an opportunity of considering whether such withdrawal would prejudice the maintenance of non - belligerency.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would certainly anticipate that any proposals to withdraw UNEF forces would be considered by the general Assembly before such withdrawal was carried out. In such consideration by the General Assembly of any proposals to withdraw UNEF from the Gulf of Akaba area, the U.S. would be guided by its concept of the functions of the UNEF as defined by Ambassador Lodge on January 28 and February 2.

8. The Ambassador pointed out that in the absence of firm guarantees for free navigation such as the Israel Government had originally sought, Israel in evacuation of the Sharem - el - Sheikh area would be performing an act of faith in the U.S. The President of the U.S. had pointed out that if Egypt were to renew blockade activities in the Gulf of Akaba an the Straits of Tiran against Israel shipping it would be for the society of nations to act firmly. The Ambassador said that it would be helpful to the Prime Minister of Israel if the President could find his way to express this thought in a direct communication to him.

The Secretary stated that he believed that the President would be willing to communicate to the Prime Minister what he had said on this point in his public address. Israel would have no reason to regret its act of faith.

9. The Ambassador referred to the connection established in the Memorandum of February 11 between the withdrawal from Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza, and the recognition by the United States of Israel's right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits. He asked whether this recognition would became operative after

The Secretary said that he was advised that when UNEF entered Gaza, the Israeli military occupation would have lapsed and Israeli officials working in the Administration would in a legal sense be subordinate to the authority of U.N.

the withdrawal of Israeli troops. He hoped that this recognition would not have to await a final resolution of the Gaza problem.

Their presence would thus not constitute belligerency. It followed that after the withdrawal of forces and the entry of UNEF into both areas there would be no room for the exercise of belligerent rights.

10. The Ambassadorstated that his government's position on Gaza was dominated by firm opposition to any return, direct or indirect, of the Egyptian control, whether military or civilian. It was disposed to consider any proposal which achieved this purpose. But it could not compromise on the non return of Egypt in any capacity.

The Secretary said that the Secretary General was working onthe problem of civil administration in Gaza. It was difficult to imagine Egypt formally consenting to abrogate its rights under the 1949 Armistice Agreement, but it was possible to envisage Egypt agreeing to the non-exercise of these rights, and acquiescing in their exercise by the United Nations. The Secretary General's report published on February 22 indicates this possibility. It might be possible for Egypt to reserve its rights without exercising them until the future of the Gaza area was finally determined. The Secretary advised the Ambassador to consult the Secretary General on these points.

11. The Ambassador summarised that after the withdrawal of Israel forces and the entry of UNEF into the Gulf of Akaba area and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, A UN mission should be despatched to Gazato work out a plan for civil administration, refugee settlement and economic rehabilitation in Gaza.

The Secretary stated that he supported the idea of a U.N. commission. He added, however, that the Ambassador would be well advised to consult the Secretary General on this proposed schedule.

12. The Ambassador mentioned the Suez Canal and referred to the recent public adress by the President of the U.S. in which he had said that it should not be presumed "that if Israel withdraws Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Akaba". The President went on to say that if Egypt did obstruct Israeli shipping "then this could be halt wit firmly by the society

The Secretary replied that the president's statement was the policy of the U.S. and that there would be no difficulty in conveying this formally to the Government of Israel. The position was covered not only by by the 1888 convention, but also by the Geneve 1950 resolution on the six principles forbidding any

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of Nations.

The Ambassador stated that it would be helpful to the Israel Government if the U.S. would agree to communicate to the Government of Israel a statement of its policy on Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal.

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MEETINGS WITH HAMMERSKJOLD ON 25.2. - DEFINITION OF POSITIONS.

As arranged with Dulles, I met Hammerskjold on 25.2. for a number of meetings which developed into a serious crisis. At the first meeting the Sec.Gen. resolutely insisted on the legal rights of Egypt according to the Armistice Agreement and refused to deal with any practical arrangements that would prevent the return of Egypt. He stated definitely that his stand on this matter was not identical with that of the US.

The second meeting opened by the Sec.Gen. presenting a memorandum which summarised the exchange of opinions in relation to the main points dealt with at the first meeting:

1. The Bay of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran.

a) The Israel delegate pointed out that Israel's main concern was the removal of danger of a renewed belligerency in the wake of the withdrawal and accordingly asked:

i. Will the aim of the UN ~~army~~ force, in the wake of the withdrawal, ~~it~~ be, as the Sec.Gen. pointed out in his reply of 5.1., the prevention of hostile acts?

ii. Will the Sec.Gen, ~~xgxxx~~ before removing the UN ~~Army~~ force from Sharem el Sheikh - whether a demand for this comes from Egypt or not - inform the members of the UN before he agrees?

iii. Will a naval force of the UN be added to safeguard the arrangements in the Bay and the Straits?

b) The Sec.Gen. replied:

1. With regard to the function of UNEF in the prevention of belligerency the answer is affirmative, subject to the qualification that UNEF is never to be used in such a way as to force a solution of any controversial political or legal problems.

MEETINGS WITH HAMMARSKJOLD ON 25.7. - CLARIFICATION OF POSITIONS.

As arranged with Dulles I met Hammarskjold on 25.7. for a number of meetings which developed into a serious crisis. At the first meeting the Sec.Gen. resolutely insisted on the legal rights of Egypt according to the Armistice Agreement and refused to deal with any practical arrangements that would prevent the return of Egypt. He stated definitely that discussion on this matter was not identical with that of the US.

The second meeting opened by the Sec.Gen. presenting a memorandum which summarized the exchange of opinions in relation to the main points dealt with at the first meeting:

1. The Bay of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran.

a) The Israel delegate pointed out that Israel's main concern was the removal of danger of a renewed belligerency in the wake of the withdrawal and accordingly asked:

i. Will the aim of the UN army, in the wake of the withdrawal, be, as the Sec.Gen. pointed out in his reply of 5.1., the prevention of hostile acts?

ii. Will the Sec.Gen. before removing the UN Army from Sharem el Sheikh - whether a demand for this comes from Egypt or not - inform the members of the UN before he agrees?

iii. Will a naval force of the UN be added to safeguard the arrangements in the Bay and the Straits?

b) The Sec.Gen. replied:

i. [illegible] the formation of [illegible] the presence of [illegible] army under the UN flag, [illegible] of the withdrawal [illegible] Egypt or to [illegible] of any conversation [illegible] on [illegible] Sec.Gen.

2. On the question of notification to Members, the Secretary-General wanted to state his view at a later meeting. An indicated procedure would be for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly.

3. The question of the naval unit, in that it implies a function which would go beyond the prevention of belligerent acts as envisaged in the basic General Assembly resolutions, would be beyond the competence of the Secretary-General on the basis of those resolutions.

2. Gaza.

a. The Israel representative defined his Government's policy as follows:

i. Opposition to an Egyptian civilian or military regime. Non-acceptance of Egyptian direct or indirect return.

ii. Egypt, which violated the armistice, cannot claim any rights in Gaza according to the Armistice Agreement.

iii. Does the de facto regime of UN in Gaza as described by the Sec.Gen's announcement of 22.2. remove the possibility of an Egyptian return?

iv. A suggestion that the Assembly send "a delegation for the clarification of facts" to Gaza to examine the situation and prepare recommendations to the Assembly, but it is impossible to say whether this step will be taken before the withdrawal.

The Sec.Gen. replied: (see page 215a *)

3. The Implementation of a UN Force.

The Israel delegate asserted that he did not consider the question of a UN force on both sides of the armistice line as urgent or affecting the central problem of withdrawal and had not dealt with it recently with anyone.

The special memorandum answered the questions in the second paragraph (3.2.) saying: (See page 215a **)

During the meeting he demanded that we should describe to him how we imagined it was possible to implement the aim of non-return, and asked that we leave the door open.

Finally he pointed out that it was impossible to postpone the Assembly debate again, as the Assembly was entitled to know what was being done, and that the problem of reporting to the Assembly placed him in a difficult situation. He asked whether we would oppose publishing the memorandum on the rights of Egypt

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* 1. Egypt is given the right to control the Gaza Strip by the Armistice Agreement. This being binding on the Secretariat, the Secretary-General's concentration has been on arrangements to secure peace and quiet in the area - always on the assumption of the Egyptian legal position.

2. Question 3 is dealt with in a special memorandum.

3. In the light of Israel's stand on Gaza it may be seriously doubted that the question of Aqaba can be solved separately, as intended by Israel's approach.

** The Secretary-General's statement on 22/2 obviously was made within the framework of the legal situation created by the international agreement. He could neither detract from nor annul any rights existing under the Armistice Agreement. His statement indicated the political arrangements envisaged within the framework of Egyptian control of the territory as established by the Agreement and could therefore not be understood as limiting Egyptian rights within the area under the terms of the Agreement.

in the Strip. We did not object to either the renewal of Assembly debates or the publication of the memorandum. But I pointed out that our reply seals the fate of the chance that had become apparent at the talk with Dulles, to find a solution to the problem.

The memorandum was therefore published. "Israeli circles" had the following comments in reply:

"In these matters one cannot discuss them according to the merely legal yardstick based upon legal assumptions that may be questioned. What is required most at the moment is an action that will combine imagination with a real feeling for the situation".

THE ASSEMBLY SESSION OF FEBRUARY 26TH.

A more practical approach was revealed by Pearson's speech at the Assembly on 26.2. in the morning. (See Pearson's speech).

TALK WITH DULLES ON 26.2. - APPEAL AGAINST HAMMERSKJOLD.

THE FRENCH ENTER THE PICTURE.

It was necessary to speak to Dulles once again in order to appeal against the barren stand of Hammerskjold. After my talk with Hammerskjold I phoned Dulles and explained that Hammerskjold stresses Egypt's right to return to the Strip and not necessarily the UN's responsibility for Gaza. Hence the danger that our negotiations in Washington would be destroyed by Hammerskjold. The next day on 26.2. Shiloach and I met Dulles, Felger, Wilcox and Rowntree at 1.30 p.m.

I explained the situation that had been created after the talks with Hammerskjold. I claimed that his stubbornness to act in the framework of Egypt's jurisdiction over Gaza is destroying any possibility of discussing the problem of the Strip. I proposed that we should implement the agreement in relation to the Straits according to the lines laid down at our last talk.(24.2.).

In relation to Gaza we will withdraw our army from there and a UN committee would examine the future of the regime in the Strip. Thereby the episode of conforming with the Assembly decisions would end and we could return to a situation of dealing with the problems properly.

The Secretary answered that one must continue the efforts to solve all the problems and it was not prepared to separate them at the moment. I mentioned Pearson's speech which represents the frame of mind of a considerable number of delegations, which also aims at a solution to the Strip which would not return Egyptians forces to the Strip.

The Secretary again urged that we make an effort to solve all the outstanding problems. Here he told that on that morning at a meeting with the President, the Prime Minister of France, Mollet, Pinay and the Secretary, Pinay had raised a proposal which in the opinion of all four of them was likely to lead to a solution. He suggested that we see Pinay and hear his proposals. He himself refused to reveal their content as the proposal was Pinay's and not his, even though the President and he agreed to it.

This was the first time that we heard of French initiative to solve the problem of Gaza.

When I passed through the Embassy between the meeting with Dulles and the meeting with Pinay, I found a cable from Israel conveying the Government's instructions for the meeting with Dulles. It appeared that what I had said to Dulles had been in accordance with this. There were a few points to which I had intended to reply that night.

PINAY AND FRENCH ACTIVITY.

I immediately headed for the French Embassy to hear what Pinay had to say about Gaza. Shiloach and I met with Pinay and the Ambassador at 4.00 p.m. and I received from the Minister a proposal for the exchange of announcements in the Assembly between Israel on the one hand and the US, France and other states that will join them, on the other. I promised to pass this on to the Government immediately. I suggested initial improvements and added that one must not interpret this as acceptance of the plan and one must not convey such an impression to the US Government.

Pinay stressed that France did not intend to put pressure on Israel to accept the plan. ~~She~~ It is merely suggesting a proposal whose acceptance, in France's opinion, would be in Israel's interests. The central idea of the plan is that Israel would evacuate the Strip on the assumption that the UN accepts full responsibility for security and administration. If unexpectedly this assumption ~~would be undermined~~ were falsified and the situation reverts to what it was before, Israel reserves ~~for herself~~ to itself the right of free action. The representatives of the US, France and other states will confirm this assumption in the Assembly and so Israel will receive international support, in advance, for ~~her~~ its right to defend ~~herself~~ itself with force if Gaza again becomes a thorn in her flesh.

At 6.00 p.m.
~~On the 6th in the evening~~ Mollet and Pinay were at the White House. An hour later the French Ambassador invited me to him and conveyed the US's agreement to the plan. In the light of this agreement the Americans will refrain from presenting a resolution that they had prepared for the Assembly and this will give us the opportunity of consulting with the two governments.

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In the meantime Pinay informed me that he had ~~attained~~ secured an important correction that I had demanded. ~~In~~ The first draft ~~of~~ by Pinay ~~it~~ stated that the UN ~~army~~ force has receives the function of rule in the Strip. I said that without a qualification that will explain that the rule of UN ~~army~~ force is "exclusive" we will not be able to discuss the proposal as our main objective is to avoid the participation of Egypt in responsibility. Pinay had achieved the insertion of this word as well as other positive corrections from the White House.

In the following text of the French proposal which I cabled that evening a number of corrections that I had proposed and were accepted are included: (See page 219a.).

THE PINAY PLAN.

The objective of the plan is:

a. At the outset the UN ~~army~~ force will accept in an exclusive form all the jurisdiction for civilian and military rule.

b. In the transition period the UN force will be the institution that will fulfill the following functions: assuring the safety of life and property; police services; efficient civilian administration; a plan for assisting the refugees; and advancing the development of the region and its inhabitants.

c. The "transition period" is the period between the exit of Israeli forces and the peace settlement.

d. If during this period Egypt ~~will~~ creates conditions in the Strip that will result in ~~violence~~ disturbances, etc. and if a change ~~will~~

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1. Israel announces that it is making a complete withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions.

2. It further announces -

a. That it is its understanding that on its withdrawal the United Nations Forces will be deployed in Gaza as contemplated by the General Assembly Resolution of 2 February and that the initial takeover of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel will be exclusively by the United Nations Emergency Force. It is furtheremore the expectation of Israel that the United Nations will be the agency which will be utilized for "safeguarding life and property in the area by providing efficient and effective police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations Refugee Program; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people". (See Secretary General's report of 22 February).

b. That it is Israel's hope that the above mentioned role of the United Nations in the administration will continue for a transitory period until there is a peace settlement, to be sought as rapidly as possible.

c. That if Egypt creates in the Gaza Strip conditions which failed to comply with its international obligations and indicated a return to the condition of deterioration which had previously come about, Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights.

3. The United States and such other states which so decide will make a statement in the United Nations:

a. Taking note of the Israel statement;

b. Declaring its hope that the above mentioned role of the United Nations in the administration will continue for a transitory period until there is peace settlement; that the conditions for peace should be vigorously sought; and that in the meantime there will be a strict compliance of both parties with their international obligations:

c. If after Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations Resolution, there is a recurrence of belligerency or a violation of International obligations, then this will create a situation calling for United Nations consideration, and the United States will consult with other members of the United Nations, to consider action within and without the United Nations appropriate to the circumstances, to bring about a settlement in conformity with the principles of Justice and International Law.

take place in the assumption according to which Israel is withdrawing from the Strip, Israel will be free "to defend her rights", etc. and as above.

e. In announcing to the Assembly her intention to withdraw from the Strip (and the assumption is military evacuation soon and gradual withdrawal of the administration), Israel will state that she is leaving only according to the basis of (a). (b). and (c). as above.

f. America, France and other States (the assumption is that England too) will rise in the Assembly and confirm d). as above, that is, Israel's right to cancel her withdrawal if the above assumptions will not be verified and if a situation of disturbance is created in the Gaza Strip. At the same time they will confirm the above assumptions. If any disturbance will occur in the Strip, the US will consult with France and other States which join the plan and decide upon a suitable action within the UN and outside of it in order to ensure a settlement based upon justice and international law.

g. The above announcements will be made in the Assembly and the assumption is that the US, France, etc. will ensure that there will not be two-thirds to defeat the announcement. (It is clear that the announcement will not require any confirmation and in any event the problem of voting in the Assembly will not arise.). As the powers outside of the UN give guarantees each one to defend her own shipping in the Straits, and recognise Israel's right to defend her rights against attack, so the determining powers guarantee that no change shall take place in the definitely international status of the Gaza Strip until peace is attained.

h. The French explained to us that the logic of their plan for Gaza is based upon what the Americans suggested for the

problem of the Straits, that is, the international character both of the Straits and of the Strip, which is dictated by the one-sided declarations of the powers, in addition to their recognition of Israel's right to defend her rights. The guarantee for the non-exit of the UN force is a clarification that this exit is likely to bring the danger of war.

I cabled to Israel evaluating the plan as follows:

a. The plan is most unusual and it is not easy at the moment to grasp its full significance.

b. The objective is to circumvent the majority at the UN by a definite policy of strength. Another objective is that the US and France by combining this plan with the plan for the Straits openly ties Nasser's hands by negating his freedom of action both in the Straits and in the Strip. Pinay stressed that by her identification with this plan, America undertakes not to return Egypt to the Strip. The plan is more positive than that of Pearson and there is no more friendly initiative than that of Pearson in the Assembly. The fact that France saw herself obliged to propose such a plan to the US is most instructive and significant.

c. The intention is that a tripartite discussion of the US-France-Israel take place tomorrow, 27.2., and that the plan be implemented while Mollet and Pinay are in the US. The Foreign Minister will reach Washington tomorrow.

d. A number of problems of formulation, procedure and law are still vague and we shall attempt to clarify them tomorrow. The State of Israel is immediately requested to decide in principle: Are we prepared in partnership with America and France to agree to a special regime in the Strip based upon exclusive international rule - de facto, without Egypt? In our opinion the reply must be positive for the following reasons:

i. I proceed from the assumption that our basic objective in relation to Gaza is the negation of Egyptian rule and that this objective is more vital than any other.

ii. Despite all the efforts, we have not found another method - and it is doubtful if we will find it - to ensure that the Strip is not abandoned into Egyptian hands. Basically one cannot ensure this aim by means of voting in the Assembly or discussions with the Sec.Gen.

iii. Collaboration with the US and France in such a fateful question is in itself an international and security asset. The establishment of the responsibility of these elements for the ~~removal~~ cessation of ~~the~~ disturbances in Gaza can lighten our burdens. The only alternative is our remaining in Gaza against world opinion and this will weaken our political and economic strength and place us in an increasingly complex situation. We have considered the P.M.'s announcement in his cable to me on 23.2. where he defined our aim in Gaza as a negative aim - the non-return of the Strip to the previous status quo.

The French initiative constituted a determining stage in breaking the deadlock. Although we were told candidly that France is not pressing us to accept the programme - it is not difficult to imagine in what sort of position we would be had we resolutely rejected a plan that even the best of our friends identified herself with ~~it~~ itself and initiated an important part of ~~it~~. One must assume that Pinay and Mollet were faced by a number of considerations -

a. The US will be thankful to them for their assistance in removing the crisis ~~which~~ with Israel and attaining the implementation of the UN decision on withdrawal.

b. Israel will thank them for finding a more or less satisfactory

outcome which is acceptable to the US.

c. Canada (where Mollet was about to visit after his visit to the US) would be grateful for having helped to establish the UN army force in Gaza.

d. The very fact that France shows international leadership reflects credit upon her, and upon Mollet and Pinay personally.

e. The fact that Nasser's ~~is being removed by~~ his ability to interfere with Israel shipping and the establishment of an exclusive rule in Gaza being removed, certainly will harm his status.

However, there is no doubt that France's main purpose is the desire to help Israel. In all our talks with Pinay and Mollet we felt their deep concern for the results overstepping the mark beyond the limit of flexibility which we had reached. French elements of great weight pointed out the fear of a crisis in our relations with the US.

## THE GOVERNMENT DECISION - TO AGREE AND TO REQUEST EXPLANATIONS

On 27/2 the clarifications in cables and talks continued between us and Israel and us and the Americans and French. Over the telephone we received the contents of the Government decisions of the previous evening. According to these decisions the Government agreed in principle to Pinay's suggestion, on the assumption that it would be explained that the UN forces would be in Gaza and the Egyptians would not be able to return there directly or indirectly. This was not sufficiently clear from Pinay's version, and the Government asked that in the agreed version of our announcement he should make this clear, and that undertakings to this effect be received from those in

a position to promise, even if it was to be a secret promise.

The agreement in principle to the plan is also conditional to the assumption that freedom of passage in the Straits will be assured. This is on the assumption that our undertaking to fulfil international decisions as stated in Pinay's plan does not apply to the armistice agreement with Egypt. Otherwise this is likely to be interpreted as initial agreement to Egypt's return to the Strip as flowing from the agreement, and such an interprepation would would empty Pinay's suggestion of all content, and make it unacceptable.

As to the text itself, the P.M. proposed a number of alterations: [redacted]

Instead of Pinay's version that Israel hopes that the object of the UN army's administration of the Strip will continue for an intermediate period until a peace settlement is arrived at, the P.M. proposed that we say that the civilian and military authority shall remain exclusively in the UN's hands until a peace settlement is arrived at.

Instead of Pinay's words that in the event that Egypt creates conditions in Gaza that are not in conformity with her international obligations, and ~~will~~ create a situation that will bring about the incidents of the past, the Prime Minister proposed that we say that Israel does not claim a state of war between Israel and Egypt, and will avoid any hostile acts against Egypt on a basis of mutuality. If ~~she will~~ discerns an intention of renewing the bad conditions in the Gaza Strip, as they existed in the past, Israel reserves ~~for herself~~ the right - as was also stated in the Pinay text - of free action to defend her rights.

As to the promised announcements of the US and other Powers, the P.M. suggested ~~to omit~~ omitting the expression "intermediate period" here too. He especially stressed that one must remove from this

as from every other text, any reliance upon the armistice agreements.

We dealt with Dulles on the fear of quoting from Hammerskjold's report. We asked whether the expression "police protection as will guarantee" does not open the door to Egyptian administration under the supervision of UN police. Dulles definately admitted that there was no such intention; in order to leave no room for doubt, in the corrected version of the text we interpreted it saying: "UN will be the agency to be utilised for carrying out the functions enumerated by the Secretary General, namely: safeguarding life etc." The discussions between us and the Americans and French and the discussions they had among themselves, on the text of our announcement, and their reaction and that of other States, carried on that whole day and the following morning (28/2) with the participation of the Foreign Minister. It was necessary to have a final meeting with Dulles and this took place on 28/2 in the afternoon.

In the meantime, at the invitation of the British Ambassador, I conveyed to him, in the presence of the Canadian Ambassador, on the conduct of the talks with Dulles and Pinay. The matter was completely new to both of them. (I read in a number of Israel newspapers, the mistaken assumption that we were faced by a "Canadian - French plan". Such a plan did not exist. The Canadians did not confirm the idea of the one-sided announcements of the Powers, and proposed the solution based upon the permanent deployment of UN force both at Sharem el Sheikh as well as along the length of the armistice lines - on both sides.)

THE DECISIVE MEETING - FEBRUARY 28

In the afternoon Rafael, Shiloach and I met Palgar, Rowntree, Wilcox, De Flemier, Wilkins and Burgos. Palgar was the chief spokesman in the American group.

At the beginning of the talk there was a basic clarification

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in summary of the talk of February 24 according to the notes that I had drafted that evening. Palgar suggested a number of alterations and omissions, all of which I accepted. As the result of this discussion the document (---) had an agreed description of the positions of the two delegations. It is worthy of note that Palgar and his colleagues particularly went into detail on our announcement concerning the right of self-defence in the event of an attack on Israel shipping in the Bay of Eilat. Not only did they not question this, but they specifically stated that Israel has full right to make such an announcement, on condition that it was worded in accordance with paragraph 51 of the UN Charter.

After completing the clarification on this document, which dealt more with the matter of shipping than with Gaza, the following procedure was agreed upon: I would propose the text of the Foreign Minister's announcement on both the questions - the Bay of Eilat and Gaza. The section on the Bay would be worded in accordance with the agreed points in the document which we had just finished dealing with in detail. The chapter on Gaza would be drafted according to Pinay's draft with the addition of the corrections and clarifications that were discussed between the three governments during the last few days. Dulles and Pinay would examine the Israel draft announcement so that they could "take note of it favourably" in their announcements in the Assembly. Thereby, the Israel announcement would clearly become the common policy of the US Israel and France and that of other goverments which will wish to identify themselves with it during the course of the discussion in the Assembly. I proposed a draft for this Israel announcement. The Eilat chapter was drafted by me although it was based upon the assumptions and drafts discussed with the US since February 11. The Gaza chapter was wholly drawn from the corrected Pinay

draft. In other words, the Eilat chapter was essentially the fruit of the Israel-US collaboration and the Gaza chapter the fruit of Israel-French collaboration.

At this stage of the discussions with Palgar, a message was received that the Secretary was free and wished to participate personally in the detailed discussions. In his office copies of the draft that I had prepared were distributed, and a careful detailed discussion of every word and sentence took place.

Dulles and his colleagues suggested alterations, and when they were accepted I wrote them in on the draft. We went over the document sentence by sentence. Finally an agreed draft of the Foreign Minister's announcement emerged - both sides being satisfied. It was agreed that Pinay would also be given an opportunity to go over the draft before it was finalised.

When this discussion ended Dulles said that Lodge would receive instructions to note the announcement favourably. I asked to know whether we could hear what Lodge had to say. Dulles stated that they would only begin to draft it now, and pointed out the instructions that he was giving to the drafters. He read a number of sentences from a prepared paper, expressing complete identification with the Foreign Minister's statement as reasonable and legitimate, and in effect as the realisation of the basic rights of Israel. The words that Dulles said were most reassuring. (As it transpired, that night certain developments took place, and Lodge gave vent to a new independent memorandum on Gaza, which was not tied to Pinay's document).

DULLES MOBILISES PARTNERS AND PLOTS THE PLAN OF ACTION

That day a meeting took place between Dulles and the Ambassadors of Britain and Canada and members of the French Embassy. Dulles read them the text of the authorised Israel announcement and told them that the US Government in its announcement in the Assembly would express the hope that the UN ~~army~~ force would not ~~exit~~ leave ~~from~~ Sharém el Sheikh without prior consultation with the Advisory Committee, which on its part, would give the Assembly an opportunity to discuss the question.

In relation to Gaza, the American announcement would express the hope that the UN would continue to administer the area until a final settlement or a peace settlement is made. If after the withdrawal of Israel forces the interim status is violated, there will be a need for immediate consultations at the UN, and the US on her part will immediately consult with other states on the steps to be taken, either within the framework of the UN or outside of it, in order to return the state of peace.

In Lodge's speech there would be two main points on the Straits:
1. The period of stay of the UN ~~army~~ force in the area
2. The exact aims of this ~~army~~ force.

Dulles pointed out that ~~the~~ a large portion of the Israel announcement is in fact included in UN decisions, or in the proposals of the Sec Gen. The Israel assumptions seemed acceptable. In any event there are two dangers: 1) That the Sec Gen is likely to negate the whole plan by an announcement that will question and deny the reasonable assumptions of Israel; 2) That Egypt will suddenly decide to back out on her agreement to the functions of the UN force. If this ~~will~~ happens

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the guilt will ~~reflect~~ lie upon Egypt.

In reply to the British Ambassador's question in relation to the other powers joining the American declaration, the Secretary of State answered that suitable instructions had been given to Lodge to approach all those delegations which he found necessary.

The Canadian Ambassador asked: What about the Sec. Gen? Dulles said that he had instructed ~~him~~ Lodge to speak to him, and it would be just as well if Pearson, Pinay and Alphand speak to him. The aim must be that the Sec Gen remains silent.

Dulles described the following process: He hopes that after the voicing of announcements, the Assembly will disperse without decisions. Before he had examined the possibility of an Afro-Asian revolt, the Frenchman suggested that if he ~~sees~~ saw no possibility of dispersing the Assembly without a decision, one ~~will~~ would have to put a resolution that the Assembly notes the announcement, asks the Sec Gen to report on the progress of the promised withdrawal by Israel, and upon other steps that the Sec Gen will take in order to set in motion the UN force ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ for the fulfilment of its objectives.

We also heard that Pinay learnt from Hammerskjold that he intended to remain neutral provided that Israel ~~will~~ did not distort his words ~~and will not~~ or misinterpret his reports.

At the Assembly session that day, our representative announced that the State of Israel ~~will~~ would have an announcement for the Assembly on the morrow.

## A PERSONAL TALK WITH DULLES

Before leaving for New York, I telephoned to Dulles asking him to receive me for a short personal talk in order to stress the importance that Egypt does not return in any form whatsoever to Gaza. He invited me to his house at 10.00 in the evening and we spoke alone for forty minutes.

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I stressed the decisive importance of this problem for us and said that we had decided to cooperate with the Pinay plan on the assumption that Egypt will not return directly or indirectly and in any form whatsoever. For us this is a central, basic consideration and therefore we are worried that the implementation depends upon Hammerskjold. It is most vital that I hear this evening exactly what is the US's attitude to this problem. Dulles rose from his seat and ~~lectured~~ spoke for some twenty minutes. He said that he was glad of the unofficial opportunity to convey to me his innermost feelings. He spoke approximately as follows:

"Before I answer your question I assume that you know what a political victory you have gained today. The opening of the Bay of Eilat as an almost one hundred percent assured international waterway; in Gaza, the period of exclusive Egyptian rule has ended and from now onwards the practical rule will be in the hands of the UN and above all, you are achieving an even more important achievement, i.e., the strengthening of the friendship between America and Israel. The Arabs have made a correct assessment of the situation and one cannot be surprised at the frustration which has taken hold of them today. There is no candidness in their words on the need for you to evacuate the two places. Their strongest desire is that you should continue to sit there, because thereby you isolate yourselves and weaken yourselves and basically prejudice your relationships with America and other friends. Had the Egyptians found any way of ensuring this situation they would have grasped it because in that way Israel opens up a vision of destruction. Friendship and cooperation with the US, France and other States are more important to the security of Israel than anything else, and the ~~xxxxxx~~ cooperation of Israel with the US and France in this plan will ~~return~~ restore to Israel ~~her~~ its international status and will ~~unsurmountably~~ immeasurably strengthen her.

As to Gaza, the US stand is clear, We want a definitely international regime without Egypt. Egypt has no 'good reason' to return to Gaza ~~xxxx~~ for Gaza was never sovereign Egyptian territory. The plan that we worked out with Mollet and Pinay is a plan intended for the non-return of Egypt to Gaza - neither in military or civilian form. The US is not all-powerful, even though there is a delusion in the world as if it was sufficient that we should desire something for it to be. At the same time, it is true that we are not without influence. You can inform your Government that the US will do the best it can so that Egypt will not return to Gaza." He added: "I am not a contractor for full success but I undertake a supreme effort to ensure the fulfillment of this aim.

This is also the opinion of the French ministers; you have no better friends than them and us; they spoke about your present situation with great concern and expressed a fear lest the crisis continues without a solution while your strength dwindles.

~~Then~~,
True, there is a double concern:

1. Will Hammerskjold concern himself with the establishment of an international regime which we desire without Egyptian influence;

2. Will the Egyptians abandon the promises that they gave to the Sec.Gen. and to the US Government acoording to which they will accept an international regime in Gaza and will not attempt to question it or weaken it. The US GOvernment has a clear impression which has not yet been confounded, that the Egyptians in the depths of their hearts understand that the period of their exclusive rule in Gaza has ended not to return. All that I can promise you is that we will work together with you against the return of Egyptians to Gaza.

Hammerskjold is not an easy problem, but he cannot completely ignore our opinion. As for Nasser, if he confounds other his/undertakings he will land on his head. Not everyday or week do we present you with a document which expresses the recognition of your rights to assure your rights if Nasser ~~will~~ throws ~~out~~ the UN ~~army from~~ force out of Gaza and renews his attacks upon you. I do not consider that he is very keen to meet you face to face. I will speak to Hammerskjold tomorrow and explain to him again the significance of the plan which is based upon de facto exclusion of Egypt in effect ~~from~~ for a transit period from taking over the rule from the UN ~~army~~ force until a final settlement."

He again requested that I inform my Government that the US will aim at the non-return of Egypt to Gaza. He did not know what will be the fate of that area but in the opinion of the State Department it was destined to maintain more intimate links with Israel than with Egypt. The US policy is that the UN will administrate Gaza until a final solution and its regime is decided. He added ~~and said~~: "I have never disguised the fact that your choice was a difficult one. But when I compare the arrangement to which you have agreed today to the position in which you would have found yourselves by staying in the two places in the face of world opinion, I cannot imagine that the balance could be anything but positive."

In ending the conversation: He promised to speak with Hammerskjold and Pinay.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON MARCH 1.

The agreed announcement was ~~voiced~~ made by the Foreign Minister when ~~in~~ the Assembly gathered on Friday afternoon, March 1.

The speech was received at the UN and by the press with sympathy and a feeling of relief. The section on the right of self-defence aroused particular attention (see attached

Hammarskjold and Pinay.

# Statement by Mrs. Golda Meir, Minister for Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on March 1, 1957

The Government of Israel is now in a position to announce its plans for full and prompt withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh area and the Gaza strip, in compliance with Resolution (I) of February 2, 1957.

We have repeatedly stated that Israel has no interest in the strip of land overlooking the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. Our sole purpose has been to ensure that, on the withdrawal of Israeli forces, continued freedom of navigation will exist for Israel and international shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. Such freedom of navigation is a vital national interest for Israel. But it is also of importance and legitimate concern to the maritime powers and to many states whose economies depend upon trade and navigation between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

There has recently been an increasingly wide recognition that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters in which the right of free and innocent passage exists.

On February 11, 1957, the Secretary of State of the United States of America handed to the Ambassador of Israel in Washington a Memorandum on the subject of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran.

This statement discusses the rights of nations in the Gulf of Aqaba, declares the readiness of the United States to exercise those rights on its own behalf, and to join with other in securing general recognition of those rights.

My Government has subsequently learnt with gratification that other leading maritime powers are prepared to subscribe to the doctrine set out in the United States Memorandum of February 11, and have a similar intention to exercise their rights of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits.

The General Assembly's Resolution (II) of February 2, 1957, contemplates that units of the United Nations Emergency Force will move into the Straits of Tiran area on Israel's withdrawal. It is generally recognized that the function of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Straits of Tiran area includes the prevention of belligerent acts.

In this connection my Government recalls the statements by the representative of the United States in the General Assembly on January 28 and February 2, 1957, with reference to the function of the United Nations Emergency Force units which are to move into the Straits of Tiran area on Israel's withdrawal. The statement of January 28, repeated on February 2, said:

> "It is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest."

My Government has been concerned with the situation which would arise if the United Nations Emergency Force, having taken up its position in the Straits of Tiran area for the purpose of assuring non-belligerency, were to be withdrawn, in conditions which might give rise to interference with free and innocent navigation, and therefore, to the renewal of hostilities. Such a premature cessation of the precautionary measures taken by the United Nations for the prevention of belligerent acts would prejudice important international interests and threaten peace and security. My Government has noted the assurance embodied in the Secretary-General's Report of February 26, 1957, that any proposal for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gulf of Aqaba area would first come to the Advisory Committee, which represents the General Assembly in the implementation of its resolution of November 2, 1956. This procedure will give the General Assembly an opportunity to ensure that no precipitate changes are made which would have the effect of increasing the possibility of belligerent acts. We have reason to believe that in such a discussion many members of the United Nations would be guided by the view expressed by Ambassador Lodge on February 2 in favor of maintaining the United Nations Emergency Force in the Straits of Tiran until peaceful conditions were in practice assured.

In the light of these doctrines, policies and arrangements by the United Nations and the maritime powers, my Government is confident that free and innocent passage for international and Israel shipping will continue to be fully maintained after Israel's withdrawal.

It remains for me now to formulate the policy of Israel both as a littoral State and as a country which intends to exercise its full rights of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran.

The Government of Israel believes that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto, in accordance with the generally accepted definition of those terms in the law of the sea.

In its capacity as a littoral State, Israel will gladly offer port facilities to the ships of all nations and all flags exercising free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. We have received with gratification the assurances of leading maritime powers that they foresee a normal and regular flow of traffic of all cargoes in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Israel will do nothing to impede free and innocent passage by ships of Arab countries bound to Arab ports, or to any other destination.

Israel is resolved on behalf of vessels of Israel registry to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and is prepared to join with others to secure universal respect of this right.

Israel will protect ships of its own flag exercising the right of free and innocent passage on the high seas and in international waters.

Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israel flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran, will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling her to exercise her inherent right of self defense under Article 51 of the Charter, and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of her ships in the Gulf and in the Straits.

We make this announcement in accordance with the accepted principles of international law under which all States have an inherent right to use their forces to protect their ships and their rights against interference by armed force. My Government naturally hopes that this contingency will not occur.

In a public address of February 20, President Eisenhower stated:

> "We should not assume that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba."

This declaration has weighed heavily with my Government in determining its action today.

Israel is now prepared to withdraw its forces from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran in the confidence that there will be continued freedom of navigation for international and Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran.

We propose that a meeting be held immediately between the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defense Army and the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in order to arrange for the United Nations to take over its responsibilities in the Sharm el-Sheikh area.

## GAZA

The Government of Israel announces that it is making a complete withdrawal from the Gaza strip in accordance with the General Assembly's Resolution (I) of February 2, 1957 (A/RES/460). It makes this announcement on the following assumptions:

(a) That on the withdrawal the United Nations Forces will be deployed in Gaza and that the takeover of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel will be exclusively by the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) It is further Israel's expectation that the United Nations will be the agency to be utilized for carrying out the functions enumerated by the Secretary-General in Document APV/659, namely, "safeguarding life and property in the area by providing effective and efficient police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee program; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people."

(c) It is further Israel's expectation that the above mentioned responsibility of the United Nations in the administration of Gaza will be maintained for a transitory period from the takeover until there is a peace settlement, to be sought as rapidly as possible, or a definitive agreement on the future of the Gaza strip.

It is the position of Israel that if conditions are created in the Gaza strip which indicate a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously, Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights.

Accordingly, we propose that a meeting be held immediately between the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defense Army and the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in order to arrange for the United Nations to take over its responsibility in the Gaza area.

For many weeks, amidst great difficulty, my Government has sought to ensure that on the withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza areas, circumstances would prevail which would prevent the likelihood of belligerent acts.

We record with gratitude the sympathetic efforts of many Governments and Delegations to help bring about a situation which would end the insecurity prevailing for Israel and her neighbors these many years. In addition to the considerations to which I have referred, we place our trust in the vigilant resolve of the international community that Israel, equally with all Member States, enjoy its basic rights of freedom from fear of attack; freedom to sail the high seas and international waterways in peace; freedom to pursue its national destiny in tranquility without the constant peril which has surrounded it in recent years.

In this reliance we are embarking upon the course which I have announced today.

May I add these few words to the states in the Middle East area and more specifically to the neighbors of Israel. We all come from an area, a very ancient one. The hills and the valleys of the region have been witnesses to many wars and many conflicts. But that is not the only thing that characterizes that part of the world from which we come. That is also that part of the world of ancient culture; that is that part of the world that has given to humanity three great religions; that is also that part of the world that has given a code of ethics to all humanity. In our countries, in the entire region, all our peoples are anxious and in need of a higher standard of living, of great programmes of development and of progress. Can we from now on, all of us, turn a new leaf, and instead of fighting among each other, can we all united fight poverty, disease, illiteracy? Can we, is it possible for us to put all our efforts, all our energy, for one single purpose — the betterment and progress and development of all our lands and all our peoples? I can here pledge the Government and the people of Israel. In this united effort there is no limit to what we are prepared to contribute so that we can all together live to see a day of happiness for our peoples, and again from that region will emanate a great contribution to peace and happiness for all humanity.



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## CHAPTER VII

## DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US GOVERNMENT ON ~~THE~~ FAITHFULNESS TO THEIR UNDERTAKINGS.

(March 1 - 28)

### LODGE'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON GAZA DISAPPOINTS.

~~During~~ That minute or two between the end of the Foreign Minister's announcement and the beginning of the US delegate's announcement marked the end of one stage and the beginning of another. The US was now put to the test of the assumptions and anticipations concerning which ~~she~~ it had given an undertaking to us and to France- to confirm and maintain them in theory and practice.

During the morning we tried in vain to ~~the~~ influence Lodge to show us his draft. He repeatedly said that the drafting was continuing and was incomplete. When he spoke it transpired that this evasiveness was not accidental. Lodge's words were satisfactory in relation to the Straits, that is, confirmed what was said in the memorandum of February 11, supported the deployment of the UN ~~army~~ force in the Straits permanently and expressed the recognition that the Sec.Gen. will have to turn to the Assembly before responding to any request to remove this army. He also announced that the US notes Israel's announcement and assumes that Israel's assumptions are in conformity with the Assembly decisions and are not unreasonable.

But in speaking about Gaza there were serious digressions both from the original version written by Pinay-Dulles and from what Dulles had promised us in the ~~same~~ negotiations ~~(see the attached comparative table)~~.

The main points were:

1. In dealing with the paragraph which quotes from the Sec.Gen's

CHAPTER LXI

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US GOVERNMENT ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO
THEIR UNDERSTANDINGS.

(March 1 - 29)

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The main points were:

1. In dealing with the paragraph which quotes from the Sec.Gen's

report, Lodge quoted the whole section and not merely the section which we had quoted which was devoid of all reference to Egypt.

2. In mentioning the "international undertakings" he definitely said "including the armistice agreement".

3. In the general sections of the speech he often mentioned the armistice agreement and the dependence upon it and also to depend upon measures that the Sec.Gen. had suggested to progress towards peace according to the decision of February 2.

The Americans achieved more or less good speeches from the representatives of Argentine, Philippines and Spain. France and Costa Rica made excellent speeches. The Ambassador George Picot who spoke on behalf of France said candidly that our assumptions were "logical and legal". Fawzi surprised everyone with his moderation and the fact that he did not question the words of the Foreign Minister and others, although it was clear that this was a tactical moderation.

The Western European delegations and members of the British Commonwealth decided to postpone their speeches to the following session. This decision flowed from a consultation that had taken place that day between the NATO states, excluding the US. At that consultation fears were expressed lest Israel, after making a declaration on withdrawal, would not implement this quickly but will seek excuses for additional long delays. Therefore, it was decided to delay the expression of support for Israel, in Assembly speeches until it would be really proved that Israel was implementing her undertaking on withdrawal in theory and in practice, and as a first step is having discussions with Burns on arrangements for the withdrawal. ~~It may be~~

~~that Pearson~~

Observers who were not au fait with the details had the

impression that Lodge's words constituted a success for us. Friends expressed satisfaction and had difficulty in understanding why we evinced dissatisfaction at the American announcement.

That day an unencouraging report of the State Department was published, in the wake of a meeting that had taken place that morning in Washington between Dulles and the diplomatic representatives of the nine Arab States. The Arabs were invited by Dulles to hear an explanation of the Israel and American announcements that were to be voiced in the Assembly that afternoon.

In the State Department announcement it was stated that it had been explained that the withdrawal "would be completely based upon previous decisions of the General Assembly, on the Sec.Gen.'s reports and on the declared stand of the US, especially as explained by President Eisenhower in his speech of February 20".

Dulles told the representatives of the Arab States that "Communist propaganda is spreading a story in the Arab world as if a secret agreement existed between the US and Israel and he expressed concern at this effort to show what in effect was a great achievement for the UN effort and its principles, that is, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces, in the wrong light".

A COMPLAINT ON LODGE'S WORDS.

Immediately the Assembly session ended, I contacted Murphy and pointed out the digressions that had appeared in Lodge's speech. I added that every word that had been expressed in the Foreign Minister's announcement was confirmed by the Secretary and therefore no-one was more committed to these assumptions than he. I said that I had no complaints about the manner in which the problem of the Straits had been dealt

with but the matter of Gaza in the speech made a penetrating clarification necessary.

When I arrived at the hotel I found an invitation from Dulles to visit him on the morrow (2.3.) in his house and to phone him immediately. I talked to Dulles and explained how our concern and amazement. Dulles said that in his opinion the progress of the day was quite good but if I was concerned then he was concerned about my concern. I explained to him the points that worried us. He said that Lodge had requested permission to include a number of "small"alterations in order to ensure that Hammerskjold would not disturb the plan but the State Department considered that these changes did not make any difference on vital matters. The US policy is complete freedom of passage in the Straits and an international regime in Gaza. The first aim had been achieved and the Secretary considered that the second would be realised. However, if we have any fear it is desirable to know that the whole Arab world was up in arms against the US. The US is not changing her its policy but it is desirable that we complete the Assembly quickly and the US implores that we have a serious practical and to-the-point meeting with Burns if possible on Sunday. The US Government will sit with us in order to implement what she it promised but it is desirable to end the Assembly soon.

In the evening the Foreign Minister, Najar and I talked to the French, that is, Mollet, Pinay, Alphand, Picot. When we came to them, Pinay welcomed us with a smile: "The meeting was good today". At the beginning the French did not want to identify themselves with our concern. They said that, on the matter of the Straits, Lodge's speech was in order and in connection with what we mentioned on Gaza, they tried to prove that these formulations merely have the value of

"nuances". We said that we ~~do~~ did not accept this assumption and that one must energetically mobilise to correct the ill that had been done by Lodge's speech. It was agreed with Pinay ~~xxx~~ that Alphand ~~will~~ would travel to Washington on the morrow and join my efforts to obtain from Dulles an announcement that the US supports the Foreign Minister's assumptions.

Pinay asked to talk~~ed~~ to me personally. With great feeling he said that he hope~~d~~ that we ~~will~~ would continue in the way that we had started because it has benefit for Israel and ~~her~~ its friends. The main thing is not the formulations and the parliamentary ~~tapestries~~ embroideries of the UN but reality, and the reality is that France and the US agreed to ensure freedom of passage in the Straits and to try to establish an international regime in Gaza. As a professional politician he understands "our internal problems" and his advice is that we should present the matter in its correct light as a great political achievement. From there he went on to recommend ~~on~~ a double line of action:

a. An announcement on Monday on the beginning of the implementation of the withdrawal.

b. ~~Common~~ Joint efforts in Washington to inoculate the Americans against the tremendous pressure which is being organised against them by the Arabs.

In the evening, the Australian, Belgian, ~~Holland~~ Dutch, ~~Ireland~~ Irish, New Zealand, Canadian, Italian, and British representatives appealed to our people at the UN and spoke of the need to start the implementation of the undertaking by a Burns-Dayan meeting on Sunday.

In the Arab-Indian camp that evening (1.3.) there were hopes that ultimately we would not implement the withdrawal and thereby the quarrel between us and the West would be renewed and then we would once again be exposed and easily attacked.

With this in mind they spread rumours that in fact Israel does not intend to withdraw but is seeking ways of dragging the matter on for a few more months. It appears that this propaganda put doubts in the hearts of the West European and British Commonwealth delegations.

I requested the Government not to react publicly to Lodge's words before I had an opportunity of clarifying the matter with Dulles.

CLARIFICATION WITH DULLES.

The Government dealt with the situation created by the Dulles' announcement. It decided to deal the Dayan-Burns meeting, and to send me instructions for a talk with Dulles.

According to these instructions (of 2.3.) I had to explain to him that the changes which Lodge inserted confused the Government and people of Israel and that the Government was about to meet tomorrow in order to fix a stand in relation to the withdrawal.

I was requested to demand:

a. A clear announcement that Egypt would not return to Gaza.

b. Recognition of our right of self-defence both in relation to the Straits and in relation to Gaza, as promised.

c. The undertaking that we will not be subject to pressure to implement the measures which the Sec.Gen. had suggested in his report of 24.1. as there was a danger that the Sec.Gen. will make the non-return of Egypt to Gaza conditional upon the deploying of a UN force on our side.

I had to demand that these points and particularly the first two and that all the details of the US agreement be included in a document, in a letter to the P.M., in a memorandum

or an agreement signed by both sides.

In an addendum it was stated that if we do not find response on the part of the Secretary, perhaps it may be worthwhile hinting to him, or to someone in the State Department, that if the matter explodes we will have no alternative but to reveal hhat there was deceit in connection with the announcement.

On Saturday afternoon, Shiloach and I spoke to Dulles and his advisors ~~at his home~~.

I analysed Lodge's speech and pointed out the diversions from what was agreed upon. A discussion began as to whether Lodge's words were as dangerous as I described. In relation to the right of protection of shipping, Dulles said that when the US GOvernment had decided ~~xxx~~ "to take note" of our announcement she had thereby embraced all sections of the Foreign Minister's speech. In relation to our section on defence by force of our ships, he requested me to inform the P.M. officially that the US Government recognises the formulation in the Foreign Minister's speech, which she in effect helped to draft. Nevertheless he is prepared to exchange documents or letters with the Government of Israel on the matter in diplomatic channels.

Dulles suggested that I ~~would~~ present a letter which would express our text of the Foreign Minister's speech and the US Government would answer accordingly, but, in the meantime, I could inform the P.M. that they have definitely recognised that they did confirm this text and they hold to their official recognition of it.

As to Gaza, the matter of the right of self-defence is less explicit. According to the armistice agreemment, Egypt has a certain right in Gaza, but ~~she has~~ no right to ~~shoot~~ fire at Israel ships in the Bay. Therefore, the Foreign Minister spoke in her speech about Gaza in more qualified terms "an action

to safeguard the rights of Israel" - and he, Dulles, does not wish to interpret this expression which was drawn from Pinay's suggestion any further.

In relation to the other problems which I had mentioned, Dulles claimed that he saw no contradiction between the words of the Foreign Minister and those of Lodge except in a number of non-vital matters which Lodge had inserted because of the special sensitivities at the UN. He cannot write Lodge's speech anew, but he is prepared, taking into account my urging, to think of some form of expressing with greater force the US identification with the assumptions and hopes that the Foreign Minister had expressed and the US's preparedness to act in order to enforce them. After he left the room with his advisors for a consultation of twenty minutes, Dulles suggested that Eisenhower write a letter to the P.M. and publish it that night. In the letter, the President will say that the assumptions and hopes that the Foreign Minister and others (the implication according to Dulles is France and other States), expressed are reasonable and the President promises that the US will act in order to realise them.

We started to discuss the text of the letter and I achieved a number of improvements in the draft. That night, Eisenhower's letter to the P.M. was sent and was due to be published that night, saying: (see following page)

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This formulation was the last and the best that it was possible to achieve. During the discussion, Dulles phoned the White House twice, and whilst speaking in our presence, stressed that one must assist the P.M., who was taking a difficult decision and it is right that the President should stand by

Prime Minister:

I am indeed deeply gratified at the decision of your Government to withdraw promptly and fully behind the Armistice lines as set out by your Foreign Minister in her address of yesterday to the General Assembly. I venture to express the hope that the carrying out of these withdrawals will go forward with the utmost speed.

I know that this decision was not an easy one. I believe, however, that Israel will have no cause to regret having thus conformed to the strong sentiment of the world community as expressed in the various United Nations Resolutions relating to withdrawal.

It has always been the view of this Government that after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil, and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore. Already the United Nations General Assembly has adopted Resolutions which presage such a better future. Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your Foreign Minister and others. I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, will seek that such hopes prove not to be vain.

I am, my dear Mr. Prime Minister.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

his undertaking and prove that Israel's decision ~~is~~ was being rewarded.

During the course of the talk, Dulles and his advisors confirmed:

1. That in relation to them from the moment that we withdraw from Sharem el Sheikh and Gaza and the UN ~~army~~ force replaces our army, we have the right of passage in the Canal and the Bay and this matter is not dependent upon Hammerskjold's other arrangements.

2. The US policy is freedom of passage in the Straits and an international regime in Gaza without Egypt. Egypt has a legal right but she must waive its implementation. The US received weighty promises in this matter and therefore he considered that the broadening of the quotation from the Sec.Gen.'s report does not affect it.

3. He said that if we compare Pinay's original version with what the US told us verbally and announced through Lodge, we ~~will~~ would be convinced that we ~~have~~ had no reason to be disappointed. After the efforts of this week, the US's ~~xxxxxxxx~~ is worthy of some faith on the part of Israel.

Finally, Dulles stated in the name of the President, that it is most important and vital that the Burns-Dayan meeting takes place ~~and that~~ with a serious and practical discussion ~~takes place~~ on the timetable of the withdrawal. It is important that Dayan should say that he ~~is~~ was acting in accordance with the Foreign Minister's announcement in the Assembly and that he should ~~xxxxx~~ ensure that the Burns Report is positive. On this assumption the US will mobilise many speakers in our interests on Monday and will attempt to terminate the Assembly immediately. He hinted that ~~his~~ the ~~festive~~ formal and public undertaking of Eisenhower ~~w~~is based upon this assumption.

Shiloach contacted ~~Beadle~~ Bedell Smith to express fear about Lodge's words. ~~Beadle~~ Bedell Smith telephoned Eisenhower and asked whether those things that he had conveyed in the President's name to the P.M. ~~are~~ were still operative. An hour and a half later he replied that he ~~sees~~ saw himself authorised to inform us in the President's name that no last minute change had taken place in the US policy, the President and the US Government ~~have~~ had undertaken a moral obligation which they intend to fulfil completely. If we withdraw from Gaza and the Straits and troubles occur, the US ~~will~~ would stand by us faithfully. He had no reason to change his last letter to the P.M.

The Foreign Minister's announcement in the Assembly on March 1 and Lodge's reply were received by the Press with satisfaction and a feeling of relief. Israel won ~~a wave of~~ much appreciation and praise. Dulles also received compliments. At the same time the Press added that henceforth the responsibility ~~will~~ would rest upon the US and the UN and that one must demand of Egypt, even with pressure, a more positive approach, an abandonment of belligerence, etc., that would facilitate progress towards peace.

Our disappointment at Lodge's speech and the crisis ~~that was revealed~~ in its wake between us and the US, did not find particular expression in the Press, because the crisis only lasted for two days and particularly at the weekend when the Press is half paralysed, and especially because the Press did not know of the episode of secret negotiations which preceded the announcement and did not exactly grasp what we were angry about. When it transpired that we had decided to delay the implementation of our undertaking to retire, by postponing the Dayan-Burns meeting, the joy became surprise and anger. Particularly as in the meantime Eisenhower's letter of 2.3. was published

and received by the public as a very weighty promise.

The news that the P.M. had encountered the opposition of the members of the Coalition was not accepted as justification for delaying the withdrawal. The Press maintained that the P.M. definitely had the power, having unified and led his people, to overcome this opposition.

THE FRENCH CLARIFY AND CONFIRM WHAT WAS AGREED UPON.

Friends who had earlier been pleased at the agreement between us and the US were very much afraid in view of the crisis and made great efforts in both directions - upon us and the US, so that the cause of the crisis could be removed. Alphand contacted me and told me that Pinay, who had phoned him from Canada, had asked to convey in his name and in Mollet's name, that with all the difficulties involved they very much recommend that we do not create a new crisis because of Lodge's speech, although France was not urging us and the decision must lie in our hands. They considered that it must be possible to receive from the State Department a clarification that would satisfy us. When I read Alphand the President's letter he was surprised and said that they, the French, did not believe that it was possible to obtain such an announcement especially on the President's responsibility.

Subsequently we were given the copy of a despatch that Pinay sent to Dulles from Ottawa on 3.3., whose object was to clarify the stand agreed between them and confirm that France

stood by this saying: (See page 245a *)

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The following day, on 4.3., Pinay sent a letter to the P.M. through the French Embassy in Israel (we received a copy from the French Embassy in Washington) to confirm the French stand and to show how France had faced the US with her obligation to honour what was agreed. Pinay wrote: (See p. 245a **)

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Alphand again urged that a meeting between Dayan and Burns take place immediately so as to ~~exxx~~ create the impression that there is no crisis and that we are acting on the assumption that everything agreed between us ~~and known~~ France and the US stands.

Information from Israel ~~proved~~ confirmed the disappointment and bitterness, felt, especially because of the fear that the achievements in relation to the security of the Northern Negev settlements would be lost when we left Gaza.

EXCHANGES WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER THE EISENHOWER LETTER

I attributed importance to Eisenhower's letter. In my opinion Eisenhower's identifying himself with the assumptions in the Foreign Minster's speech was important and of great value - more so in fact than if these words ~~would have~~ had appeared in Lodge's speech. The President's words included ~~the~~ a serious undertaking, not only to us but - and this is what gives it such an obligatory nature - in the eyes of the American people and the world. The personal word and honour of the President, were ~~given~~ committed as guarantees for the fulfilment of a promise.

I cabled to the P.M. adding the special importance of Eisenhower's words in relation to the future. It was obvious that the problem of Gaza could not be solved without international aid, and there is no more effective political investment in the world than the undertaking of the President of the USA who announces

* As France has already indicated on March 1, France understands that the situation resulting from the preceding deliberations of the United Nations is as follows:

The United Nations assumes the exclusive responsibility of the civil and military administration of the Gaza Strip until the conclusion of a peace treaty or of a definitive settlement concerning that area. In the event that that responsibility should be abandoned, in whole or in part by the United Nations to Egypt, Israel would then have the right to apply the safeguard clause under paragraph 1 (c) of the Israel declaration.

(translated from the French)

** I have the honor to confirm that the statement made Friday March the 1st by M. Georges-Picot from the rostrum of the United Nations expresses a certain number of ideas which I suggested in the course of my conversation with Mr. Foster Dulles with a view to solving the problems relating to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip.

However, with a view to making the position of France perfectly clear I transmitted yesterday to Mr. Dulles a message, the text of which I am communicating to you under separate cover, which indicated the exact interpretation which we give to Paragraph 10 of Mme. Meir's statement before the United Nations.

Under the circumstances I place my confidence in your wisdom to find the solution conforming with the interests of peace and the people of Israel.

that following upon the withdrawal a special effort must be made by all states to bring about quieter and more stable conditions in the area, better conditions that existed until now, in order to bring benefit to the whole region.

I suggested that Eisenhower's words be weighed not only in relation to practical security considerations in one or another area of the State, but also in relation to the State as a whole, whose security and fate are so tied up with our relationships with the US.

It was also clear that our relationships with France were in the balance. France, which honestly was interested in bolstering our resistence, security, and ability to develop, did not see herself able alone to give us all the international support which we required. The effort which she made to get the US to shouldered the maximum part of the undertaking in relation to us appeared to be possible to be attained /even though not perfect, and she was very much afraid that it would be lost without a possibility of regaining it.

I therefore urged the P.M. to announce the implementation of the Foreign Minister's announcement, and that he place the responsibility for what would transpire on Eisenhower, in the spirit and style of his letter.

The Government dealt with this development in the light of my talk with Dulles, and Eisenhower's letter, and the P.M. subsequently cabled (on 3/3), saying that the Government tends to accept the situation, and will meet again on the morrow in order to finalise the discussion before the Knesset session. The P.M. asked that, in order to make it easier for the Government, that I make one last effort that night to receive from the Secretary, a written explanation in relation to our right of self-defence if the Egyptians try to return to Gaza. On the basis of his announcement that he would be prepared to exchange letters on the Straits, I would have to send him a letter from us on our right to self-defence, both in the Straits and in Gaza and to ask for his

written confirmation on the spot. I was to explain that the Government was about to meet the following morning, in order to fix its position finally, before delivering the announcement in the Knesset in the afternoon and before the Assembly meeting. On the morrow the Burns-Dayan meeting would be decided upon, and if the decision were positive, the meeting would be fixed for the same day. I was asked to describe for Dulles the storm that had raged in Isreal as a result of the decision to withdraw from Gaza, and to explain that we required from the US the recognition, even be it secret, of our right to self-defence in relation to Gaza, because on the basis of such recognition, the P.M. could recomend to the Government the implementation of the withdrawal.

The P.M. also stressed that with all due respect to the Secretary's words on Egypt's promise not to return, in the final analysis, the Sec Gen could assume on the basis of the armistice agreement, and certain things that Lodge had said, that he was able to circumvent the corrected US stand; because even the President's words - in his letter on the need to continue with the efforts, after the withdrawal - could be interpreted as support for the Sec Gen's proposals of January 24, on the basis of UN decisions.

The only way to prevent this inclination on the part of Hammerskjold is by a specific expression, albeit limited, provided that it is not connected with the armistice agreement, on the part of the US in relation to Gaza.

A TALK WITH DULLES - A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION IN WRITING

I consulted the Foreign Minister and then returned with Shiloach to Washington for the meeting with Dulles. I explained our desire to obtain confirmation in writing, not only for our announcement on the right of self-defence in the Straits, but also in Gaza, in the event that the UN abandons its responsibility, and a danger becomes apparent that Egypt is returning. I described the storm

in Israel and the need to calm public opinion. I showed him the text of the announcement that the French were prepared to give us. When I spoke about the doubts of certain parties in Israel, I said that the background to their concern is the responsibility for the security for kibbutzim and settlements in the south and the northern Negev. The Government must calm these fears by proving that the security of these settlements rests not only upon our strength, but also upon the recognition in advance on the part of the US, of our right to take steps to defend ourselves. Such recognition would also influence Hammerskjold to take care not to revert to a situation whose meaning was the danger of war.

Dulles answered that it was very difficult for him to commit himself in writing to anything that he would not like to see published. On the other hand it was impossible to publish anything over and above the President's letter and Lodge's speech. The US had fulfilled what she had promised to do in the Assembly, and to the extent that we found things unclear in Lodge's words this was corrected by the President's letter. He, Dulles, knows what a responsibility the US took upon herself when she invited Israel to say that under certain circumstances "she would act to safeguard her rights", and by confirming these serious words; but an announcement in advance saying under what circumstances the US would support the use of force, would contradict the whole of her political and legal tradition. For in relation to the use of force, the US judges each case on its merits. The problem is that what the US is aiming to achieve in Gaza, i.e. an international and not an Egyptian regime, does not conform with the legal position. According to the law it is not easy to negate Egypt's right in Gaza. The US policy is to ensure continuity of the international regime, and to limit Egypt's right to merely formal spheres, can therefore only be realised de facto. He considers that the US has sufficient influence to realise this, but because of the contradiction between the political desire and the

legal fact, there is some difficulty in placing it in writing. The President himself identified himself with the Foreign Minister's words in her speech and undertook to ensure that her words are realised.

This applied to everything stated in the Foreign Minister's speech. He is prepared to sit with us and to watch every development of the situation in Gaza, in order to ensure that our fears are not verified. The US stands for the continuation of the UN's responsibility in Gaza, not only because of the security consideration, but because she would like to solve the refugee problem, the main burden of which falls upon her; this is not possible if Egyptian rule replaces that of the UN.

In the light of my urgings he promised to consult his advisors and to see whether there was still no solution. Later he phoned and said that he regrets that he cannot at the present, and especially in haste, formulate anything more on the US policy in Gaza. The US maintains that the UN should enter and take over the administration, and that this should not be changed at all until a final settlement is reached in general or an arrangement is made specifically for Gaza. This stand was expressed both in Lodge's speech and by implication by the US's confirmation of the Foreign Minister's speech. Dulles summarised by saying:

a) The undertaking to exchange letters on the Straits of Tiran stands. There is no contradiction between the political desire of the US and the legal position. If the Israel announcement will be couched in concise legal language, a positive reply will be sent by the US. In the meantime I could inform my government that such an exchange of letters was acceptable.

b) In relation to Gaza he regrets that he has to refuse a separate letter, for the reasons given above, which are mainly legal. On the other hand, the US undertakes to devote her fullest influence to the realisation of the Pinay plan.

c) H e stated that he very much would like to help us, as was proved by his concern with this problem ~~from~~ since February 11. He proposes that we draw up a balance sheet and it will be apparent that the balance is neither negative nor inconsiderable.

1) In the memorandum of February 11 our basic justice in relation to both problems is recognised.

2) In the Assembly the US announced that ~~she~~ it willingly notes the Foreign Minister's words and sees them as acceptable.

3) When it transpired that Lodge's speech disappointed because of the weakness of his identification with the concerns and assumptions of Israel, the President identified himself with the assumptions and hopes of Israel in the clearest ~~from~~ form that the US is capable of doing.

Dulles asked himself if we properly appreciated the political significance of the President's.letter.

Dulles ~~again~~ added that we ~~shall~~ should not have any reason to regret the implementation of the plan. He ~~is~~ was very concerned about the situation that ~~will~~ would be created in the Assembly and advised us immediately to take steps ~~which will~~ to prove our readiness to honour the Foreign Minister's undertaking before the world. It is most vital that a practical discussion takes place between Burns and Dayan before the Assembly convened on 4.3., otherwise the Assembly ~~will~~ would become a negative forum instead of being an impressive demonstration of support for the policies agreed upon by the US, Israel and France. Otherwise all the work done by the three Governments during this week would be in vain.

After this discussion the French Ambassador Alphand phoned and told me that Dulles had spoken to him on the above lines. He too considers that from the legal American point of view it is impossible to expect what I requested. Eisenhower's letter and Dulles' ~~verbal~~ oral explanations, in addition to the Foreign Minister's speech having been confirmed at the beginning of Lodge's speech, constitute in his

opinion the maximum that one can achieve. Mollet and Pinay who are in Canada and who are maintaining an hour-to-hour contact with him, await with bated breath our decision and pray that it be positive. Pinay again urges that a "good meeting" take place between Dayan and Burns before the Assembly convenes ~~in order~~ so that the Foreign Minister ~~will be able to~~ can convey something about it when the meeting opens. The White House explained to France that in the President's letter the words "and others" are intended to express, inter alia, the US's agreement to the words of the French representative in the Assembly.

On Monday 4.3. in the morning the meeting of the Government took place and that evening at Lod a meeting took place between Burns and Dayan.

THE ASSEMBLY SESSION OF MARCH 4.

The Assembly session that was originally convened for 4.3. in the morning was postponed till the afternoon in anticipation of ~~khm~~ information on the Dayan-Burns meeting.

In opening the Foreign Minister announced: (See Assembly Minutes).

When on March 4, we confirmed that our undertaking was being implemented, and especially after information was received from Israel on the internal problems that the matter caused the Government, the Press came out with warm appreciation to Israel in general and the Foreign Minister in particular. The "New York Times" of 5.3., for example, carried a leading article "Israel keeps a promise".

The Assembly returned to the matter only on March 8 in order to hear a report by the Sec.Gen. on the implementation of the withdrawal.

On the evening of March 6-7.3. all the military forces were

withdrawn including Israel administrative personnel in Gaza except for the Rafiach Camp that was evacuated on 7.3. in the afternoon.

On March 8 units of the UN ~~army~~ force entered Sharem el Sheikh and the evacuation of the Israel unit ended on the 12th.

DULLES AND EISENHOWER ON FREEDOM OF PASSAGE.

On 5.3., Dulles had a press conference: (attached)

Two days later, Eisenhower spoke at a press conference. In reply to questions he again confirmed that as long as an international court does not rule otherwise, the US will regard the Bay and the Straits as an international waterway.

In reply to another question, he vigorously defended the recognition that the US must support the UN in everything possible and not ~~to~~ act over its head. On a question in relation to his talks with King Saud, he answered that he had always maintained and stressed that Israel is an historic reality, one has to treat ~~her~~ it as every State and ~~her~~ its problems ~~are~~ like those of any other State.

HAMMERSKJOLD'S TREATMENT IN GAZA AROUSES CONCERN.

On 7,3. secret information reached us to the effect that Hammerskjold intended to retain the UN ~~army~~ force in Gaza only for two weeks and thereafter to evacuate it in favour of Egyptian forces.

We went into the question with Hammerskjold and the representatives of Norway, Canada, and others, and they denied the existence of any such plan.

At the same time, it transpired that in the UN Secretariat there were dangerous tendencies in relation to the nature and length of the transition period in Gaza.

It was agreed and accepted that the UN force enters Gaza and receives all military and civilian jurisdiction for the interim period, etc.

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HAMMERSKJOLD'S TREATMENT IN CAIRO DURING CONCERN.

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At the same time, it transpired that in the UN secretariat there were dangerous tendencies in relation to the nature and length of the transition period in Gaza.

It was agreed and accepted that the UN enters Gaza and receives all military and civilian jurisdiction for the interim period, etc.

Dulles Press conference 5.3.57.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some question there about what commitments, if any, that the United States has given Israel previous to this withdrawal. Could you expand on that for us, please?

A. Yes. The position of the United States with reference to these matters has been fully and totally set forth in the public documents in the case. Those are primarily the Aide Memoire of February 11, the President's speech of February 20, the statement of Ambassador Lodge on March 1, and the letter of the President to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, that I referred to, of March 2. There are no private assurances to anyone which go beyond or which are different from what is set forth in those public documents.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the President's letter to Ben Gurion the President says he hopes that the expectations raised by the Israeli Prime Minister will not be proven in vain-more or less like that. Would you say that this includes that part of Mr. Meir's speech where she expressed the hope that the Egyptian troops would not return to Gaza?

A. I do not think that the President's letter should be read as endorsing every detail of everything that was said. The President's letter referred to the fact that statements were made by the Foreign Minister of Israel and by others with relation to their hopes and expectations. The others included, of course, the statement made by Ambassador Lodge as well as the statement by Mrs. Meir, and there were other statements made there. The President's letter I think referred generally to the hopes and expectations for a better future for the area, and should not be interpreted as necessarily an endorsement of every detail of everything that everybody said, because, indeed, some of those statements were in conflict with each other.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on Friday, India said in the United Nations that it would have to disassociate itself from the idea that UNEF could go into Gaza and take over the civil administration and both the Yugoslavs and the Indians have indicated that if Egypt objected they would withdraw from the force. How long do you think that they can keep the United Nations force in Gaza without another United Nations resolution?

A. Well, I believe the matter is adequately covered by the second resolution of the 2nd of February. I don't think another resolution is required. Of course, the United Nations cannot require countries to keep their elements in the UNEF. And I suppose to some extent UNEF could be disrupted by withdrawals. But I do not anticipate that will take place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said a few minutes ago that we assumed that British and French shipping will go through the Canal without discrimination. Do we have any similar assumptions connected with Israeli ships!

A. I think it was indicated in one of the statements I referred to, I think it was the President's speech of February 20, that we should not assume that there will be a discrimination against Israeli ships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after the last Israeli soldier leaves Egypt, will we recognize Egypt's right to reassert the state of belligerency on which she has blocked Israel or will we consider her then in violation of the Treaty of 1888 and the Security Council and act accordingly?

A. Well, we are not indulging in any assumptions or speculations that there will be a violation of the 1888 Treaty if that is what your question assumed.

Q. No, my question assumes that Egypt has insisted on a state of belligerency between itself and the State of Israel. Well, if this insistence continues, how will we regard that?

A. I prefer not to answer that question.

The administration during this period would be entirely military. There was division of opinion in relation to what followed. Hammerskjold maintained that he must prepare an international civilian administration that would replace the military administration and for this purpose he must conduct negotiations with Egypt too. If they agree, all the better, if not, he will appeal to the Assembly. Others to whom we spoke tended to extend, as far as possible, the first stage during which the exclusive rule of UN should apply. This was the stand of Canada, Norway and the US.

Hammerskjold's stand did not surprise us as we knew that he propounds the return of the Egyptians but we assumed that the friendly powers combined with a severe warning on our part would restrain him.

We ~~demanded~~ asked that the Americans exercise all their pressure on Hammerskjold in order that neither he nor Burns do anything apart from deploying the UN forces and establishing a UN administration. That is, that he should not force the issue at the initial stage and should not go into discussions with the Egyptians concerning any step which is likely to bring about their return. They promised to do so. Our concern about Hammerskjold's approach increased in the light of the information on his intention to travel to Egypt for talks ~~xxxxx~~ with Nasser. The official reason for his journey was supposed to have been a discussion on Suez but it was clear that he was also likely to speak about the permanent arrangements in relation to Gaza.

In order to receive permission for this mission, Hammerskjold invited the Norwegian representative in the Advisory Committee to join him, hoping thereby to ~~spread~~ divide the responsibility with the Advisory Committee and ~~to xxxx~~ dispel ~~the~~ Western ~~opinion~~ fears, as he would be accompanied by a person in authority who could ~~follow the conduct of matters~~ safeguard their interests. affairs.

The Norwegian delegate had a talk with Raphael and me before his journey. We warned him ~~of~~ against any discussion with Nasser on Gaza. We maintained that any talk about Gaza would bring about a confusion of the issue with Suez and ~~will~~ enable Nasser to adopt an attitude of extortion both in relation to Suez and ~~to~~ Gaza. He agreed ~~to~~ with our opinion that there was no reason for the Sec.Gen. to initiate a discussion on Gaza. He too defended himself with the argument that the policy of his Government was to oppose the return of Egypt but there is a legal problem which forces them to allow Egypt a symbolic representation in Gaza.

To our question as to what the Sec.Gen.'s stand would be if Nasser ~~would~~ demand the return of Egypt or ~~their~~ its participation in the UN administration, the Norwegian answered that the Sec.Gen. would reply in the negative and, if Nasser insists, the Sec.Gen. would apply to the Assembly before agreeing to any change. He agreed with our opinion that one must not limit the initial stage, ~~and thereby~~ not limiting it would prevent the question of Egypt's return from arising.

Later we heard that during those very days the US and Hammerskjold contacted General Clay and requested him to draft a plan for an international administration in Gaza, in accordance with the framework of the military regimes of the ~~occupying~~ occupation forces in Germany

AN ACTION TO HOLD THE US TO ~~HER~~ ITS UNDERTAKINGS.

On March 5 in the evening, the P.M. appeared in the Knesset. He reported on the Government decision concerning the withdrawal, explained it and evaluated the achievement in the campaign ~~on Sinai~~ Sinai.

In summarising the debate the next day, the P.M. added that Israel does not recognise Egypt's right, as it were, to Gaza, according to the Armistice Agreement. If Egypt will act in relation to Gaza on the basis of this agreement, Israel will regard ~~herself~~ itself

free to take action including the use of force.

The Foreign Minister also insisted on this point at her meeting that day in New York with the UN Press Corps. She stated that whoever wants peace in the Middle East must ensure that the Egyptians do not return to Gaza in any form whatsoever.

We stressed this matter in order to restrain any intention to become reconciled to the return of Egypt to Gaza in any form. We saw the need to hold Eisenhower and his Administration to their undertakings to us and especially against the return of Egypt to Gaza.

Before the Foreign Minister's return to Israel, she sent a farewell letter to Dulles (on 6.3.) saying, inter alia: (See page 255a)

The letter ends by expressing the hope that it will be possible again to deal with constructive objectives, i.e. to renew the economic cooperation.

On March 8, the P.M. received Lawson and gave him his reply to Eisenhower's letter of 2.3. The letter is intended to hold Eisenhower to his undertakings; it deals with the political and moral responsibility and the decision that the Israel Government had taken because of the faith in this, and stresses his responsibility for the future. The letter says: (See page 255b)

On 7.3., Congress confirmed the amended Eisenhower Doctrine. From the point of view of the Administration, this was one of the fruits of having resolved the crisis with us; as long as the crisis existed, Congress' confirmation was doubtful. The Administration was not capable of passing the Doctrine as long as it was at loggerheads with the heads of the Senate of both parties in the discussion on sanctions against Israel.

THE ASSEMBLY SESSION ON 8.3.

This wasthe last session before the adjournment of the Aseembly. The agenda consisted of the Sec. Gen.'s report.

"I think that we were in agreement that decisive weight and importance is to be attached to President Eisenhower's letter to the Prime Minister of March 2 and to his assurance that he will seek that the expectations and hopes which I expressed on March 1 shall not be in vain. This assurance has been a decisive element in my Government's action.

"Ambassador Eban will work closely with the Department of State to maintain cooperation on the objectives set ou in President Eisenhower's letter of March 2, your Memorandum of February 11, and in my address of March 1, which was so fully and carefully considered with you.

"We venture to hope that there will be speedy action to give effect to the readiness of the United States to exercise free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba.

"On the question of Gaza, I urge the most serious consideration of the point which Ambassador Eban explained to you last Thursday night. If the United Nations does not maintain fully military and administrative control, the situation could speedily get out of hand.

"It is a compelling element of my Government's ploicy to ensure that Gaza, for the transitory period described in my statement, continue under the exclusive control of the United Nations.

"The abandonment to Egypt by the United Nations of any part of its responsibility for the civil and military administration of the Gaza area would create, in the view of my Government, a situation which would compel it to defend its rights as envisaged in my statement at the General Assembly on March 1, 1957. This is a situation which I fervently hope will not arise ... Irrespective of any views on the legal position, we agreed that an arrangement for a "de facto exclusion of Egypt" would meet the very vital security problems of the area, and it was this that my Government had in mind when it took its decision."

"Now that we have evacuated the whole Sinai Desert, as promised in my letter to you of November 8, and in addition also the Gaza Strip, which in my profound conviction, both for political and security reasons, we ought not to have had to vacate, permit me to say to you that we have done so largely on the strength of your letter to me of March 2, in which you expressed your belief that "Israel will have no cause to regret" her action, and that "hopes and expectations" voiced by your Foreign Minister will "prove not to be in vain".

"I need not say how much we have the continuance and deepending of friendship between the United States and Israel at hearts and how great is the esteem in which all of us, and I myself in particular, hold you as a noble and moral personality.

And I should like to tell you why we found it so difficult, as you indicated in your letter, to evacuate the Gaza Strip:

During the past four months, for the first time in eight years, the settlers in our villages in the South and in the Negev have been able to live in peace.....

You will understand why, since yesterday, (evacuation of Gaza) our hearts are heavy and the peace of mind of our settlers is shaken. Our anxiety is greater lest the Secretary General of the United Nations, out of merely formalistic interpretations of his own, may seek to bring the Egyptians back to Gaza, which had never belonged to them. We have, however, relied on your attitude as expressed in your letter and on your beliefs that hopes and expectations expressed by our Foreign Minister will not be in vain.

I am confident that we shall, in your own words, have no cause for regret, I also believe that the statements made by yourself and by your Secreatry of State Dulles on Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran will, in the very near future, become a lasting reality."

MEETING WITH HERTER - MARCH 9.

I asked for a meeting with Dulles in order to convey to him the letter from the Foreign Minister of March 6. As Dulles was about to leave for a meeting of SEATO in Canberra, Australia, the meeting took place with Herter. I summarised the distance that we had covered and stressed that we wished to maintain close contact in the future too, as the Secretary had stated, in order to ensure the attainment of the aims for which we had striven during the past weeks. Herter confirmed that this was the desire of the US Government.

I asked whether and how the US Government intended to apply the right of passage in the Bay and the Straits soon. I expressed the assumption that my Government would consider the beginning of this process an encouraging sign of the effectiveness of the agreement created between us on this matter. Herter and Pelgar answered that the procedure should be:

a. Loading a vessel bearing the American flag and inviting it to sail for Eilat.

b. The moment we decided on the ship and the cargo the State Department would exert its full influence to encourage it to sail and assure the owners of its support.

c. It was clear that they were prepared to act immediately if we were interested in this.

Herter asked that in relation to the naval force in the Bay one should safeguard the status quo and one must not remove the naval vessels because their passage in the Straits is bound up with approaching the Egyptian coast and, according to the Armistice Agreement, we agreed not to do this. Until a solution was found for this legal problem, it was best therefore to keep the ships of our fleet in the Bay without sending them southwards and one must concentrate at this time on the creation of the custom of civilian passage in cargo boats through the Bay. I promised to

convey his recommendation that we do not remove our fleet from the Bay.

On the matter of Gaza he said that American influence was directed at crystallising the control of the UN ~~army~~ force and post-poning any discussion or additional examination. The general aim of the US Government is near to that which we expressed to Lodge and ~~o~~hers, i.e., a period of quiet for the implementation of the achievements and arrangements which we had attained. He expressed the hope that the stand of all sides ~~xxxxx~~ should be moderate.

~~In reply,~~ I said that the Egyptian announcement on the renewal of discrimination against Israel in the Suez Canal concerned us greatly. Here the UN and the US had acted in order to remove British, French and Israel forces from Egyptian soil and had undertaken the responsibility for clearing the Canal. On the eve of receiving the Canal from the US, the Egyptian Government had announced its intention to renew the illegal discriminatory policy. This is effrontery of the first order. Here I quoted the words of the President and Lodge, who claimed that, on the day of the completion of the withdrawal, Egypt will have no right to prevent free passage to Israel. I added that, ~~if xx~~ while in general we could well understand ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the idea of a period of quiet, ~~was very clear to us, I do not propose this version in the matter under discussion.~~ I did not believe that this was true in this case, For if the custom of a Canal open to all and closed to us becomes crystallised, it would be very difficult to overcome it and therefore the US had a moral obligation to say what it had to say immediately and the sooner the better.

Herter, Pelgar and Rowntree confirmed that the US policy was expressed in the speeches of the President and Lodge, i.e: with the completion of the withdrawal Egypt's right to interfere with Israel shipping is cancelled and the US will act in accordance with this line. It is still not clear whether ~~an official and obligatory~~ Egypt's announcement was official and obligatory

but they would examine it and the US would remain faithful to its her word. They asked whether it was correct that we were on the eve of a test voyage. We have the right to this but they wished to propose carefulness in the timetable. The US and her its allies were trying to achieve an interim arrangement for the running of the Canal. This arrangement would be based from the legal aspect on the 1888 Treaty and the Six Principles, i.e. on two bases which were convenient from Israel's point of view. If they attained this agreement they would speak to us about including Israel passage therein. If they do not attain this then the whole situation will be serious and complicated and a crisis will be created. Their proposal is that we allow them an opportunity for clarifying the chances of an interim arrangement because this is vital to Europe and is likely to be vital to Israel too.

I stated that I did not know anything concerning the idea of a test voyage in the near future but we take as the starting point Eisenhower's announcement: One does not assume that our shipping will be disturbed after the evacuation. I expressed the assumption that in any such matter we would be in continual touch with our friends. In general, we propose the custom of consultation on common aims with those interested in helping us.

In relation to the last paragraphs in the Foreign Minister's letter, I pointed out that since October we had continuously been dealing with political matters and we had neglected a number of aspects of direct cooperation between our two Governments. I pointed out that the prohibition on the visit of tourists to Israel still stands and that one must implement the grant, which must be put into effect by the end of April, the budgeting of agricultural surpluses, the return of technical assistance

personnel and the negotiations with the Import-Export Bank as well as other programmes that we would like to discuss.

Herter stated that they would immediately examine these matters and decide. It was most important that the present quiet should not be disturbed. (When we left, Burgoss said that the first subject for decision in the coming days would be the lift of the ban on travel.)

THE MATTER OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

Herter stated that the President had received the P.M.'s letter through Lawson. Here Herter and Pelgar began a serious discussion on our repeated announcement that the Armistice Agreement is null and void. They urgently recommended that we consider the value of these announcements. In effect, Israel is maintaining the main points of the Armistice Agreement and therefore she is entitled to enjoy such rights as freedom of passage and immunity from belligerent acts. They agreed with my opinion that Egypt accepts the agreement but does not implement it. Pelgar said, with some feeling, that as a friend and as an expert on law he must advise Israel that she should not lose the advantages of this situation. It is one thing to say that Egypt negates the Agreement in effect by continuously undertaking belligerent activities and as long as she breaks the agreement she does not deserve her full rights according to it. It is another thing - and more dangerous - if we proclaim its repudiation at our initiative and desire. We have the right to do so but it is not wise. We are on the eve of important developments on the matter of the Straits and the Canal and those who would like to support us with all their hearts are propounding a legal theory based upon the 1949 Agreement and the decision of the Security Council in 1951. Why should we negate from the US her desire to identify herself with us in these matters? As a jurist, he has

examined and thought about the matter and he does not understand what Israel will gain, especially after the withdrawal, from ~~x~~ abandoning her most basic rights such as: integrity of borders, prevention of belligerence and the obligation of a transit to final peace. I stated that I do not accept the assumption that Israel has cancelled the agreement. Our version is that Egypt maintained a position of belligerence and therefore negated the agreement. Herter, Pelgar and Rowntree stressed that were we to be satisfied with a version condemning the ~~breaking~~ violating of the agreement by Egypt they would not question it, but if we go to the extreme and announce its nullification as a considered legal act, we will simply destroy the basis on which the US would like to assure our rights. Israel does not derive any gain for any of her interests as long as she maintains this negative, legal stand. They stressed that the appeal to us in this matter is based upon a desire to assist us in vital matters and not to disturb us. Every state must be careful ~~x~~ in dealing with ~~her~~ its assets in international law. The US is entitled to cancel ~~her~~ its agreement with China and Korea on an armistice which the other side is violating unceasingly, but decided that this is not wise. It is easier to condemn the other side ~~on~~ for ~~xxx~~ the non-fulfillment of its obligations. The fact that Egypt is violating the agreement does not oblige Israel to abandon her rights, which ~~are in existence~~ stand. They suggested that we find a formulation for our political stand which does not imply the negation of our own rights at our initiative. The conclusion hinted at by their proposal was that we should say that Egypt does not maintain the agreement and therefore ~~xxx~~ is not entitled to lean upon it without fulfilling ~~her~~ its obligations, but we should refrain from declarations on the nullification of the agreement and the giving up of our rights.

This argument we heard during the course of a number of weeks.

Americans, Canadians and others repeatedly told us that Egypt is overjoyed everytime we announce the abolition of the Armistice Agreement because she thereby sees a possible solution to the serious crisis in relation to Suez.

EGYPT APPOINTS A GOVERNOR TO GAZA.

On March 11, Egypt announced that her rule in Gaza was being renewed and that she had appointed a military governor who would depart for the area in order to assume the administration into his hands.

Nasser also announced that day that he did not intend to allow Israeli ships to pass through Suez or Akaba and is not certain whether he will respond to the decision of the International Court on this question.

Information was received from Gaza that Egypt was inciting the inhabitants and the refugees against the UN army and encouraging ferment against cooperation with the UN administration and that the urban councils had resigned.

Other information on the same day attributed an announcement to Bunche in Gaza that the UN does not intend to impose an international regime on Gaza "the UN army is in Gaza as in Sinai, with the agreement of the Egyptian Government".

These news items aroused concern in Western capitals. Many interpreted Egypt's initiative as an effort to gain a bargaining position in relation to Suez.

In Washington diplomatic activity took place between the Western representatives and the State Department. Eisenhower called for consultations with Herter and the leaders of Congress. The State Department avoided official reaction, claiming that she did not have complete reports, but could not hide her fears.

We on our part demanded an immediate vigorous reaction that

that would bring Nasser to his senses.

The Foreign Minister invited Lawson and Gilbert to see her and I asked for a meeting with Herter, and Kidron with Hammerskjold.

The Foreign Minister who saw Lawson on 12.3. in the evening expressed severe concern that the ~~black~~ dark prophecies on the return of Egypt to Gaza had been fulfilled with such startling swiftness. Not only did the Egyptians announce the appointment of a governor for Gaza, but the UN staff allowed the entry of his entourage to the Strip. The Foreign Minister warned that we would be forced to put into effect our right of self-defence, stressed that we did not have faith in the Sec.Gen. and ~~that~~ demanded that Dulles explains to him clearly that he ~~must~~ will bear the responsibility if war breaks out. The Foreign Minister asked Lawson to convey these words to Dulles ~~to~~ in Australia and added that the US must act immediately.

During those days, I was on a short leave and the activity at the UN took place without me.

Kidron, Raphael, Najar and other members met on 12.3. with all the members of the Advisory Committee, apart from India and Pakistan, and also with the French, ~~English~~ British and US delegations. Their words were heard with concern. The British advised carefulness. The Americans listened in silence and promised to convey our remarks to the State Department.

That evening a meeting of the Advisory Commitee took place. Thereafter Kidron met Hammerskjold. The Sec.Gen. admitted that the demonstrations in Gaza against the UN ~~army~~ force were not spontaneous but organised, at the same time claiming that he could not determine who was the organiser and that after the demonstrations quiet reigned in the Strip. He stated that the appointment of an Egyptian governor had surprised him and aroused his concern but he still

did not know if the appointment was for propaganda purposes only or whether the Egyptians were really thinking of implementing it.

He said that he had instructed Bunche who originally was only supposed to visit Gaza and the Canal, that he should see Nasser and clarify the situation with him, and that he himself was about to fly to Cairo and deal with the matter.

Under Kidron's pressure to clarify what instructions were sent to Bunche, Hammerskjold maintained that Bunche was acting in the framework of the UN decisions and he, the Sec.Gen., did not have any secret undertakings outside of the Assembly decisions. Subsequently, he added that Bunche's instructions were in conformity with the American position. According to these instructions he had to make it clear to Nasser, in an unequivocal fashion, that the UN had decided to put an end to the incursions beyond the border and that this stand was that the exclusive rule of the UN for a army in the Strip will continue as long as possible.

The appeals of Kidron and of the members of the Advisory Committee and the representatives of France and Britain the following day to clarify with the Sec.Gen. what occurred in the Nasser-Bunche discussion, were answered to the effect that Bunche's report had not yet been received. Instead, his office had stated that five Egyptian civilians would enter Gaza on 14.3. "in order to investigate the situation from the administrative point of view".

APPEALS TO THE US TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF EGYPT TO GAZA.

On 12.3. in the evening, Shiloach saw Herter, Rowntree and Meroz were present.

Shiloach demanded a clear stand by the US in relation to the Sec.Gen. and Egypt. They had demanded that we place our faith in the US and we had responded, but it appeared that those who

demanded this of us ~~are~~ were deluding themselves with valueless promises of Nasser and Hammerskjold.

Herter requested that we do not adopt test cases lest we thereby increase the tension and stressed that his Government is sparing no effort to restrain Egypt and avoid their return to Gaza.

Again, an atmosphere of crisis developed. On 13.3. I returned to Washington from my leave for a meeting with Herter. Shiloach, Murphy, Pelgar and Rowntree participated.

I brought with me a letter frmm the P.M. to Eisenhower. The letter ~~xkakxxx~~ pointed out the matter of the appointment of an Egyptian governor to Gaza, apparently with ~~the~~ agreement on the part of the Sec.Gen., and the renewal of fedayin activity, as well as the announcement of Cairo Radio that the passage of Israel ships in the Straits of Tiran, including American tankers, would not be permitted. And here there was a serious warning: (see p. 265a)

I read the letter and gave it to Herter. I stressed the last paragraph and detailed the matters which we had agreed upon with the US Government and by virtue of which we had agreed to the withdrawal.

a. Exclusive rule of the UN ~~army~~ force in Gaza during the first stage and a UN administration until a settlement.

b. Non~~0~~entry of Egypt "de facto" and abandonment ~~on~~ of its part of the implementation of legal rights.

c. Cessation of hostile acts on land and ~~xxxx~~ sea immediately the withdrawal was complete.

d. The ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ Secretary's words that if Israel withdraws the US and the whole world would owe her a debt of gratitude.

e. The Secretary's promise that in the wake of the withdrawal a new/chapter and brilliant would be opened in US-Israel relations~~hips~~.

"If immediate and effective steps are not taken to ensure, in the words of Secretary Dulles, the "de facto exclusion" of the Egyptians from the Strip, and to halt the regression to the status quo ante of tension, violence and blockade, I fear that the area will once more be cast into the throes of a most grave crisis.

It is my fervent hope that Israel will not have to make use of her right to self-defence as we announced in the General Assembly of the United Nations on March 1 that we might have to do under certain circumstances, and as was noted by the United States and other governments.

Mr. President, I place my reliance on your assurance that we shall have no cause to regret our withdrawal."

f. The promise that the withdrawal would be followed by greater quiet and calm.

As compared to these things, I detailed what had happened in effect:

1. Increased tension in border settlements.

2. Fedayin running amok.

3. Confusion in the Gaza Strip because of Egypt undermining the UN authority.

4. Egypt's threats of the renewal of the ~~blockade~~ blockade and the existence of a state of war.

5. Definite signs that Egypt aspires to control the Canal completely and to ~~"whistle"~~ scoff at the UN and those using the Canal.

In the light of these conditions it was as clear as daylight that when an Egyptian governor came to Gaza his aim would be to organise the Strip for war against Israel. As this was our interpretation of Nasser's aspirations in appointing a governor, our conclusion was self-evident.

Herter answered that the State Department shared all the fears that I had expressed and sees the situation with considerable concern. It is making efforts to ensure that the hopes of the US and Israel will not be confounded. He promised that within a day he would inform us in greater detail on the results of their efforts.

We repeatedly stressed that we ~~are~~ were speaking not only about Gaza in itself but as a manifestation of the extreme anti-Israel and anti-West policy of Nasser.

Contrary to our fears, Herter did not mention either explicitly or implicitly the matter of the deploying of a UN ~~army~~ force on our side.

The following day an announcement was published on the entry of an Egyptian governor with his entourage to Gaza.

Herter asked me through Rowntree to convey to the Government that the US Government was energetically trying to prevent this development and ~~is~~ was still of the opinion that the fate of the assumptions that the Foreign Minister had expressed on March 1, was not sealed and that it ~~is~~ was possible to maintain them, although it had become more difficult than they originally thought. The US ~~is~~ was still aiming at this objective.

That day Herter's reply to the Foreign Minister's letter of March 6 was received.

The main points of the reply were as follows: (see original).

In the evening Herter phoned to announce that he had spoken to the President and that the following day there would be an announcement from the White House on the US intention to renew cooperation with Israel in the economic field and for that purpose the consultations would be renewed on all subjects of common interest. He explained that the only thing to be delayed would be the lifting of the ban on travel - and that because it was decided to wait for the relief of security tension as a result of Gaza.

The French had a bad conscience in relation to us because of the undermining of the Tripartite Agreement.

This was expressed in the form of despatches by Pinay to the P.M. and to Dulles and by continuous contact of Alphand with me and the State Department.

Mollet, on 13.3., sent a letter to Eisenhower to remind him of the agreement and pointed out that there ~~is~~ was a danger that Israel ~~will~~ would be forced again to enter Gaza and thereby the common effort made in Washington would be wasted. Mollet added that he was convinced that the US and France ~~are~~ were acting within the agreed framework.

That day Alphand went to Herter and received a reply to the

letter. He subsequently told me that Herter promised that the US was making an effort to maintain what had been agreed, and was doing so on three levels: by their Ambassador in Cairo, with the Sec.Gen., and with the Advisory Committee.

On 14.3. I talked with the British delegate about the matter. His impression was that the US was making a serious effort. The opinion of the British was that Hammerskjold was acting in the right direction although it was not clear how much energy hex was putting into it. According to him, the West hoped that the Egyptian governor would be satisfied with a visit to Gaza and would return to Cairo to report.

That day I also spoke to the Canadian Ambassador. He also interpreted the Egyptian step as demonstrative and expressed the understanding that the Egyptian governor would not stay long in Gaza but would return to Cairo and would leave all the practical authority in the hands of the UN. He stated that if the Egyptians would cancel the UN administration, this would mean the end of the UN ~~army~~ force as well as a serious ~~harm~~ blow to ~~the~~ US ~~esteem~~ prestige. He told me he had asked the that/~~xhe~~ State Department, on the assumption that the situation in relation to Gaza was likely to worsen, to what extent would the situation have to worsen in order that Israel's right to protect ~~her~~ its rights be recognised. ~~His~~ The people to whom he ~~was~~ talked did not wish to commit themselves, but expressed the assumption that the Government of Israel would only act when it was revealed that the ~~Egyptians~~ Egyptians ~~are~~ were in effect controlling the Gaza Strip.

From the British Embassy, they informed us that Herter had told the Ambassador that Lodge ~~had demanded~~ was instructed to appeal to the Sec.Gen. with the demand that he warns Nasser lest he increases the difficulties and that he should not press for an Egyptian civilian administration. In that spirit the US Ambassador in Cairo was instructed to speak to Nasser. Herter

proposed that Britain and France exert pressure on Hammerskjold.

We also heard that at the State Department meetings with Alphand and the British Ambassador, the question of the cessation of clearing activities on the Canal was raised. (Shiloach proposed to Alphand that he suggest such a step), and it appeared that the British considered that this would not restrain Nasser.

It appears that the US appeals to the Sec.Gen. by Lodge and to Nasser by Hare, were extremely sharp. It appears that they warned Nasser that Egypt's return to the Gaza Strip would arouse serious doubts among the members of the UN on the continuation of aid to the refugees through UNRWA.

It was reasonable to assume that this threat was not an empty one. The US Government itself was trying, and the Congress criticism on foreign aid was pressing it even more, to free itself of the tradition of interminable and purposeless assistance to the Arab refugees. The US therefore has a positive interest in ensuring that convenient conditions should exist for the swift and efficient solution of the problem of the refugees and hence had an additional reason to object to the return of Egypt to Gaza together with everything involved therein.

DISCUSSIONS WITH BUNCH AND HAMMERSKJOLD

In his speech in the Knesset the P.M. criticised Bunche's announcement. He said that Egypt no longer had a voice in Gaza's affairs, and pointed out that "Bunche's superiors sometimes evince more concern for the status of the Egyptian dictator than for the maintenance of the international undertakings of Egypt". The P.M. warned that if Israel will be forced to take steps against Egypt, it she will obviously not announce this in advance.

On 14/3 I phoned from Washington to Hammerskjold about the information on the Bunche-Nasser talks, and mainly about the rumours

concerning the arrival of an Egyptian governor and his entourage. I stated that I had been informed that morning that the State of Israel would not accept the establishment of an Egyptian civilian regime in Gaza. I asked whether Bunche was authorised to impose the UN stand. The Sec Gen replied that he was trying with all the power at his disposal to ensure that no fact should be created until he reached the area. Bunche's function is to clarify and to discuss but not to commit. He claimed that he was in a peculiar situation and in confusion - the Assembly did not empower him to oppose Egypt's entry, and on the other hand the Americans and French were talking to him about the "assumptions" of the Washington talks.

Under these conditions he had no alternative but to ask Egypt not to create facts until he reached the area and investigated.

He expressed concern for my announcement that "we would not accept". I said that the discussion time had ended and that I must convey facts and results, which also have bearing on the balance of international life. He thanked me for my candidness and said that he was acting in an effort to prevent the creation of any explosive facts.

The next day I met Hammerskjold face to face in New York. I informed him of the Foreign Minister's arrival on Sunday. He replied that if that was the case he would postpone his trip to Cairo. He made the personal observation that the Foreign Minister's visit appeared to him to be a correct step. At a later stage he hinted that he would be interested in meeting the Foreign Minister before his departure in order to ensure that his talks in Cairo would be conducted against a background of maximum clarity of the American and Israel stands.

I reviewed the history of the Washington negotiations, stressing that both the initiative and the original formulation were

French-American and that the Foreign Minister's announcement in the Assembly on March 1 was formulated in collaboration with the Americans. The assumption during the course of all the negotiations was that the exclusive administration in the Gaza Strip would be that of the UN. This assumption was confirmed as reasonable by the Americans and others and served as the basis for our withdrawal. The Egyptian step negates this assumption and is causing a most serious and tense situation. The Government of Israel was once more being faced by fateful decisions.

The Sec Gen reviewed the history of the negotiations on his part, and said that his first official contact with the matter was on February 28, when Pinay showed him the text of the French-American proposal. The Sec Gen maintained that he made a number of technical comments but did not go into the ~~matters~~ issues. That evening he heard from Alphand that the intention was that not a single Egyptian should return to the Strip, and commented that this was not reasonable as no-one had the legal jurisdiction to prevent Egypt from entering an area in which ~~she~~ it had rights. He stressed that he had no share in Lodge's speech, although he had to admit that a number of Lodge's statements, and especially the full quotation from his report of 22/2, calmed him. The clear announcements of the Foreign Minister proved that, on the basic legal question of the American plan, Israel's stand was completely opposed to that of the majority of the other delegations. This fact had caused him concern, and since then he was making efforts to ensure that matters in Gaza be conducted on a factual basis, without the legal background being raised. This was not an easy task for the UN. According to him, he had explained the matter to Fawzy, who had recognised the difficulties. He had told Fawzy that he hoped that there would be no complications in the first period, during which, according to the existing agreement, the exclusive

responsibility for administration was handed to the UN. Fawzy had answered positively without contacting Cairo.

The Sec Gen pointed out that with a little luck the first period would be extended, and then, in a more quiet atmosphere, there would be an opportunity to find a compromise between the legal rights of Egypt and the factual position as demanded by Israel. However, all sorts of little problems arose (such as the problem of currency, marketing of citrus, etc.) which made the orderly transfer of authority more difficult. Eventually there was the demonstration of police force of the UN force on Sunday. All these, in the pathologically suspicious atmosphere of Cairo, added up, and brought about the Egyptian step on Monday, i.e. the appointment of the Governor. According to him he had voiced some hard ~~sentiments~~ feelings to Fawzy, and since then the Egyptian behavior was more or less satisfactory. On Tuesday (12.3) they announced that the inhabitants of the Strip would cooperate with the UN force, on Thursday (14.3) when Bunche apppealed to Nasser about the information on the entry of the Governor and his entourage that was about to take place, the promise was given that no matters of principle would be decided until the arrival of the Sec Gen. The Sec Gen stated that he did not know how far the Egyptians would go, he was convinced that they did not intend to ~~enter~~ introduce military units. They ~~are~~ stressing their desire to avoid incursions and infiltration on both sides of the border, but there was no sign that they would like to be rid of the UN ~~army~~ force.

I asked whether the formal position was that we were still at the first stage, when the exclusive responsibility rested upon the UN. The Sec Gen answered that it was the second part of the first stage, and the UN was still responsible for everything. The Egyptian Governor had merely paid a courtesy call and did not attempt to expedite the establishment of his own administration.

I summarised by pointing out that a certain State had attained

our agreement to withdraw on the basis of the assumption of the de facto rule of the UN after the withdrawal. As this assumption had been completely undermined, a serious crisis had occurred. I pointed out that I had not come to negotiate with him but to inform him of the great seriousness with which we see the situation. Our main issue at this moment is with those governments, and especially the US according to whose evaluations we decided upon the withdrawal, but also the Sec. Gen., for the simple reason of maintenance of the peace, must take into account our opposition to Egyptian rule in Gaza. Hammerskjold replied that he had asked the US for an absolute clarification of its stand, as he must know this. The Egyptian stand was known to him: He had reported it in his report of 22.2: There were the two last declarations of Fawzi in the Assembly, and there was the Egyptian declaration on cooperation with the UN force.

I expressed doubt whether one could even consider that the UN and Egypt would stay in Gaza together, while the UN regards Israel as a sovereign state, and Egypt looks upon it as an enemy with which it is in a state of war. The Sec. Gen. answered that in the event of Egptian hostile acts the UN force would have to act. I stated that we were faced by the conclusion that Egypt would organise the population of Gaza against us behind the UN's back; the infiltration will be renewed and the UN will immunize the organisers from any fear of retaliation. Hammerskjold replied that the function of the UN force was to prevent conflagrations, and he believed that this was also Egypt's desire. As to belligerence it was clear that the UN must aim at the mutual implementation of paragraph 1 of the armistice agreement, just as it acted in the past in relation to paragraph 2. From here he passed on to the old idea of the deployment of the UN forces on both sides of the border, pointing out that this question still stood both from the

formal as well as from the practical point of view. The time had not yet arrived to raise the matter formally, but we would have to deal with the matter sometime because the chance of keeping the UN force in Egypt for a prolonged period would depend upon that.

I told Wilcox of my talk with the Sec. Gen. He said that the US was making stringent efforts in Cairo, with the Sec. Gen and with the Advisory Committee, and still hopes that the Egyptian plan will not be implemented, and will remain a propaganda gesture. The US Government is concerned by Bunch's announcement and is attempting to get a retraction, because it is important that the UN should not appear as confirming an Egyptian action in Gaza.

It was stressed that the Governments of the US, France and Britain are acting in the manner agreed upon at the Washington talks.

Later he phoned to say that an official, public denial by Bunch had been ~~attained~~ obtained.

There was a positive manifestation from the point of view of the Advisory Committee.

On 14.3 a cable sent by the Colombian delegate to the UN was published in the "New York Times". He was a member of the Advisory Committee and the cable was addressed to the Egyptian Foreign Minister. In the cable the sender assumes that Israel and Egypt are interested in the opinions of the members of the Advisory Committee and therefore he feels it correct to reveal these opinions.

According to him the members of the Advisory Committee recognise Egypt's right to the regime in Gaza according to the armistice agreement, but they consider that the time has not arrived to renew Egypt's responsibility for the area. The UN requires a reasonable period of time to arrange the first stage in the organisation of the administration in Gaza.

In ending he expressed the hope that Egypt will not hastily

create a situation that the UN force is not able to deal with, and will make an urgent discussion in the Security Council or the Assembly necessary.

EISENHOWER'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16.3

On 16.3 Eisenhower replied to the P.M.'s letter of 13.3. (See p. 175a)

The new situation aroused tremendous interest in public opinion. The general trend of opinion was very positive in relation to us, and it stood out in the comments, television, radio and caricatures. While the majority wondered exactly what the US had promised Israel, and some were confused as to what the US could do in this situation, all severely attacked Egypt, urging that the US and especially the UN puts pressure on Egypt. Many proposed clear steps against Egypt, and in a few cases even sanctions were suggested.

A certain amount of criticism was levelled at the Secretary of State, especially in relation to his optimism as to Nasser's not turning the tables. Severe criticism was levelled at the policy or lack of policy of the US, and the new situation was described as a test of the status of Dulles and Eisenhower.

Although they attacked Nasser, there was a tendency on the party of a considerable number of editors to wait and see whether Nasser would really apply his threat. Although there was the fear of a large conflagration as the result of a new clash between Egypt and Israel, it was felt from their words that if the US and the UN could not prevent hostile acts of Egypt, Israel would have the right to use force in self-defence.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER COMES TO THE US - MEETS WITH DULLES

In the light of the political developments in Gaza it was decided that the Foreign Minister should leave for the US. The object of the journey was to determine what would the US policy be in the light of developments in Gaza, to confront the US with her

Eisenhower's Reply To The Prime Minister's

Message On 16.3

"I have received your message of March 13 delivered through Ambassador Eban. I want you to know that we are following recent developments affecting Gaza with concern and are working hard to the end that the objectives of peace and tranquility in the area will be achieved.

"The United States has made clear its hopes with respect to the situation which should prevail following the Israeli withdrawal. We shall continue to strive to see to it that these hopes materialize. It is, of course, obvious that this will involve many difficulties and will raise questions which the United States alone cannot decide. The problems with which we are confronted have been for a long time in the making, and patience and forbearance are required in our task of seeking a solution to them. I am sure you will agree that it is of the utmost importance that the greatest restraint be exercised by all concerned and that there be avoided any precipitate action which might result in a deterioration of the situation and a risk of undoing all that has been accomplishted.

"My personal interest in the establishment of stability and tranquility in the area continues deep. I look forward to continuing close consulation with your Government on the problems involved."

moral responsibility for ~~the~~ Nasser's incitement, and to prepare her and public opinion for the possibility that we would find it necessary to implement the right of self-defence. The very fact that the Foreign Minister had found it necessary to return to the US a few days after her departure, gave her arrival a dramatic turn. She appeared as the representative of a nation which was deeply hurt and disturbed.

The meeting with Dulles took place on 18.3. and lasted for two hours. Present were Herter, Pelgar, Wilcox, Rowntree, Burgoss, Shiloach and Raphael. The Foreign Minister opened with a comparison between the agreed assumptions that she had taken with her when she had left the US and the situation created in recent days. She described the great disturbance in Israel when, a few days after the end of the Assembly, all the assumptions had been confounded. We informed the State Department in good time of the intention to send an Egyptian governor to Gaza with the agreement of the Sec.Gen. and his ~~messenger~~ envoy. We hoped that the US Government would forestall the evil step but unfortunately ~~it~~ she did not act. There is no longer any doubt that the Egyptians have returned to Gaza and that the UN force in effect is serving the function of an observor to Egypt's taking over ~~the~~ rule in the area. This process is accompanied by official declarations on the part of Nasser regarding the destruction of Israel and the renewal of belligerency and the blockade. King Saud had also joined the ~~string~~ chorus of declarations on the renewal of the blockade. The people of Israel is confused

and does not understand its Government. The question asked by the man in the street of his Government is: why did you do this? Upon what assumptions did you base your decisions? What did you agree upon?

The Government of Israel did not rely upon the promises of UN officials, she relied upon the President and Secretary of State. It is true that we knew that the US does not rule the UN but we knew that their influence was great. Was this influence applied? Upon what authority did the UN Secretariat decide that Gaza is being returned? Israel does not intend to act hastily but the Government has already decided to discuss this serious question. No decisions shall be taken until the Foreign Minister completes her discussions with the US Government. But the people is waiting and the whole world would like to know who imposed Nasser upon eighty-one members of the UN? The people awaits whether the assumptions according to which the Assembly concluded will be realised, or whether Israel will once again find herself faced by Egyptian belligerency.

Dulles agreed that events were developing not as anticipated. He did not share our hopes fully. In talks with us the US Government had openly announced that she recognises the legal status of Egypt in Gaza according to the Armistice Agreement, and accordingly also her rights to symbolically renew her rule. On the other hand, the US hoped that Egypt would accept the UN regime in practice. She did not conduct direct negotiations with Nasser as she considered that it would neither be correct or efficient to conduct negotiations with him not through the UN. She relied upon the promises that Hammerskjold had received.

The Foreign Minister answered that she saw no value in a talk with Hammeskjold and described his behaviour as Nasser's spokesman. She pointed out how he had sheltered Nasser all the time. She described the episode of Hammerskjold's journey and his talks with the P.M. She mentioned his refusal to pass on to Nasser the question which we had put to him whether he was prepared to discard hostility towards Israel. From here she passed to an analysis of the declaration at the UN, explained the process of the composition of the announcement and how every word in the announcement was discussed fundamentally with the US and French Governments. She told how on her way to the US she had seen Guy Mollet and received complete confirmation from him that our declaration and its intentions were clear and agreed upon by the three governments. It is true that there were differences of opinion in relation to the legal status of the Strip but we agreed to stop this discussion and to accept in effect Dulles' version of the practical exclusion of Egypt. However, what had happened was the complete opposite of what was agreed.

Here I commented that it is essential to clarify once more what were the assumptions agreed upon between us and the US in relation to the Strip. In order to prevent misunderstanding,

I wished to repeat to the Secretary the formulation that I had adopted in reporting to my Government on the US stand on the question of the Strip. I requested that the Secretary confirm or correct the formula if I quoted him incorrectly. I read how we had defined the US stand: (See page 279a)

The Foreign Minister's reliance upon the confirmation that she had received from Mollet and the quotation that I had read cut-off Dulles' lines of retreat. He admitted that what I had read constituted "a correct and proper definition" of the US outlook and went on to say that it was still too early to conclude that our hopes have not been realised. He hoped that Hammerskjold with the aid of a direct American action would still change the situation, urged that we do not reach a premature conclusion and stressed that no matter what the conclusions which we would be forced to reach, the fact that we respond to the UN decisions would strengthen our stand. He is convinced that our decision was correct and that Israel would enjoy an international and legal status which is much stronger than that which she enjoyed in the past.

Dulles again stated that we must not assume that matters had developed badly. From his great international experience he knows that difficult problems are solved by perseverance and patience. He understands the difficulties faced by the Government of Israel but he must stress that we are but at the beginnings of a new stage in the Middle East while the US and the world "are just beginning to deal with Egypt".

The US Government has not yet found the correct way to apply its full influence on Egypt but is not dealing with the matter lightly. It does not see herself as the intermediary between two sides in a bargain but as fighting for principles.

"Gaza would be under the de facto control of U.N., not Egypt, both with respect to security and with respect to civil administration.

Preferably the Egyptian exclusion should be total. At most, you indicated that there might have to be some token expression of Egypt's legal position - but you protrayed this possibility in the most nominal and innocuous terms - such as occasional visits or something of the sort."

The status of the US Government in the world forces her to stand up for principles. Until now, she had pressed for response to the first principle in the Charter, that is, the solution of quarrels by peaceful means, and now she is devoting herself to ensure justice and safeguarding international law. Egypt had violated this law for years both in the Straits and in the Canal and the US Government will concentrate all the weight at her disposal and the weight of world opinion through the UN against the violation of the law by Egypt. Here Dulles pointed out that he could not speak convincingly about Gaza, in relation to border incidents in the past because it was not always clear who started. The Foreign Minister reacted sharply and described the continuous belligerence after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. She stated that there was not a single incident when we had acted before we had been preceded by Egyptian and Arab hostile acts. She does not know a nation who will not reply to belligerence and in the future too we will not give up our right to live and to defend ourselves and to react to belligerence. She does not ignore the value of the UN but she does not recognise the authority of the moral judgement of someone who is against us when we are fighting for our elementary right to live in security.

At this stage, ~~at our initiative,~~ we raised the question of the deployment of UN forces on two sides of the Armistice lines and the propaganda that was being conducted in the American press, with the permission of unknown officials of the State Department, as if Israel's refusal to agree to the deployment of UN forces on the Israel side of the border was holding up the solution. ~~and the redemption.~~ We also commented on the Secretary's words at the press conference in Australia. We stressed the

impropriety of the fact that the State Department had not raised or clarified the matter with us.

The Secretary justified himself. He maintained that he had not raised the matter at his initiative at the press conference but had merely answered a question and stated that the plan could not be implemented because of Israel's opposition. As to the press propaganda he did not know who was responsible for it. As to the matter itself, he agreed that the question is not central at this time but he would like to know the reason for our opposition. He again stressed that his question should not be interpreted as pressure but as a desire to understand something that public opinion was having difficulty in understanding.

The Foreign Minister explained our opposition from three points of view:

a. In principle we could not agree to the demand to place observers or forces at Nitzana when the Armistice Agreement was violated by Egypt and had ~~[illegible]~~ become a dead letter. We would not agree to Hammerskjold's approach relating to Egypt's right to choose the paragraphs of the Agreement convenient to her.

b. From the practical point of view, the responsibility and efficiency ~~for~~ guarding the border ~~is~~ are dependent upon the desire of the governments affected.

c. Israel, because of her small area and her settlements close to the border, could not agree to be surrounded by a foreign army.

Dulles again pointed out that he ~~is~~ was not raising the question for discussion.

Dulles returned to the situation in the Strip. The US recognises that the situation has been undermined and is examining methods of applying direct pressure. The US cannot ignore the UN and replace the UN and the Sec.Gen., and she is

examining what is the most effective method of applying suitable pressure on Egypt. The UN can serve as a suitable channel for pressure and one should not belittle it.

The Foreign Minister explained that, particularly as a small people and having a tradition such as we have, we value the UN and are sensitive to moral values, but under no circumstances will we be able to forfeit the right and the basic moral value of existence. When the Government decided to respond to the urging of the US Government and her President, she did not imagine the Gaza which was unfolding today. We decided on the basis of an agreed assumption of the practical exclusion of Egypt from Gaza. Despite our sensitivity to world public opinion and our friendship with the US, we would not have given in to sanctions or any pressure in the world. We agreed only because we relied upon the moral undertaking of the US - it may be that we erred.

Dulles replied that he did not think that the game was over and that one cannot prevent a decline. At the moment hostility had not been renewed and shipping had not been disturbed and he hoped that we would still be able to save the situation.

The Foreign Minister replied by describing the incitement, the pressure and the belligerence of Egypt. She pointed out the fact of the Danish ship whose commander was afraid to sail for Eilat and returned to Hammerskjold's answer to the question of the Danish Government on the security of shipping in the Straits. Afterwards she returned to Dulles' claim on the need to act through the UN and said: "You found a way to speak to us not through the medium of the UN, you spoke in letters that were published, in television, etc., We are not angry that you said things which did not appeal to us. You have the right to express your opinion; but it is difficult for us to understand why you are dealing with Nasser with kid gloves. Why do you not

tell him publicly that you cannot accept a demand for an Armistice and belligerence? Your silence encourages Nasser, he is returning to Sinai with the assistance of the Soviets. The incursions from El Arish and the Strip have been renewed. We will not agree and we will not accept an Egyptian Gaza".

Dulles answered that he did not quarrel with our opinion that the situation in Gaza is different to what we expected. He admits that the assumption was that Gaza would in effect be under UN rule. He agrees that the development is serious and that if the process is not altered, the situation may become dangerous. The US Government is adamant in her opinion that every effort must be made to prevent a crisis. He cannot guarantee that the US will succeed but he believes that if matters reach a crisis and if Israel will need to reach conclusions she will realise that ultimately she will not lose because of her response to those who urged her. The US is not yet prepared to recognise that the effort failed. In his opinion there is still hope to correct the situation. He was a partner to the assumption according to which we evacuated the Strip but he did not delude himself that the hopes would realise themselves. He always feared and was prepared for a certain period of pressure and effort.

Finally, he suggested that we decide what to say to the Press on the discussion. The Foreign Minister replied that the question worrying her, before she deals with the Press, is what she must say to her Government and her people. Again a discussion raged on the calamitous line of the Sec.Gen., on the UN force which serves as a cover for Nasser's fortifying himself in Gaza, and on the serious alternatives facing the Government of Israel.

Dulles again summarised that the US Government ~~xxxxx~~ upholds the agreed assumptions, is not convinced that the ~~gain~~ game is lost, and will exert the fullest pressure upon Nasser. ~~She~~ It understands that Israel is likely to reach conclusions that the time has come to implement ~~her~~ the right of self-defence. But he still urges Israel not to act hurriedly but to listen to the US and know that the US does not intend to cast a veto; - Israel will find her showing understanding for ~~her~~ its stand. We drew the attention of the Secretary to the last paragraph in the President's last letter to the P.M., where he invites us to consultations on the matters being discussed and ~~the~~ we proposed ~~that~~, in view of the fact that the agreed assumptions were exposed to danger, that ~~it~~ they take place, before the Bermuda Conference and before the Secretary ~~xxx~~ left ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ in order to clarify practical suggestions with the State Department. The Secretary agreed and it was decided that an additional meeting between the Embassy and the State Department ~~would~~ should take place.

A discussion began on what ~~would~~ should be said to the Press and, after consultation, it was agreed that a ~~common announcement~~ joint communiqué be issued, that would say: (see page 284a)

The announcement confirmed, therefore, ~~a~~ common policy of Israel and the US in relation to the problems of Gaza, the Bay and Suez. More detailed things were said than in the previous

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir discussed with Secretary Dulles today various aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, particularly developments in the Gaza Strip following Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations resolution.

Mrs. Meir expressed her deep concern at the return of Egypt to Gaza, the re-establishment of its control therein and the reduction of the responsibilities of the United Nations in the Gaza area. The Foreign Minister of Israel pointed out the gravity with which Israel viewed this situation and emphasized that it was contrary to the assumption and expectations expressed by her and others in the United Nations on March 1 and subsequently. She also expressed her anxiety at reports and statements envisaging restrictions against Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba, and the maintenance of belligerency by Egypt.

Secretary Dulles reaffirmed that the US policy with respect to these matters continued to be as publicly expressed, notably in the speech of Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations General Assembly on March 1 and in the President's letter of March 2 to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. The Secretary said that the United States was concerned with current developments and was in close touch with UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld and other members of the UN. He said that the United States would continue to use its influence in seeking the objectives of peace and tranquillity and the avoidance of any situation which would negate the great efforts which had been made by the world community to settle the current disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The United States, the Secretary said, stood firmly by the hopes and expectations it had expressed with regard to the situation which should prevail in the area with respect to the exercise of the responsibility of the United Nations in Gaza, the free and innocent passage of the Straits of Tiran by the ships of all nations in accordance with international law, and the settlement of the Suez Canal problem in accordance with the Six Principles adopted by the Security Council and accepted by Egypt. A common readiness was expressed for continued consultation of these matters.

American announcements on the responsibility of the UN in Gaza. It also expressed publicly for the first time the US's concern since the withdrawal and it is well that this concern was expressed together with Israel.

All this did not yet assure that the methods of implementation would be ~~efficient~~ effective and immediate. But any assumption that the American promises themselves before the withdrawal were either in doubt or ~~unclear~~ vague was negated.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TALK TO HAMMERSKJOLD 19.3.

The next day the Foreign Minister met Hammerskjold. The Sec. Gen. claimed that the UN force did not have the authority to prevent the entry of the Egyptian governor and his entourage and that the increasing of the UN forces' authorities and the limiting of Egyptian authority required an Assembly decision. He admitted that the appointment of an Egyptian governor, only three days after the UN took received the Strip into its hands, was a hasty act that had caused him disappointment. He could not explain why the information on the giving of permission to the Egyptian governor to enter had not been brought to the knowledge of the members of UN, including Israel. At the same time he maintained that there was no further retraction from maintaining the objective of preventing fedayeen incursions and that it was not clear from the Foreign Minister's announcement on March 1 that we opposed in any way or form Egypt's entry to the Strip.

In a bitter and protracted discussion with the Foreign Minister,

claimed that the UN forces did not have the authority to prevent

The next day the Foreign Ministers met Hammarskjold. At the

Hammerskjold, ~~bycxxa~~ with various excuses, avoided undertaking to put the questions regarding belligerence to Nasser. When his excuses were exhausted, he agreed to do so at his next visit to Cairo, as a matter of principle of the first order. He said that in his talks he intended to arrange for such arrangements and powers in the Gaza Strip ~~that~~ as would ~~facilitate~~ enable the UN force ~~to~~ fulfil~~ling~~ its function on the border.

The Foreign Minister made it clear that Israel would not agree to the deployment of a UN force within her its borders. The Sec.Gen. maintained that he was not raising the question now but he would have to note our stand on some occasion. He pointed out that if Egypt demanded the removal of UN forces from Sharem el Sheich the matter would be brought before the Advisory Committee for a decision.

On the morrow, 19.3., the Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Sec.Gen. when she again demanded that he ~~place~~ put the question on refraining from belligerence on land, sea and air to Egypt, and announced that he ~~is~~ was authorised to inform the Government of Egypt that Israel ~~is~~ was prepared to come to a mutual undertaking with Egypt on non-agression.

MEETINGS WITH CLAY, McCLOY AND DEAN.

Before she left for Israel, the Foreign Minister talked to General Clay and I talked to McCloy, who was the Sec.Gen.'s advisor on financing the clearing of the Suez Canal and in effect mobilised the necessary funds, and the two of us together with Shiloach talked to A. Dean.

The three of them stressed that despite the complications Israel enjoys a ~~fortified~~ stronger status as ~~she~~ it implemented the withdrawal and thereby removed the anger ~~with her~~ and gained the US's under-

taking to bear responsibility. If Israel is forced to defend herself she is assured of a very different reaction to that which she could expect previously. The other alternative, i.e. an attempt on Israel's part to remain in Gaza and the Straits despite the world, would have ended in tragedy.

Clay explained that the US Government had set the following scale of preferences from the point of view of assuring Israel's interests:

1. Assuring free Israel passage in the Bay of Eilat as there was a supreme interest for which Israel was prepared to sacrifice herself in defending.

2. Preventing attacks and infiltrations from Gaza by the efficient implementation of the UN's influence.

3. Passage in Suez, although this is no small matter, it is not merely Israel's question, as a general crisis on the matter of Suez was anticipated in the course of time.

## THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TALK WITH TO LODGE

Lodge also visited the Foreign Minister before she left.

He repeated a number of the things that Dulles had said in order to calm us.

In his opinion matters had changed at the UN, and Israel had the upper hand in world opinion. Any hostile Egyptian act on land or on sea would encounter a strong reaction on the part of the US and the UN Assembly, which would not have been the case a few weeks

## THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TALK TO LODGE

before. In Lodge's opinion it was not impossible to mobilise two-thirds in the Assembly, for example, against the stopping of a boat in the Canal or an extreme act of Egypt's in Gaza. Even were a majority ~~which did not reach~~ of less than two-thirds to be attained, the political status of Israel would be strengthened and if ~~she~~ it needed to act by ~~herself~~ itself ~~she~~ it would be better understood. Therefore he advises that if something happens we should not hesitate in appealing to the Assembly. It was clear to him that if the Egyptians fired at our ships in the Bay we could react with force. But if the Egyptians wished to block the passage for our ships in the Canal they would not need to do so by the use of armed force and therefore it was desirable that Israel's reaction in the first stage should be political and not military - putting Egypt on trial at the Assembly.

Lodge promised ~~to~~ to keep watch ~~on~~ on the question of maintaining the UN ~~army~~ force in Sharm el Sheikh. And here he put a question: Israel is interested in maintaining the UN ~~army~~ force in the Straits and Sinai and in Gaza. On the other hand, the chances of maintaining such an arrangement for any length of time is not great if the UN force encamps only in one country. It was therefore necessary for a symbolic arrangement to be made for the placing of a number of UN observers of the UN ~~army~~ force on the Israel side too even from the psychological point of view. If Israel face the alternative of the removal of the UN ~~army~~ force under Egyptian pressure and its remaining by virtue of observors, moving to the Israel side, in certain defined and agreed places, why should Israel not prefer the second alternative?

The Foreign Minister explained our stand fully. Lodge stressed that he was not raising the problem officially but public opinion does not understand Israel's approach in this

matter.

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The Foreign Minister's visit brought about an elucidation of the background of relationships upon which the contact between us and the US Government was to develop in the coming months - cooperation in the solution of the immediate problems not only of Gaza and the shipping in the Bay, but also the question of economic aid in various forms which had worsened with the increase of immigration and the striving towards basic and far-reaching ~~xx~~ solutions ~~x~~ to our security problems and our relationships with the Arab States.

Our attention was turned during those days to Bermuda, to the Conference of the US President and Britain's Prime Minister which was due also to deal with the basic problems of the Middle East.

But in the meantime on 21.3. the ~~office~~ Ministry informed me that an American tanker bearing oil for Israel was on the way to Eilat and that in due course I would have to inform the State Department.

A NUMBER OF MARGINAL CONCLUSIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN.

Within four days from the beginning of the incursion into Sinai~~x~~, Israel plunged from the summit of military success and became immersed in ~~her~~ its greatest political crisis. This is no wonder. Under the conditions in which our generation lives there is no assurance that military victory will provide the victorious state with advantages in the long run; and it is ~~not inevitable that~~ possible for the most wonderful military campaign ~~will~~ to bring about dangerous trials, especially if, parallel to the success, the political and military collapse of one's allies takes place.

This was Israel's position in the first week of November: Never had Israel's rule encompassed such wide areas - from the vicinity of the Nile and the Straits of Tiran, from the Red Sea to the Jordan; and never was the State in such danger as in those days: ~~a raid~~ arrayed against the Arab world; under the threat of attack by the USSR and ~~engrossed~~ immersed in the most penetrating quarrel with the US since her establishment; the target for the arrows of criticism and the anger of the UN Assembly - Israel's stand was solitary, abandoned and ~~without solution~~ beset on all sides. We had made great inroads into the enemy's area but in this very process we had reached beyond the circle of international relationships which determined the fate and security of every state, large and small.

For four months we struggled with the political ~~xxxxx~~ results of our military campaign, and the objective was not only to safeguard the achievements and advantages, but also to prevent serious ~~rampage~~ onslaught, which, had it not been repelled, would have threatened us with the weakening of the structure of the State from the foundations to the very ~~xx~~ pinnacle. In drawing up an account of the struggle one must include the dangers that were avoided, and not only the advantages attained.

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c. <u>The Function of the USSR:</u>

The USSR's involvement in the Hungarian Campaign did not ~~prevent her from~~ deny it the possibility of casting ~~her~~ its full political weight ~~on~~ into the ~~balance~~ scales against us when ~~she~~ it saw fit.

d. <u>Nasser and the West</u>:

The tension that reigned between Nasser and the Western world, including the US, did not deny him the support of his opponents when he could appear as the object of a considered military attack.

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c. The Evacuation of the USSR:

It is no wonder ~~therefore~~ that from the operational point of view the fate of the military campaign was easier than that of the political struggle. The military campaign ~~encountered~~ a crumbling Arab front. When Zahal attacked Egypt, the other Arab states stood on the sidelines. No state came to the assistance of the Egyptian army squirming in ~~its~~ defeat, ~~and particularly~~ while we enjoyed great military aid, especially in the ~~air~~ air, on the part of ~~alien~~ foreign elements. On the other hand, ~~in~~ on the political front we encountered a united Arab front, stormy and belligerent, enjoying the assistance of ~~tens~~ scores of states, Asiat~~ic~~n, African, Soviet and American - and in effect of all the members of the UN. The solitude that was Egypt's lot in the military front was ours with all its severity in the political battle. In Sinai we were opposed only by Egypt and ~~she~~ by Egypt alone, and we were supported on both sides. But in the UN and in the world capitals we had much more powerful opponents than Egypt, who were more likely to determine ~~the~~ it policy than Egypt was able to decide on the battlefront.

One must not belittle the force of the dangers that appeared on the horizon in the course of the battle and which sometimes loomed from close. The danger of military intervention of a tremendous power ~~who~~ which sought the favour of the Arab world; the danger of a prolonged paralysis of the processes of building and creativity in the State as a result of the quarrel with the US and UN; the danger of a spiritual breach between us and the Jews of the world (because in the early days surprising days, Jews looked at us with amazement and lack of understanding

until the Assembly discussions gave us the opportunity to plead our cause in public and enlighten public opinion); the danger lest the crisis between the ~~pxx~~ powers intensify, as it were, — because of us, to the great concern and criticism of ~~x~~ proponents of peace in the world; the danger that at the end of February we overstepped the ~~mark~~ bounds of public sympathy because of postponing the possibilities proposed to us for an honorable settlement; the danger of the fighting being renewed, with us sitting in Egypt, devoid of any legal and political status that would justify our defending ourselves; and with the danger of Soviet intervention on Egypt's side - these dangers were not the fruits of a terrified imagination or the predictions of prophets of gloom; ~~but~~ they were cruel reality and we walked on ground strewn with mines on every side.

The Bay of Eilat and Straits of Tiran

Here two changes took place - one political and one practical. Our stand in Sharem el Sheikh forced the Powers to define their stand in relation to the legal character of these waters. The American memorandum of February 11, followed by the declarations of other Powers, converted the Bay from a private Arab lake into an international waterway in world consciousness and by legal force of the maritime Powers. Overnight, a positive stand in international law was created for us, that we had not hoped for before the Sinai ~~Campaign~~ Campaign.

In addition to this, steps were taken - the main one being the deploying of a UN force in the Straits - that ensured that on the morrow of the withdrawal the Bay would remain open, and a continuous custom of international passage to and from the Bay of Eilat ~~would~~ come into effect. Also our right to defend Israel shipping achieved recognition - and did not ~~bring~~ encounter the opposition of the Western Powers. This achievement is subject to ~~the~~ continuous safeguarding against its being ~~from its~~ undermined,

but one cannot ~~maintain~~ deny that the military and political Sinai campaign fundamentally changed the horizons.

Gaza.

It is too early to conclude to what extent relative quiet on the Gaza border is assured, although the first ~~xxxx~~ months were quite encouraging. The main change here is that the responsibility for preventing attacks upon us is not necessarily placed upon the ~~xxxxx~~ State which maintains a state of war against us, but upon an international body which must give an account to us and to to world opinion.

Change in the Balance of Powers in the Arab World.

One can assume that it will not be easy for Nasser to threaten the area by virtue of the ~~fable~~ myth of his military superiority. His military defeat opens a new chapter in the area from the point of view of the relative balance of military powers, and his ~~xxx~~ main aim at the moment is to avoid any confrontation on the battlefield. Two certain results flow from Nasser's military defeat: the weakening of Soviet influence at the expense of the West, and the emancipation of Arab States from their dependance on Nasser. These tendencies have already found expression and manifestation in the revolt of Jordan, in the cancellation of the treaty ~~g~~ between Saud and Nasser, in the strengthening of the anti-Egyptian tendencies in Lebanon and perhaps even in Syria; and in the ~~flowing~~ movement of many Arab States towards the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Even in the existing situation we are faced by many dangers; but it is instructive to compare it with the terrifying vision which faced us a few months ago, when the Nasserite tempest was about to overcome the area and impose the USSR within it, with the latter leaning mainly upon ~~xxx~~ a definite cooperation with the Arabs against Israel.

Israel's Status Among the Nations.

From the danger of complete isolation, first in November and subsequently at the end of February, Israel entered an inconceivable expanse in her international relationships. The friendship of France remained strong, that of Western Europe became firmer, and the US had never shown such concern and energy in ensuring rapprochement and understanding between her outlook and that of Israel. Over and above this development in our relationships with the Governments of the world, there is the wonderful movement of public opinion, in most countries, and its sharp sensitivity to the security problem in the area. Were it not for the military campaign and our firm stand in its wake, it is doubtful whether the world would have found the time to listen to our claim as it was forced to do for lack of an alternative.

The esteem for the courage of Zahal and its ability in implementation existed even in circles which did not support the Campaign itself. It is doubtful whether we brought peace with our neighbours any nearer - and if there is anyone who originally thought that we would bring peace closer by war, he was mistaken - but a certain respect has spread in the Arab world for our military might spread, and if this is not an efficient alternative for peace in the long run, it is some defence against serious incitement.

All the decisions and recommendations described in this review must stand the test of one question: "What was the alternative?" If these decisions had been not taken, would we not have faced more serious dangers? At no stage were we faced with the alternative of US and French suggestions on the one side, and an easier and more secure position of the other.

The Sinai Campaign was a stage in/and not the end of the State's progress towards the strengthening of its security and broadening of its possibilities of flourishing. As compared to the weakening of the enemy and the raising of the esteem and status of Israel among the nations, one must ~~set-up~~ balance the pain for the victims who fell and the heavy price paid in the State's economic assets. However, between the clouds, the horizons of relief and fortification are becoming apparent - without the Sinai Campaign these would have remained far from us.

Dangers await us and our battles are not ended. If from this long ~~composition~~ essay a number of landmarks ~~will be~~ are revealed for the continuation of our journey - this will be my reward.